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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Bundling under Competition: Duopoly and Oligopoly
by
Araz Khodabakhshian
Doctor of Philosophy in Management
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor Uday S. Karmarkar, Chair
In many markets, bundling, or the offering of two or more products in a package for a single
price is a common practice. While most markets are competitive, the majority of research work
around bundling has focused on monopolistic markets, which are more tractable for analysis. From
a monopolist’s perspective, bundling has many benefits such as economies of scope, price discrimi-
nation, and expansion of demand. However, competition adds an important dimension to bundling
decisions and their results. In this dissertation, the aim is to study the implications of competition
for firms’ product offering, pricing, and bundle design decisions.
In the first chapter, we study bundling in a duopoly under price competition and show that
bundling can serve as a product differentiation tool and moderate competition even when firms are
perfectly identical and offer undifferentiated products. In equilibrium, firms have an asymmetric
bundling strategy, i.e., if one firm bundles the other does not. The bundling decision depends on
the valuations of customer groups for the two products in the market. However, the firm offering
the bundle earns a higher profit. This suggests an inherent first-mover advantage to bundling.
There are two factors predicting the success of bundling in a price-competition setting. One is
being ahead of the competitor in offering the bundle, and the other is the degree of correlation or
its lack in customer valuations of bundle components.
In the next chapter, we utilize a quantity competition (Cournot) framework to study the im-
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plications of bundling with entry. This model enables the analysis to go beyond duopoly to an
oligopolistic market with fixed costs of entry, where firms enter as long as they can recover the
fixed cost. We investigate firms’ production quantity decisions and profits in equilibrium to deter-
mine the number of firms that enter each market. In a two-component setting, we consider examples
with two types of offers: a single product, and the product bundled with the other. Then we con-
sider the case of three markets consisting respectively of the first product, the second product, and
a matched-quantity bundle of both products. We find that there may not be a unique equilibrium
for the number of firms in each market. Moreover, we show that it is possible to construct settings
where the number of equilibria can be arbitrarily large. We identify two factors for the success of
bundles: one on the demand side and one on the supply side. On the demand side, customers buy
bundles as long as both components within the bundle add relatively comparable values to them.
On the supply side, firms enter the bundle market if the fixed-cost of entry for the bundle market
is lower than the sum of fixed-costs of entry for all components within the bundle by at least a
certain amount. We show that these results hold for a single customer group, as well as multiple
customer groups.
In the last chapter, we study bundle design, which does not seem to be addressed in the liter-
ature. We relax the quantity matching assumption common to most bundling research, and allow
the firm to choose the ratio of component quantities within the bundle, i.e. bundle proportion,
so as to maximize profits. We study four market settings: a monopolist with one type of bundle
and one customer group, a monopolist with one type of bundle and two customer groups, two
bundling firms with the same bundle design and with multiple customer groups, and two bundling
firms in competition with potentially different bundling proportions. We conclude that for a mo-
nopolist bundler the optimal bundle proportion depends on the satiation consumption levels of
the customer. When there is just one customer group in the market, the bundle proportion has
iii
a unique global maximum. However, with two customer groups the profit function can have two
local maxima and it is possible, though unlikely, to have two optimal bundle proportions. When
two bundlers offer potentially independent bundles, in equilibrium, the bundle proportion choices
converge. The bundling proportions ratio is a function of the aggregate satiation consumption
levels of all customers and is the same for simultaneous as well as sequential entry.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Firms with multiple products or services can engage in bundling, which is selling more
than one product or service as a combination for a single price (Guiltinan 1987, Adams
and Yellen 1976). Bundling is prevalent in many industry sectors, including tangible
goods (e.g., gift baskets, option bundles for cars, fast-food menu combos), services
(e.g., insurance, fast food, telecommunications, retail banking), and digital platforms
(e.g., Google, Amazon, Pandora). Bundling strategies range across a spectrum. At
one extreme in a “pure component” strategy, products are only offered separately and
customers can purchase any mix according to their preferences. At the other extreme of
the spectrum, in “pure bundling”, products are only offered in pre-defined combinations
or bundles. In between are cases that are referred to as “mixed bundling” and “partial
mixed bundling”, where one or more bundles are offered along with a subset of pure
components, hence giving customers more flexibility in their purchase decisions.
The reasons for bundling vary across markets. However, the most common ben-
efits of bundling are seen either on the supply side, on the demand side, or in com-
petition (Venkatesh and Mahajan 2009). On the supply side, bundling can lead to
economies of scope by lowering production costs, transaction costs, and administrative
costs (Venkatesh and Mahajan 2009). On the demand side, bundling can expand de-
mand by combining complementary products, e.g., a product and a service contract (see
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Eppen 1991), and can reduce customer valuation heterogeneities across different market
segments (Eppen 1991), enabling firms to extract more customer surplus (Raghunathan
and Sarkar 2016). Under competition, bundling serves as a product differentiation strat-
egy to moderate competition and avoid price wars or to increases customer switching
costs in recurring sales of services and goods (Eppen 1991).
Competition is an important factor in determining the success or failure of bundling
strategies. Competition might come from firms in the same category of bundled offering,
from their own offerings which may include single products as well as bundles, and from
other categories of firms offering other combinations of bundles and single products.
Under competition, bundling can serve as a product differentiation tool. For example,
in recent years, the music, TV, and telecom industries have constantly bundled, re-
bundled and unbundled their offerings: a practice that is often enabled by technological
advancements. Under competition, every new bundle combination serves as a new
offering that helps the firm to differentiate its set of offerings from those of competitors.
Although bundling is prevalent in many product and service sectors, the number of
research papers studying bundling under competition is limited.
In this thesis, the purpose is to study bundling under competition with a focus
on three decisions: Bundling strategy, Entry, and Bundle design. Bundling strategy
pertains to the optimal choice of bundle combination, e.g., pure bundle or mixed bundle,
given the competitive environment. Every bundling strategy creates a certain revenue
potential, affects competition intensity and in general requires a different fixed cost of
entry. Hence another important factor shaping a firm’s decision is whether to enter a
particular market or not. Finally, firms can optimize bundle design by adjusting the
proportions of the products within the bundle. In each chapter we address one of these
2
decisions using Bertrand or Cournot competition models.
In the second chapter, we investigate the following questions:
• What is the optimal bundling strategy for two identical firms who compete in
undifferentiated markets under price competition?
• Given their symmetry, will firms adopt symmetric bundling strategies?
• How do the results depend on whether firms practice pure or mixed bundling and
on whether customers have positively or negatively correlated valuations?
We consider a symmetric Bertrand duopoly where firms have the ability to offer
two undifferentiated components (or goods), separately or as a bundle. Given two
components A and B, a product consists of any combination of {A}, {B}, and the
bundle {A,B}. Firms first choose their offering as a set of products, and then choose
the price vector for their offering. Under pure bundling, each firm offers at most one
product (i.e., {A}, {B}, or {AB}). Whereas under mixed bundling, each firm may
offer any set of products; e.g., a firm could offer both {A} and {AB}, but not {B}.
On the demand side, we assume that there are two customer groups. Each customer
group has a strictly stronger preference for one of the components; these preferences
may be positively or negatively correlated across groups. For tractability, we focus on
the extreme cases of perfect positive or negative correlation. Customers purchase the
products that give them the highest surplus in terms of total value net of total price.
We conclude that even if the structure of demand (i.e., customers’ correlation in
valuations) suggests that a monopolistic firm should bundle, it may not be optimal for
the firm to do so if it faces a competitor offering a bundle. However, in equilibrium, the
firm that bundles in a competitive setting captures the largest profit from the market
which implies a first-mover advantage to bundling.
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In the third chapter we focus on quantity competition in a Cournot framework since
it permits the analysis of oligopolistic competition with multiple identical firms and
undifferentiated goods. It is also possible to study entry with fixed costs. By contrast
price competition (Bertrand) with undifferentiated products results in a collapse even
in the duopoly case, so that it is not possible to tackle entry with cost since the entry
costs cannot be recovered so that there is no incentive for even a second firm to enter. In
practice it is easy to find cases where multiple relatively undifferentiated firms survive
in the market, and are also able to recover the fixed costs of entry, which can be quite
substantial. Examples include the telecommunication and financial services sectors.
Furthermore, the Cournot model potentially allows for many extensions in terms of the
number of firms, the number of customer groups, number of products, and multiple
bundle designs. Of course, despite this flexibility in modeling, solving formulations
and extracting clear general results is not always easy. We will see that even with
simplifying assumptions, the solutions are quite complex with multiple equilibria even
in small simplified cases.
We present solutions for two special cases. In the first case there are two types of
firms. One type offers a single product, the other type offers that product bundled with
another. We show that it is possible to have multiple equilibria with both types of firms
and that there is no upper bound to the number of equilibria. We then consider the
case where there are three types of firms – two that offer each of the two products alone,
and one that offers a bundle of the two. We find that bundling can be a viable strategy
when the fixed cost of entry for the bundle is lower than the sum of the entry costs for
the independent product markets. In order to identify all the equilibria in a given case,
we propose enumeration methods to determine all the equilibria in both these scenarios.
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In the fourth chapter, we tackle the bundle design issue for several market settings.
The majority of papers studying bundling have assumed that firms offer bundles with
fixed proportions and their main goal is to maximize profit through pricing and product
offering strategies. In this chapter we take a step back and study the effects of bundle
design on firm profits. We allow the choice of bundle proportions as an option that
firms can employ to maximize profits. As an example, Cable TV providers typically
offer multiple bundles with different component proportions that match the needs of
specific customer segments.
We assume that firms can offer bundles of two components to customers who have
quadratic utility functions. We first show that for a monopolist firm offering a bundle
of the two products, with a single type of customer, there is always an optimal bundle
proportion. This proportion is a function of the satiation consumption levels of the
customer. We extend this case to an oligopolistic setting by allowing multiple firms to
enter the bundle market and determine the number of firms that are able to survive
in equilibrium. Next we study a monopolist bundler who sells a single bundle (type)
to two customer groups. If customer groups are very heterogeneous, under special
circumstances, this firm can have two distinct choices for the optimal bundle proportion.
Finally, we study two identical firms offering independent bundles to multiple customer
groups. In equilibrium, both firms choose the same bundle proportion. The optimal
bundle proportion is again a function of the aggregate satiation consumption levels of
all customers.
5
Chapter 2 Competitive Bundling in a Symmetric Bertrand
Duopoly
Abstract
Bundling, i.e., the practice of offering a combination of products or services, for one
price, is widely adopted, although not ubiquitous, in competitive industries. Although
the game-theoretic literature on bundling in competitive oligopolies predicts uneven
adoption of bundling by competing, but asymmetric, firms, it is not clear whether this
results from the firms’ strategic response or from their inherent asymmetry. In this
chapter, we characterize the bundling strategies of two symmetric firms competing in
a Bertrand duopoly. We model the bundling and pricing decisions as a two-stage non-
cooperative game. In the first stage, firms choose their offerings, which may include any
components and the bundle, considering both pure and mixed bundling strategies. In
the second stage, they simultaneously choose prices for their offerings. We show that
when firms practice pure bundling there always exists an equilibrium in which only one
firm bundles. This result extends to mixed bundling, in the particular case of two firms
offering two components to two customer groups with perfectly correlated valuations
for the components. We show that irrespective of whether customers’ valuations are
positively or negatively correlated at most one of two competing firms chooses to bundle
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in equilibrium. Moreover the bundling firm earns higher profits. Our results indicate
that bundling can serve as a way to soften price competition, and that the bundling
firm has a competitive advantage. Hence for both cases of pure and mixed bundling,
asymmetric bundling strategies can be expected even in symmetric oligopolies.
2.1 Introduction
Bundling, or tying, is the practice of selling more than one product or service as a
combination for a single price (Guiltinan 1987, Adams and Yellen 1976) and is prevalent
in many industry sectors, including tangible goods (e..g., gift baskets, option bundles in
cars, fast-food menu combos), services (e.g., insurance, fast food, telecommunications,
retail banking industries), and digital platforms (e.g., Google, Amazon, Pandora).
Bundling offers several benefits. On the supply side, bundling can lead to economies
of scope by lowering production costs, transaction costs, and administrative costs (Venkatesh
and Mahajan 2009). On the demand side, bundling can expand demand by combin-
ing complementary products, e.g., a product and a service contract (see Eppen 1991),
and reduce customer valuation heterogeneities across different market segments (Ep-
pen 1991), enabling firms to extract more customer surplus (Raghunathan and Sarkar
2016). Under competition, bundling serves as a product differentiation tool to soften
competition and avoid price wars and increases customer switching costs in recurring
sales of services and goods (Eppen 1991).
Although bundling seems to offer multiple benefits, competing firms in any given
sector do not appear to employ a uniform bundling strategy. For instance telecom com-
panies compete through bundling, unbundling, and re-bundling of their existing services.
In particular cable companies, which provide broadband Internet, TV, and telephone
7
services, used to offer double-play or triple-play bundles of several sizes and types. Fac-
ing intense competition from Internet streaming services (e.g. Netflix, Amazon Video),
they have recently changed their bundling strategy by offering smaller targeted “skinny
bundles,” in which fewer TV channels are bundled for a cheaper price.
Retail banking is another industry where competing firms practice asymmetric bundling
strategies. The incumbents, which are mostly large banks, offer bundles including mul-
tiple services such as checking and saving accounts, credit cards and mortgages, whereas
new entrants, which are mostly digital, often choose a focus strategy on a product or
a segment (e.g. TransferWise). While unbundling could be expected in retail banking,
not all players will choose to unbundle (Gujran et al. 2019).
As these two examples suggest, firms may adopt different bundling strategies under
competition. Consistent with these examples, most of the game-theoretic literature on
competitive bundling has suggested uneven adoption of bundling. However,to the best
of our knowledge, it this has been under the assumption that firms were asymmetric
from the start (e.g., different bargaining power, different presence in multiple product
markets, different order of market entry). As a result, it has not been clear whether
the asymmetric equilibrium outcome in the bundling game is the result of the firms’
strategic response or their inherent asymmetry.
In this chapter, we investigate the following questions: ‘What is the optimal bundling
strategy for two symmetric firms who compete with undifferentiated offers under price
competition? Given their symmetry, will they adopt symmetric bundling strategies?
How would that result depend on whether firms practice pure or mixed bundling and
on whether customers have positively or negatively correlated valuations?’
We consider a symmetric Bertrand duopoly where firms have the ability to offer
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two undifferentiated components (or goods), separately or as a bundle. Given two
components A and B, a product consists of any combination of {A}, {B}, or the bundle
{A,B}. Firms first choose their offering as a set of products, and then choose the price
vector for their offering. Under pure bundling, each firm offers at most one product
(i.e., {A}, {B}, or {AB}). Whereas under mixed bundling, each firm may offer any set
of products; e.g., Firm 1 could offer both {A} and {AB}, but not {B}. On the demand
side, we assume that there are two customer groups. Each customer group has a strictly
stronger preference for one of the components; these preferences may be positively or
negatively correlated across groups. For tractability, we focus on the extreme cases of
perfect, positive or negative, correlation. Customers purchase the products that give
them the highest surplus in terms of total value net of total price.
We obtain the following results. First, under pure bundling, regardless of the number
of customer groups and their relative valuations for different product, there always ex-
ists an equilibrium such that only one firm bundles and the second firm offers either one
of the single components. Second, under mixed bundling, we find that when customers
have perfectly negatively correlated valuations and the difference in their valuation of
the components is significant, then in equilibrium just one firm bundles and the other
offers a single component. Second, when customers have perfectly positively correlated
valuations, or perfectly negatively correlated valuations with a small difference in valu-
ation of the components, then at least one firm bundles. The second firm may bundle,
offer a single component, or offer nothing. In other words, multiple equilibria exist for
this case. The Pareto-optimal strategy is when each firm focuses on one of the compo-
nent markets. All equilibria are asymmetric, although firms are symmetric. We thus
show that an asymmetric equilibrium outcome in the bundling game typically arises
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even when firms are symmetric.
Our results lead to the following managerial implications. Even if the structure of
demand (e.g., customers’ correlation in valuations) suggests that a monopolistic firm
should bundle, it may not be optimal for the firm to do so if it faces a competitor offering
a bundle. This may explain why new entrants in media and entertainment (e.g. Netflix)
and in retail banking (e.g. TransferWise) compete with large incumbents by staying
focused on a niche. Moreover, the firm that bundles in a competitive setting captures
the largest profit from the market and there is therefore a first-mover advantage to
bundling. An example is the telecom industry, where large incumbent firms are able
to earn greater revenues by offering several different bundles of voice, text, data, and
content, while smaller firms can only focus on a smaller subset of those products.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the
literature on bundling. We then model the bundling and pricing game as a two-stage
non-cooperative game. We characterize the equilibrium pricing and bundling strategies
under pure bundling in Section 2.4 and under mixed bundling in Section 2.5. Section
2.6 summarizes the results and discusses the managerial implications of our work. All
proofs appear in the appendices.
2.2 Literature Review
Although bundling has been extensively studied in economics, it has received a lot of re-
cent attention due to the growth of high-technology sectors and increasing competition;
see Venkatesh and Mahajan (2009), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000), Raghunathan and
Sarkar (2016), Kobayashi (2005), and Stigler (1963). Although bundling often arises in
competitive settings in practice, most research on bundling has established the optimal-
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ity of bundling from a monopolist’s point of view, identifying the following advantages
of bundling:
• Price discrimination by reducing customer valuation heterogeneities (Stigler 1963,
Adams and Yellen 1976, Schmalensee 1984, McAfee et al. 1989, Salinger 1995,
Bakos and Brynjolfsson 2000, Raghunathan and Sarkar 2016),
• Economies of scope in production, distribution, and promotional activities (Raghu-
nathan and Sarkar 2016, Eppen 1991),
• Demand complementarities among the bundle components (Raghunathan and Sarkar
2016, Eppen 1991).
In contrast to the large literature on bundling in monopolistic settings, the litera-
ture on bundling under competition is limited (Anderson and Leruth 1993, Bakos and
Brynjolfsson 2000, Nalebuff 2004). Typically this literature considers two component-
markets with the possibility of either selling the components individually or bundling
them (Kobayashi 2005, Shu et al. 2014) and assumes various degrees of asymmetry be-
tween firms or different market structures across the components. We distinguish three
groups of papers:
• One group of papers (Whinston 1989, Carbajo et al. 1990, Bakos et al. 2005,
Venkatesh and Mahajan 2009, Nalebuff 2004, Vamosiu 2018) assumes firms com-
pete in only one of the product markets and that one of the firms has monopolistic
power in the other product market. The monopolist firm can increase its compet-
itive advantage in the competitive market by bundling the common product with
the product for which it has monopolistic market power. This effect, known as
leverage theory, usually hinders new entry in the competitive market (Whinston
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1989, Carbajo et al. 1990, Nalebuff 2004).
• A second group of papers (Schmalensee 1984, Greenlee et al. 2008, Chen et al.
1997, Evans and Salinger 2005) assumes perfect competition in one or both of the
markets. In other words these papers assume price-taking behavior on some or all
of the bundle components.
• A third group of papers (Anderson and Leruth 1993, Liao and Tauman 2002,
Matutes and Regibeau 1992, Economides 1993, Raghunathan and Sarkar 2016, Shu
et al. 2014), including ours, assumes that both products are offered in oligopolistic
markets.
We contribute to that latter stream by considering the most generic model of
oligopolistic competition, namely a Bertrand duopoly. In particular, we consider a
simultaneous-move game in contrast to Shu et. al. (2014) who consider a Stackelberg
leader-follower framework. Also, in contrast to Anderson and Leruth (1993), Liao and
Tauman (2002), Matutes and Ragibeau (1992), Economides (1993), and Raghunathan
and Sarkar (2016) we do not make any assumptions of perfect complementarity or sub-
stitutability between the two products in our model.
Although we assume perfectly symmetric firms competing on symmetric market
structures, we obtain asymmetric equilibria for the game. Given that our model relies
on very generic assumptions, we clearly demonstrate the optimality of bundling under
competition as a way to differentiate offerings and soften price competition, and that
an asymmetric equilibrium outcome is that the result of the firms’ strategic behavior,
and not of their inherent difference.
Moreover, we study the full set of possible strategies, i.e., Pure Component, Unbun-
dled Offering, Pure Bundling, Mixed Bundling and Partial Mixed Bundling (Adams and
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Yellen 1976, Bhargava 2013). Previous papers have found that even for a monopolist
firm and a small number of products, the computational burden for comparing Pure
Bundling, Mixed Bundling and Individual Pricing is quite large (Vamosiu 2018). There-
fore several papers do not consider one or more of the bundling strategies (Bhargava
2013, Bakos and Brynjolfsson 2000, Geng et al. 2005). To the best of our knowledge,
this dissertation is the first attempt to identify analytical closed form solutions for the
the full scope of potential equilibria, including mixed bundling in a competitive setting
(Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003, Wilson 1993, Bhargava 2013, Schmalensee 1984).
2.3 Model
In this section we introduce the model and the equilibrium concept. We consider a
duopoly with two symmetric firms operating in two independent component-markets.
Each firm has the ability to offer three products, namely Product 1 consisting of Compo-
nent 1, Product 2 consisting of Component 2, and Product 3 consisting of Components
1 and 2. Similar to Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000), we assume that products have zero
marginal cost of production.1
Bundling decisions are usually considered irreversible: once a firm makes a product
offering decision, it usually needs to stay committed to that decision for a significant
amount of time. Accordingly, we model the game as a two-stage game. In the first
stage, which we call the bundling game, firms choose their product offering (or bundling)
strategy simultaneously and non-cooperatively. In the second stage, which we call the
1The effect of a uniform non-zero production cost will essentially be similar to a lower customer valuation. However,
if the production costs are non-uniform across the firms, the lowest-cost firm has an advantage and the Bertrand
paradox disappears (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). Since our focus is on demonstrating the existence of asymmetric
equilibria even when firms are symmetric, this case lies outside the scope of this chapter. We also note that this level of
asymmetry would further amplify the combinatorial nature of the problem. Although an equilibrium characterization
is in principle feasible in this case, it would most likely be cumbersome to express – making it very difficult to generate
insights.
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pricing game, each firm chooses its pricing decisions.
The demand side consists of two homogeneous segments of surplus-maximizing cus-
tomers. For simplicity, we assume that both segments have the same size, which is
normalized to one. A customer’s valuation for the bundle is assumed to be the sum
of her valuations for each component inside the bundle (Guiltinan 1987, Schmalensee
1984, Adams and Yellen 1976, McAfee et al. 1989), i.e., there is no complementarity
or substitutability in customer valuations (Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003). We as-
sume that each customer has zero reservation utility and buys at most one unit of each
component, i.e., there is full satiation in consumption.
Tie-Breaking Rules
We consider the following tie-breaking rules:
1- More is better: If two products yield the same surplus to a customer, the customer
chooses the product that has the largest number of components.
2- Even split: If two products yield the same surplus to a customer and they both
have the same number of components, the customer will randomly choose one
product with equal probability.
Notation
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We adopt the following notations.
Indices:
i indexes firms i = 1, 2,
j indexes customers j = 1, 2,
k indexes components k = 1, 2,
l indexes products l = 1, 2, 3, where l = 1 refers to a product consisting of only
Component 1, l = 2 refers to a product consisting of only Component 2, and l = 3
refers to the bundle of Components 1 and 2.
Parameters:
ujk Customer j’s valuation for Component k,
vjl Customer j’s valuation for Product l. In the absence of complementarity
effect vjl = ujk for k = 1, 2, and vj3 = uj1 + uj2.
Decision Variables:
zil Firm i’s decision to include Product l in its offering, zil ∈ {0, 1},
zi = (zi1, zi2, zi3)
z = (z1, z2)
pil Firm i’s price of Product l, pil ≥ 0,
pi = (pi1, pi2, pi3)
xijl(p, z) indicator variable for Customer j’s purchase of Product l from Firm i at pil
xijl(p, z) = 1 if Customer j buys Product l from Firm i at price pil,
xijl(p, z) =
1
2 if Customer j randomizes the purchase between the two firms,
xijl(p, z) = 0 otherwise,15
Fi(pi) Firm i’s pricing cumulative distribution function (CDF),
F Set of all feasible price distributions,
F = {F (p)|F (0) = 0, lim
p→∞F (p) = 1, and F (p) non-decreasing},
Z Set of all feasible product offerings.
Functions:
Πi(pi; p−i, zi, z−i) Firm i’s profit function,
pˆi(p−i; zi, z−i) Firm i’s best-response correspondence for given p−i, zi, z−i,
Fˆi(F−i; zi, z−i) Firm i’s best response to the pricing mixed-strategy of its opponent,
sijl(p) = (vjl − pil)xijl(p, z) Customer j’s surplus from consuming Product l at Firm i’s price.
To simplify the notation, we sometimes omit the dependence of xijl on p and z. Since
for any j = 1, 2, Customer j buys at most one unit of each component, we have:
∑
i
xij1 + xij3 ≤ 1 and
∑
i
xij2 + xij3 ≤ 1 ∀j.
Similarly, since a firm needs to offer a product for a consumer to buy it, we have:
xijl(p, z) ≤ zil,∀i, j, l.
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xij3 = 1 ⇐⇒ zi3 = 1 and vj3 − pi3 ≥ max(0, (vjl′ − pi′l′)zi′l′) ∀i′ and l′ = 1, 2
and vj3 − pi3 > (vj3 − p−i3)z−i3.
xijl = 1 ⇐⇒ zil = 1 and vjl − pil > max(0, (vjl − p−i,l)z−i,l), (vj3 − pi3)zi3, (vj3 − p−i,3)z−i,3) for l = 1, 2.
xij3 =
1
2
⇐⇒ zi3 = z−i,3 = 1 and
(vj3 − pi3)zi3 = (vj3 − p−i,3)z−i3 ≥ max(0, (vjl′ − pi′l′)zi′l′) ∀i′ and l′ = 1, 2.
xijl =
1
2
⇐⇒ zil = z−i,l = 1 and
(vjl − pil)zil = (vjl − p−i,l)z−il > max(0, (vj3 − pi3)zi3, (vj3 − p−i,3)z−i3).
(2.1)
Pure and Mixed Pricing Strategies
In the pricing game, we assume firms play in pure strategies if there exists such an
equilibrium, and adopt otherwise a mixed strategy. For a given bundling strategy, each
firm’s profit function is a piecewise linear function of its own price:
Πi(pi; p−i, zi, z−i) =
∑
j,l
pilxijl(p, z) for i = 1, 2.
Each firm randomizes its price according to the cumulative distribution function
Fi ∈ F , i = 1, 2 and has the following expected profit function:
Πi(Fi;F−i, zi, z−i) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Πi(pi; p−i, zi, z−i)dF−i(p−i)dFi(pi).
Firm i’s best response to the mixed strategy of its opponent is identified by the
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cumulative distribution function Fˆi:
Fˆi(F−i; zi, z−i) = arg max
Fi∈F
Πi(Fi;F−i, zi, z−i), ∀i = 1, 2. (2.2)
Although for any i = 1, 2 the profit function of Firm i is not continuous in pi over its
entire strategy space, there always exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg
and Tirole 1991), and we construct such an equilibrium (see Proposition 2.5).
The game can have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if the mixed-strategy best-
response correspondences of the firms are singletons; in that case, we select the pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium and denote it as (pˆi(z), pˆ−i(z)). If the pair of CDFs Fˆi(Fˆ−i, zi, z−i)
and Fˆ−i(Fˆi, zi, z−i) is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for each choice of offering
z = (z1, z2), then we have the following for i = 1, 2:
Πˆi(zi; z−i) = Πi(Fˆi; Fˆ−i, zi, z−i), (2.3)
Bundling Strategies
We assume firms choose their bundling strategy simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
The bundling game is a finite game and, according to Nash (1950), it always has a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, (zˆi, zˆ−i), such that for i = 1, 2:
zˆi(z−i) = arg max
zi∈Z
Πˆi(zi; z−i). (2.4)
However, this game might have multiple equilibria. In Section 2.6, we discuss how
the indeterminacy associated with multiple equilibria can be addressed by employing
equilibrium selection rules (Harsanyi et al. 1988).
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We use the general rule that every firm on the market can choose to capture either
none, one, or both customers for each product they offer. Profit-maximizing firms can
indeed choose to serve only the higher-value customers if doing so enables them to
charge higher prices and extract more revenue even if the lower-value consumers remain
unserved (Armstrong 1996).
In this chapter we model two types of bundling games: pure and mixed bundling:
Pure Bundling Z = {zi|zTi zi ≤ 1, zi ∈ {0, 1}3}. Each firm may offer only one product,
either one of the individual components or the bundle,
Mixed Bundling Z = {zi ∈ {0, 1}3}. Each firm may offer any number of products,
i.e., any subset of the individual components and the bundle. In the literature,
Mixed Bundling sometimes refers to an offerings consisting of the bundle and all
of the single components. Here, we use Mixed Bundling for a larger set of offerings
including partial mixed-bundling, i.e., offering the bundle along with only one of
the single components (Bhargava 2013).
Customer Valuations For tractability we consider the following two special structures
of correlation of customer valuations across groups:
Perfectly Negatively Correlated (PPC) valuations between customers, i.e., v11 = v22 =
v, v12 = v21 = v,
Figure 2.1: Perfectly Negatively Correlated customer valuations
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Perfectly Positively Correlated (PPC) valuations between customers, i.e., v12 = v22 =
v, v21 = v11 = v.
Figure 2.2: Perfectly Positively Correlated customer valuations
In both cases without loss of generality, we assume v > v > 0.
We first show that, when both firms offer the same offering, they engage in a price
war, which eventually drives down profits to zero.
Lemma 2.1. When both firms have identical offerings, i.e., z1 = z2, they both make
zero profit, in equilibrium.
The results of Lemma 2.1 holds for both cases of Pure Bundling and Mixed Bundling
under both assumptions of PPC or PNC.
We analyze the pure bundling game in the next section and the mixed bundling
game in Section 2.5, considering the cases of PNC and PPC valuations.
2.4 Pure Bundling
We first consider the case where each firm offers only one product, i.e., either the
bundle or one of the individual components, for i = 1, 2. Hence, each firm faces four
possible strategies, namely (0,0,0), (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1).2 We find the set of the
potential equilibria always contains four equilibria in which one firm bundles and the
2All results in this section are robust to the number of customer groups (i.e., can be greater than 2), their respective
size (i.e., can be unequal), and their valuations (i.e., can be arbitrary).
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other does not; i.e., for any i = 1, 2, zi = (0, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 0, 0), and zi = (0, 0, 1)
and z−i = (0, 1, 0). For certain values of customer reservation prices, the equilibrium
set can be larger. In all cases, the firm that offers the bundle makes more profit in
equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1. Under pure bundling, the game always has at least four equilibria
where one firm offers the bundle and the other one offers a single component. The firm
that offers the bundle earns more profit than the other.
2.5 Mixed Bundling
In this section, we consider mixed bundling and separately analyze the case of PNC and
PPC customer valuations. We solve the game presented in 2.2,2.3, and 2.4 by backward
induction. First, we identify the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for the pricing game
for each possible outcome of bundling game. Subsequently, we identify the equilibrium
strategies in the bundling game, incorporating the equilibrium outcomes of the pricing
sub-games.
The sixty-four possible offerings z can be categorized as follows:
• No firm bundles, i.e., zi3 = z−i,3 = 0
• Only one firm bundles, i.e., zi3 + z−i,3 = 1
• Both firms bundle, i.e., zi3 + z−i,3 = 2
We first consider the case of Perfectly Negatively Correlated (PNC) valuations.
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2.5.1 Perfectly Negatively Correlated Valuations
2.5.1.1 The Pricing Game
2.5.1.1.1 No firm bundles
Proposition 2.2. Under PNC valuations, when no firm offers a bundle and when firms
have non-overlapping offerings, for i = 1, 2:
• If zi = (1, 0, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), then Πˆi(zi; z−i) = max{2v, v} and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) =
0,
• If zi = (0, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), then Πˆi(zi; z−i) = max{2v, v}, and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) =
0,
• If zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), then Πˆi(zi, z−i) = max{2v, 4v} and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) =
0,
• If zi = (1, 0, 0) and z−i = (0, 1, 0), then Πˆi(zi; z−i) = Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = max{2v, v}.
Proposition 2.3. Under PNC valuations, if zi = (1, 1, 0) and either z−i = (1, 0, 0) or
z−i = (0, 1, 0), then Πˆi(zi; z−i) = max{v, 2v} and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
2.5.1.1.2 Only one firm bundles We break down this category of offerings into
several sub-cases and show the equilibrium profits of the firms in each case.
Proposition 2.4. Under PNC valuations, when one firm offers the bundle, i.e., zi3 = 1,
and the other firms stays out of the business, i.e., z−i = (0, 0, 0), Πˆi(zi, z−i) = 2(v + v)
and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
If a bundling firm faces competition in one of the component markets, it might
prefer to capture only the customer that has the highest valuation for that particular
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component, or both customers, or randomize between these two strategies. The firm’s
choice depends on the relative magnitude of customers’ valuations for both products.
Proposition 2.5. Under PNC valuations, when zi = (0, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 0, 0) or
when zi = (0, 0, 1) and z−i = (0, 1, 0) there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
the pricing game if and only if v ≤ 2v. Otherwise, when v ≥ 2v, there only exists a
unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the pricing game, constructed in Appendix
B. With these equilibria, the payoffs are:
• For v > 3v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = v + v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = v−v2 .
• For 2v < v ≤ 3v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2(v − v) and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = v − 2v.
• For v ≤ 2v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
Proposition 2.6. Under PNC valuations, when zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 1), then
Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 0 and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 2v.
Proposition 2.7. Under PNC valuations, when zi = (1, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 0, 0) or
when zi = (0, 1, 1) and z−i = (0, 1, 0),
• For v > 2v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0
• For v ≤ 2v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0
Proposition 2.8. Under PNC valuations, when zi = (1, 0, 1) and z−i = (0, 1, 0) or
when zi = (0, 1, 1) and z−i = (1, 0, 0), Firm i sets the price of its component so high
that no customer buys it. Hence, the equilibrium is the same as in Proposition 2.5.
Proposition 2.9. Under PNC valuations, when zi = (1, 0, 1) or zi = (0, 1, 1) and
z−i = (1, 1, 0), then Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
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Corollary 2.1. Under PNC valuations, when zi = (1, 1, 1) and when either z−i =
(1, 0, 0) or z−i = (0, 1, 0),
• For v > 3v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = v + v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = v−v2 .
• For 2v < v ≤ 3v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2(v − v) and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = v − 2v.
• For v ≤ 2v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
Corollary 2.2. Under PNC valuations, when zi = (1, 1, 1) and z−i = (1, 1, 0), then
Πˆi = 2v, and Πˆ−i = 0.
2.5.1.1.3 Both firms bundle
Proposition 2.10. Under PNC valuations, when both firms offer the bundle as part
of their offering, then Πˆi = Πˆ−i = 0.
In Lemma 2.1 we showed an extension of a classic result, i.e., two firms make zero
profit under Bertrand competition with identical offerings. Proposition 2.10 extends this
result to the case of differentiated offerings, as long as they both contain the bundle.
2.5.1.2 The Bundling Game
Next, we consider the bundling game. Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 summarize the equilibrium
payoffs for each combination of offerings, under different customer valuations. The
tables represent finite strategic-form games in which each player has eight strategies
to choose from. According to Nash (1950), each game has at least one mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium. In fact, we find that there always exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in
each of the bundling games, but that equilibrium may not be unique. All pure-strategy
equilibria are highlighted in the tables.
24
Firm 2’s offering
(0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
(0, 0, 0) 0, 0 0, v 0, v 0, 2v 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v)
F
ir
m
1’
s
off
er
in
g
(1, 0, 0) v, 0 0, 0 v, v 0, v v−v
2
, v + v 0, v v−v
2
, v + v
v−v
2
, v + v
(0, 1, 0) v, 0 v, v 0, 0 0, v v−v
2
, v + v
v−v
2
, v + v 0, v v−v
2
, v + v
(1, 1, 0) 2v, 0 v, 0 v, 0 0, 0 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v
(0, 0, 1) 2(v+v), 0 v + v, v−v
2
v + v,
v−v
2
2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(1, 0, 1) 2(v+v), 0 v, 0 v + v, v−v
2
2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(0, 1, 1) 2(v+v), 0 v + v, v−v
2
v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(1, 1, 1) 2(v+v), 0 v + v, v−v
2
v + v,
v−v
2
2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Table 2.1: Firms’ payoff matrix in the mixed bundling game under PNC valuations when v > 3v
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Firm 2’s offering
(0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
F
ir
m
1
’s
off
er
in
g
(0, 0, 0) 0, 0 0, v 0, v 0, 2v 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v)
(1, 0, 0) v, 0 0, 0 v, v 0, v v − 2v, 2(v −
v)
0, v v − 2v, 2(v −
v)
v − 2v, 2(v −
v)
(0, 1, 0) v, 0 v, v 0, 0 0, v v − 2v, 2(v −
v)
v − 2v, 2(v −
v)
0, v v − 2v, 2(v −
v)
(1, 1, 0) 2v, 0 v, 0 v, 0 0, 0 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v
(0, 0, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2(v − v), v −
2v
2(v − v), v −
2v
2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(1, 0, 1) 2(v+v), 0 v, 0 2(v − v), v −
2v
2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(0, 1, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2(v − v), v −
2v
v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(1, 1, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2(v − v), v −
2v
2(v − v), v −
2v
2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Table 2.2: Firms’ payoff matrix in the mixed bundling game under PNC valuations when 2v < v ≤ 3v
From Tables 2.1 and 2.2, it appears that only one firm offers the bundle as part of its
offering and the other firm offers only a single component. In each case, two symmetric
sets of six payoff-equivalent equilibria are possible. The firm offering the bundle earns
more profit and thus there is an inherent first-mover advantage to bundling.
In our model we did not associate any cost with offering additional products, but
in reality firms will avoid adding components with zero marginal revenue. Thus, in the
presence of infinitesimal costs for offering a product, the surviving equilibria for v ≥ 2v
will be zi = (0, 0, 1) and either z−i = (0, 1, 0) or z−i = (1, 0, 0) for i = 1, 2. This result
if consistent with the pure bundling case analyzed in Section 2.4.
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Firm 2’s offering
(0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
F
ir
m
1
’s
off
er
in
g
(0, 0, 0) 0, 0 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 4v 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v)
(1, 0, 0) 2v, 0 0, 0 2v, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v
(0, 1, 0) 2v, 0 2v, 2v 0, 0 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v
(1, 1, 0) 4v, 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v
(0, 0, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(1, 0, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(0, 1, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(1, 1, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Table 2.3: Firms’ payoff matrix in the mixed bundling game under PNC valuations when v ≤ 2v
Note that all equilibria under the PNC valuations are payoff-equivalent. Therefore,
the bundler does not gain anything (or does not make the other firm lose anything)
from offering more than the bundle . The set of equilibria is the same when v > 3v and
when 2v < v ≤ 3v.
When v ≤ 2v, the game has multiple equilibria with different payoffs, as shown in
Table 2.3. However, the only equilibria where both firms earn non-zero payoffs are when
each firm focuses on offering only one type of component. All other equilibria result
in zero payoffs for one or both of the firms. Thus the Pareto-optimal equilibria of this
game are z = ((1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)), and z = ((0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0)) .
We conclude that under PNC valuations, when customers have a strictly stronger
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preference for one of the components (i.e., v > 2v), then one firm bundles in equilibrium.
However, when customers have close valuations of the components (i.e., v ≤ 2v), then
the Pareto-optimal equilibrium is the focus strategy, i.e., firms offer distinct components.
2.5.2 Perfectly Positively Correlated Valuations
2.5.2.1 The Pricing Game
2.5.2.1.1 No firm bundles
Proposition 2.11. Under PPC valuations, when no firm bundles and when firms have
non-overlapping offering, for i = 1, 2:
• If zi = (1, 0, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), then Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0,
• If zi = (0, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), then Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v, and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0,
• If zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), then Πˆi(zi, z−i) = 2(v+v) and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0,
• If zi = (1, 0, 0) and z−i = (0, 1, 0), then Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 2v.
Proposition 2.12. Under PPC valuations, if zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (1, 0, 0), then
Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
Proposition 2.13. Under PPC valuations, if zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 1, 0), then
Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
2.5.2.1.2 Only one firm bundles
Proposition 2.14. Under PPC valuations, when one firm offers the bundle, i.e., zi3 =
1, and the other firm stays out of the business, i.e., z−i = (0, 0, 0), then Πˆi(zi, z−i) =
2(v + v) and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
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Proposition 2.15. Under PPC valuations, when zi = (0, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 0, 0), then
Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proposition 2.16. Under PPC valuations, when zi = (0, 0, 1) and z−i = (0, 1, 0), then
Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proposition 2.17. Under PPC valuations, when zi = (0, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 1, 0) then
Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
Proposition 2.18. Under PPC valuations, when zi = (1, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 0, 0), then
Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proposition 2.19. Under PPC valuations, when zi = (0, 1, 1) and z−i = (0, 1, 0), then
Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proposition 2.20. Under PPC valuations, when zi = (1, 0, 1) and z−i = (0, 1, 0), then
Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
Proposition 2.21. Under PPC valuations, when zi = (0, 1, 1) and z−i = (1, 0, 0), then
Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
Proposition 2.22. Under PPC valuations, when zi = (1, 0, 1) or zi = (0, 1, 1), and
z−i = (1, 1, 0), then Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
Corollary 2.3. Under PPC valuations, when zi = (1, 1, 1)
• If z−i = (1, 0, 0), Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0,
• If z−i = (0, 1, 0), Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
• If z−i = (1, 1, 0), Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
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2.5.2.1.3 Both firms bundle
Proposition 2.23. Under PPC valuations, when both firms offer the bundle as part
of their offering, then Πˆi = Πˆ−i = 0.
2.5.2.2 The Bundling Game
Firm 2’s offering
(0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1)
F
ir
m
1’
s
off
er
in
g
(0, 0, 0) 0, 0 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v) 0, 2(v+v)
(1, 0, 0) 2v, 0 0, 0 2v, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v
(0, 1, 0) 2v, 0 2v, 2v 0, 0 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v 0, 2v
(1, 1, 0) 2(v+v), 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0,2v 0,2v 0,2v 0,2v
(0, 0, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(1, 0, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(0, 1, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
(1, 1, 1) 2(v+v), 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 2v, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Table 2.4: Firms’ payoff matrix in the mixed bundling game under PPC valuations
Considering next the bundling game, we face a finite strategic-form game in which
each player has eight strategies to choose from. Table 2.4 summarizes the equilibrium
payoffs. Each cell in this table corresponds to the equilibrium payoffs of both firms for
each combination of offerings. Similar to the PNC case, we find that there are multiple
pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this game. All pure-strategy equilibria are highlighted
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in the table. Note that all equilibria have the same payoff as in the PNC case with
v < 2v (see Table 2.3). The equilibrium consists of three sets of strategies: a) both
firms offer the bundle that results in zero payoff for both firms, b) only one firm offers
the bundle that results in zero payoff for the firm that does not offer the bundle, c)
each firm focuses on one of the single component markets, which has non-zero payoff
for both firms. The last set, i.e., the focus strategy, is the Pareto-optimal equilibrium
of this game.
2.5.3 Stackelberg Game
We can also use a leader-follower approach to analyze the strategic form games presented
in tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 .
2.5.3.1 Perfectly Negatively Correlated Valuations
• When v > 2v, the payoff-equivalent subgame perfect Nash equilibria are
– {(0,0,1),(1,0,0)} and {(0,0,1),(0,1,0)},
– {(1,0,1),(0,1,0)},
– {(0,1,1),(1,0,0)},
– {(1,1,1),(1,0,0)} and {(1,1,1),(0,1,0)}.
• When v < v ≤ 2v, the game does not have a Weak Stackelberg equilibrium but
the Strong Stackelberg equilibria (Breton et al. 1988) are
– {(1,0,0),(0,1,0)},
– {(0,1,0),(1,0,0)}.
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2.5.3.2 Perfectly Positively Correlated Valuations
The game does not have a Weak Stackelberg equilibrium but the Strong Stackelberg
equilibria are
• {(1,0,0),(0,1,0)},
• {(0,1,0),(1,0,0)}.
We conclude that when customers have negatively correlated valuations and each one
has a strictly preferred component, the leader bundles and earns larger profits while
the follower offers a single component only. However, when customers have perfectly
positively correlated valuations or they do not have a strictly preferred component in
the PNC case, the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium for both firms is a focus strategy,
i.e., offering an independent component only.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we propose a stylized model of competitive bundling in a Bertrand
duopoly. We consider two symmetric firms with perfect information that make simulta-
neously but non-cooperatively offering decisions followed by pricing decisions. Within
that setting, we characterize the equilibrium bundling strategies in the cases of both
pure and mixed bundling.
With pure bundling, we show that there always exists an equilibrium when one
firm bundles and the other firm offers a single component, to avoid head-to-head price
competition. Moreover, this result is robust to the number, size, and preferences of
customer groups.
With mixed bundling, we consider two heterogeneous groups of customers in terms
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of their valuations for the components and we consider the specific case of perfect pos-
itive or negative correlation. We find that there always exists an equilibrium in the
bundling game, though multiple equilibria are possible. If customers have relatively
similar valuations for both components, i.e., if their valuations are PPC or PNC with
small discrepancies, most equilibria are such that only one firm makes positive profit.
However, there is always one Pareto-optimal equilibrium where firms operate in indepen-
dent component markets without bundling and avoid competition. On the other hand,
if customers have strong preferences for distinct components, i.e., if their valuations are
PNC with medium to large discrepancies, the game has multiple payoff-equivalent Nash
equilibria, in which both firms make non-zero profit, one firm bundles, the other firm
offers a single component, and the bundler captures a larger profit.
Our study leads to the following managerial implication: Under competition, the
firm that offers a bundle earns more profit compared to the firm that does not. However,
when an incumbent firm already bundles, it is optimal for a new entrant not to offer the
bundle to avoid head-to-head price competition. This suggests a first-mover advantage
for bundling. Also, firms who face the decision of whether to offer a bundle or to focus on
a single component market should refer to the relative valuations of the heterogeneous
customer segments in the market.
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Chapter 3 Bundling and Competition in a Cournot Oligopoly
3.1 Introduction
Bundling is the practice of offering some combination of products and services in fixed
proportions with one price for the bundle that is typically discounted below the sum
of the prices of the components of the bundle. This has been a common strategy for
vendors in many product and service industries. Product examples range from gift
baskets and meal combinations in restaurants to large tool sets. Service bundles are
common in education, telecommunications and cable services. Post sales services such
as maintenance and repair are sometimes bundled with products. There are many
incentives for vendors to bundle, including cost savings due to economies of scope,
expansion of demand due to a reduction in customer heterogeneity, increased barriers
to entry, differentiation of the offer, risk pooling with uncertain demand, and increased
customer switching costs. One or more of these advantages might be relevant in a
specific market setting.
Competition is an important factor in determining the success or failure of bundling
where competition might come from firms in the same category of bundled offering,
from their own offerings which may include single products as well as bundles, and from
other categories of firms offering other combinations of bundles and single products.
Although bundling is prevalent in many product and service sectors, the number of
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research papers studying bundling under competition is limited. In this chapter we
focus on quantity competition in a Cournot framework, since it permits the analysis of
oligopolistic competition with multiple identical firms and undifferentiated goods. It is
also possible to study entry with fixed costs. By contrast, price competition (Bertrand)
with undifferentiated products results in a collapse even in the duopoly case, so that it
is not possible to tackle entry with cost since the entry costs cannot be recovered. Hence
there is no incentive for even a second firm to enter. In practice it is easy to find cases
where multiple relatively undifferentiated firms survive in the market, and are also able
to recover the fixed costs of entry, and make profits, which can be quite substantial.
Examples include the telecommunications sector and financial services. Furthermore,
the Cournot model potentially allows for many extensions in terms of the number of
firms, the number of customer groups, number of products, multiple bundle designs
and different customer groups. Of course, despite this flexibility in modeling, solving
formulations and extracting clear general results is less easy. We will also see that even
with simplifying assumptions, the solutions are quite complex with multiple equilibria
even in small cases.
This chapter studies a market which may have multiple customer segments that
have differing preferences. Firms may offer independent (single) products or services
and bundles of products and/or services, in some mix. There may be multiple symmetric
firms of each type. Entry in any category incurs a fixed cost. We address the following
research questions:
• What are the production decisions made by each type of firm, and the resulting
prices formed in the market?
• For each type of offering, consisting of some combination of single products or
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services, and bundles, what is the number of firms that can enter and survive?
• How do these outcomes (quantities and prices) depend on the types of firms that
compete, and on customer preferences (i.e., utility function parameters)?
We find that there are generally multiple equilibria in terms of the number of firms of
each category that enter and survive, with no further entry possible. We then consider
the extension to the case of three types of firms and to two customer groups. In general,
both firms with independent products, as well as firms that bundle can enter and survive
if the fixed costs of entry are not excessive. The presence of bundled offer has the effect
of coupling markets for independent products.
In the next section we present a brief review of the literature on bundling and
competition. We present a general model formulation in the third section. In subsequent
sections we analyze specific examples using both analytical and numerical methods.
We conclude that when firms bundle, the equilibrium is not necessarily unique and
multiple (arbitrarily large) equilibria are possible. The degree of differentiation between
preference for the standalone products and the relative values of the standalone products
are two predictors of the prevalence of bundling.
3.2 Literature Review
The majority of papers in the bundling literature study monopoly bundling (Stigler
1963, Adams and Yellen 1976, Schmalensee 1984, McAfee et al. 1989, Salinger 1995,
Varian 1995, Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999, Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003, Geng et al.
2005, Prasad et al. 2010, Chu et al. 2011). However, in this chapter, our focus is on
competitive bundling, which is studied in a few previous papers (Anderson and Leruth
1993, Bakos and Brynjolfsson 2000, Nalebuff 2004). In analyzing bundling behavior,
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competition type and product differentiation should be taken into consideration (Chung
et al. 2013). Among the papers that study competitive bundling the majority consider
competition a la Bertrand (Whinston 1989, Economides 1993). Cournot equilibrium
formulations are largely absent from the literature. Table 1 summarizes the major
contributions in this area. The traditional bundling literature, assumes that customers
have unit demand for each of the components. However here, customers may purchase
any quantity of any of the products or bundles similar to non-linear pricing, where
customers demand can be any quantity of each of the offers available (Wilson 1993).
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Bertrand Cournot
Whinston (1989),Carbajo et al. (1990) Carbajo et al. (1990), Martin (1999)
Le Blanc (2001) , Nalebuff (2004) Le Blanc (2001), Hinloopen (2005)
Bakos et al. (2005), Peitz (2008) Chung et al. (2013)
Monopoly in one
market and duopoly in
the second market
Chung et al. (2013)
Schmalensee (1982)
Chen et al. (1997)
Evans and Salinger (2005)
Monopoly in one
market and perfect
competition in the
second market
Greenlee et al. (2008)
Matutes and Regibeau (1992)
Anderson and Leruth (1993)
Economides (1993) Matutes and Regibeau (1992)
Liao and Tauman (2002) Anderson and Leruth (1993)
Mantovani (2013) Mantovani (2013)
Raghunathan and Sarkar (2016)
Duopoly in both
markets with
complementarity or
substitutability
assumption
Duopoly in both
markets with
independent products Chapter 2
Oligopoly with
undifferentiated
products
Chapter 3
Table 3.1: A summary of the bundling literature.
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Only a few papers have studied bundling under quantity competition (Martin 1999,
Hinloopen 2005). Some papers study bundling under Cournot competition in parallel
with Bertrand competition to contrast the results for some special cases (Carbajo et al.
1990, Matutes and Regibeau 1992, Anderson and Leruth 1993). Most other papers
assume differentiated products or assume firms have no strategic choice for one of the
goods (Orbay 2009); for example they are price-takers under perfect competition (Chen
et al. 1997), or one of the firms is a monopolist in one of the goods (Whinston 1989,
Martin 1999, Carbajo et al. 1990). Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Anderson and Leruth
(1993) and Mantovani (2013) are some papers that consider duopolistic competition with
two components but they assume the goods are perfect complements, which of course
favors bundling.
Almost all the papers studying bundling, consider a two-firm, two-product model. In
our analysis, we allow for multiple firms for each type of offer. We are able to investigate
the number of firms that offer each type of bundle in equilibrium, as a function of the
fixed costs of entry into each market.
3.3 Model Formulation
In this section, we present a general formulation of the market model. In the subsequent
section, we obtain solutions for a specific instance of this model.
3.3.1 Notation
We examine an oligopoly with I firms where all firms have the ability to sell one of
K bundles. Each bundle consists of a subset of T standalone components in various
fixed proportions. At entry, each firm i makes a decision to enter either one of the
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bundle markets where positive profits are attainable post-entry. Profits in each market
k depends on the total quantity offered of bundle k and all other bundles that have any
overlap with k. The entry game ends when new firms stop entering any bundle markets
and all existing firms make non-negative profits.
We use the following notation:
i indexes firms, i = 1, ..., I,
j indexes customers, j = 1, ..., J ,
k indexes offers or bundles, k = 1, ...,K,
t indexes standalone products or components included in bundles, t = 1, ..., T ,
Bk = (ak1, ak2, ..., akT ), akt ≥ 0 the quantity of each product t = 1, ..., T in the
kth bundle,
B ≡ {Bk|k = 1, ...,K} set of all bundles or offers ,
n = (nk|k = 1, ...,K) the number of firms in all K markets, nk is an integer
for k = 1, ...,K,
rik Firm i entry decision, rik =

1 if i enters market k,
0 else
qik Quantity of the k’th offer by firm i, qik ≥ 0,
Qk Total quantity of the k’th offering in the market, Qk =
∑
i
qik,
Q−i The vector of the total quantities produced by all firms except firm i,
Fk Fixed cost of entering the k’th market, Fk ≥ 0,
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vk Variable cost of producing each unit of the k’th offer, vk ≥ 0,
Πik(qik; Q−i) Profit of firm i from selling qik units of the bundle k, given Q−i,
Πˆk(n) Equilibrium profit of firms in the k’th market,
yj ≡ (yjk|k = 1, ...,K) The vector of customer j’s purchase levels for the k offers,
yk ≡
∑
j
yjk the aggregte purchased quantity of offer k
y ≡ (
∑
j
yjk|k = 1, ...,K) The vector of all customers’ aggregate purchase levels,
Y The set of all possible purchase vectors yj ,
Uj(yj) Utility function of customer j for consumption yj , in monetary units
y′jt =
∑
k
aktyjk Customer j’s consumption levels for each component product t,
U ′jt(y
′
jt) Customer j’s utility function for standalone product t,
Sj(yj ,p) ≡ Uj(yj)− p · yj , Customer j’s net value for yj at prices p.
3.3.2 The Walrasian Equilibrium
Two Walrasian equilibrium conditions determine the prices and the quantities in equi-
librium:
a) Customers choose utility maximizing purchase quantities:
We assume customers do not have any budget constraints, however they always have
an alternative opportunity to spend each dollar to gain a utility of one. In other words,
the marginal utility of saving each dollar equals one. Thus, given any price vector p,
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each customer j chooses the consumption levels yj that maximize total net value Sj .
max
yj∈Y
Sj(yj ; p)
subject to yj ≥ 0,
(3.1)
where,
y¯j(p) = arg maxY
Sj(yj ; p). (3.2)
In our formulation we do not consider any budget constraints.
b) Prices are set to clear the market:
Let Dk(p) =
∑
j y¯jk(p) represent the aggregate demand for offer k. Prices are chosen
so that Dk(p) = Qk for k = 1, ...,K. Therefore, under market clearing conditions, p is
such that pk · (Qk − Dk(p)) = 0 ∀k. This implies that markets clear for all products
with positive prices and any product in excess supply has a price equal to zero.
Let Q be the vector of the production quantities in all markets. Let D be a multi-
variate function such that Q = D(p). If D is an invertible function, the inverse demand
function for all offers is1:
p = D−1(Q) (3.3)
c) Firms choose optimal production levels:
Next, firms in each market k choose the optimal production levels in a one-period
game, given the price vector p. Each firm can sell in only one market k. Each firm i
1Orbay (2009) proposes a method for finding the optimal prices even if the inverse function is not computable.
42
producing offer k solves for the following profit maximizing problem.
max
qik
Πik(qik; Q−i)
subject to qik ≥ 0,
(3.4)
where Πik(qik; Q−i) = qik[pk(qik,Q−i) − vk]. Thus the optimal production levels and
the profit of the firm i are the following:
Πˆik(Q−i) = maxqik
qik[pk(qik,Q−i)− vk]; qik ≥ 0 (3.5)
qˆik(Q−i) = arg maxqik
qik[pk(qik,Q−i)− vk] (3.6)
In equilibrium, due to symmetry, all firms in the market k produce the same amount
qˆk, and the amount is a function of the number of firms present in all markets, thus,
Qk = nkqˆk(n). Therefore, for symmetric firms the equilibrium profits are a function of
the number of firms present in all markets, i.e., Πˆk(n).
3.3.2.1 Firm Entry Decisions and Equilibrium Characterization
Firm i has the binary choice of entering the k’th offering market or not. Then we define
nk+ ≡ (n1, n2, ..., nk + 1, nk+1, nk+2, ...) and:
rik(n) =

1 If Πˆk(nk+) ≥ Fk
0 Otherwise
(3.7)
We assume that each firm can enter at most one market k to enable comparison. So∑
k rik(n) = 1,∀i. Also I is assumed to be large enough to let new firms enter as long
as they make positive profits.
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To identify the equilibrium in this game, we define the following two sets:
S ≡ {n|Πˆk(n) ≥ min{Fk, nkFk},∀k}, S ∈ NK ,
N ≡ {n|Πˆk(nk+) < Fk, ∀k}, N ∈ NK .
(3.8)
Where set S contains all n such that every firms earns nonnegative net profit. Set S
also contains all the vectors n with one or more zero components, i.e., markets with no
entrants. Set N contains vectors n representing situation where no new firm is able to
make a profitable entry. We define E ≡ S ∩N,S,N,E ∈ IK .
Definition 3.1. The vector n is an equilibrium if and only if n ∈ E.
satisfies Πk(nk+) ≤ Fk ≤ Πk(n), ∀k and contains all equilibria.
The profit functions Πˆk(n) are defined over integers nk, ∀k. We relax integrality of
n, to define Πˆ′k(x) over continuous variables xk. We define corresponding regions N
′,
S′ and, E′ such that:
S′ ≡ {x|Πˆ′k(x) ≥ min{Fk, xkFk},∀k}, S′ ∈ RK≥0,
N ′ ≡ {x|Πˆ′k(xk+) < Fk, ∃k}, N ′ ∈ RK≥0,
E′ ≡ S′ ∩N ′, E′ ∈ RK≥0.
(3.9)
The region E′ contains the set E. In the analysis that follows we use the relaxed profit
functions to identify E′.
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3.4 Quadratic Utility Functions and Two Products with
Matched-Quantity Bundles
In this section we analyze an example commonly studied in the literature. We examine
an oligopoly where firms have the ability to sell one of the 3 bundles consisting of a
subset of 2 standalone components A and B. The three bundles are {A}, {B}, and a
bundle with fixed proportions {AB}. In a sequential entry game, each firm i makes a
decision to enter either one of the bundle markets where positive profits are attainable
post-entry. We assume firms in each market have identical cost structures and hence
are identical in each market. The entry game stops when there is no further entry.
We focus on two scenarios that have been extensively studied in the literature:
• Exclusive Bundling: One of the goods is only included in the bundle and not sold
separately.
• Mixed bundling: Both products are sold independently, as well as in a bundle.
On the demand side, customers have quadratic and strictly concave utility functions,
expressed in monetary terms. We study two variations of the exclusive bundling and
mixed bundling scenarios:
• With one customer group.
• With multiple customer groups.
In the following sections we study four different cases, i.e., Exclusive Bundling and
one customer group, Exclusive Bundling and multiple customer groups, Mixed Bundling
and one customer group, and Mixed Bundling and multiple customer groups. We present
analytical and numerical results for each case.
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3.4.1 Exclusive Bundling and One Customer Group
The majority of previous research on competitive bundling considers two firms: a mo-
nopolist who offers a monopoly product tied to a competitive product and competes
with a second firm who offers the competitive product only. We first study the following
oligopolistic markets,
Case 3.1.
Supply Side: There are two types of firms in two sub-markets: type 1 that offers the
competitive product {A} in the first sub-market and type 2 that offers a matched-
quantity bundle of the competitive product and an exclusive product {AB} in the
second sub-market.
Demand Side: There is one customer group with quadratic utility function.
The customer chooses consumption vector y to maximize net value, S:2
U(y) = U ′1(y
′
1) + U
′
2(y
′
2)
=

a1(y1 + y3) + a2y3 − b12 (y1 + y3)2 − b22 y23 if 0 ≤ y3 ≤ a2b2 and 0 ≤ y1 + y3 ≤ a1b1
a1(y1 + y3)− b12 (y1 + y3)2 +
a22
2b2
if y3 >
a2
b2
and 0 ≤ y1 + y3 ≤ a1b1
a2y3 − b22 y23 +
a21
2b1
if 0 ≤ y3 ≤ a2b2 and y1 + y3 > a1b1
a21
2b1
+
a22
2b2
if y3 >
a2
b2
and y1 + y3 >
a1
b1
(3.10)
S(y,p) = U(y)− p1y1 − p3y3 (3.11)
2Since there is only one customer group, we remove the index j from the expression, also we normalize the size of
the customer group to one. We can scale the results for a different size of the customer group.
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The optimal consumption choice given price vector p is:
y¯(p) = (y¯1, y¯3) =

(a1−p1b1 −
a2+p1−p3
b2
, a2+p1−p3b2 ) if 0 ≤
a2+p1−p3
b2
≤ a1−p1b1
(a1−p1b1 , 0) if
a1−p1
b1
≥ 0 and a2+p1−p3b2 < 0
(0, a1+a2−p3b1+b2 ) if
a2+p1−p3
b2
≥ 0 and a2+p1−p3b2 >
a1−p1
b1
(0, 0) if a2+p1−p3b2 < 0 and
a1−p1
b1
< 0
(3.12)
It is clear that there will be non-zero consumption for all components only if a1b2−a2b1 ≥
0, which we assume throughout this chapter. Next, prices are set such that both markets
clear. We find the following inverse-demand functions which characterize the Walrasian
equilibrium prices, p1 and p3.
p1(Q1, Q3) =

a1 − b1(Q1 +Q3) if Q1 +Q3 < a1b1
0 otherwise
p3(Q1, Q3) =

a1 + a2 − (b1 + b2)Q3 − b1Q1 if b1Q1 + (b1 + b2)Q3 < a1 + a2
0 otherwise
(3.13)
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The profit function of each type of firm is the following:
Πi1(qi1; Q−i,p) = p1(qi1 +Q−i,1, Q3) · qi1
=

(a1 − b1(qi1 +Q−i1)− b1Q3)qi1 if qi1 < a1b1 −Q−i1 −Q3,
0 otherwise.
(3.14)
Πi3(qi3; Q−i,p) = p3(Q1, qi3 +Q−i,3) · qi3
=

(a1 + a2 − b1Q1 − (b1 + b2)(qi3 +Q−i3))qi3 if qi3 < a1+a2b1+b2 −Q−i3 − b1b1+b2Q1
0 otherwise
(3.15)
Thus the optimal production level for each firm is the following:
qˆi1(Q−i,1, Q3) =

1
2
(
a1
b1
−Q−i1 −Q3
)
if 0 < a1b1 −Q−i1 −Q3,
0 otherwise.
(3.16)
qˆi3(Q−i,3, Q1) =

1
2
(
a1+a2
b1+b2
−Q−i3 − b1b1+b2Q1
)
if 0 < a1+a2b1+b2 −Q−i3 − b1b1+b2Q1
0 otherwise
(3.17)
We assume that all firms in each market are symmetric, and have the same optimal
production level, i.e. qik = qk for any firm i selling product k. These levels only depend
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on the number of players in each market and are:
qˆ1 =

1
b1
(
a1(b1+b2)+(a1b2−a2b1)n3
b2(1+n1)(1+n3)+b1(1+n1+n3)
)
if n1 ≥ 1,
0 if n1 = 0,
(3.18)
qˆ3 =

a1+a2+a2n1
b2(1+n1)(1+n3)+b1(1+n1+n3)
if n3 ≥ 1,
0 if n3 = 0.
(3.19)
Similarly, the equilibrium prices will only depend on the number of players in each
market:
p1(n1, n3) =

a1(b1+b2)+(a1b2−a2b1)n3
b2(1+n1)(1+n3)+b1(1+n1+n3)
if n1 ≥ 1,
0 if n1 = 0,
(3.20)
p3(n1, n3) =

(b1 + b2)
(
a1+a2+a2n1
b2(1+n1)(1+n3)+b1(1+n1+n3)
)
if n3 ≥ 1,
0 if n3 = 0,
(3.21)
Result 3.1. The equilibrium profit for each type of the firms given the total number of
players in each market is the following:
Πˆ1(n1, n3) =

1
b1
(
a1(b1+b2)+(a1b2−a2b1)n3
b2(1+n1)(1+n3)+b1(1+n1+n3)
)2
if n1 ≥ 1,
0 if n1 = 0,
(3.22)
Πˆ3(n1, n3) =

(b1 + b2)
(
a1+a2+a2n1
b2(1+n1)(1+n3)+b1(1+n1+n3)
)2
if n3 ≥ 1,
0 if n3 = 0,
(3.23)
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The continuous relaxations of the profit functions are defined as
Πˆ′1(x1, x3) =
1
b1
(
a1(b1 + b2) + (a1b2 − a2b1)x3
b2(1 + x1)(1 + x3) + b1(1 + x1 + x3)
)2
,
Πˆ′3(x1, x3) = (b1 + b2)
(
a1 + a2 + a2x1
b2(1 + x1)(1 + x3) + b1(1 + x1 + x3)
)2
.
(3.24)
Our goal here is to determine the number of players in each market in equilibrium,
i.e., where every firm on the market makes non-negative profits but no new firm can
enter and make a profit in any of the markets. The number of firms who can successfully
enter each market is a function of the fixed cost of entry in that market.
Result 3.2. Given that a1b2−a2b1 ≥ 0, the continuous relaxations of the profit functions
of both types of firms are strictly monotonically decreasing in each xk, k = 1, 3.
∂Πˆ′1
∂x1
= −2(b1 + b2 + b2x3)(a2b1x3 − a1(b1 + b2 + b2x3))
2
b1(b2(1 + x1)(1 + x3) + b1(1 + x1 + x3))3
< 0,
∂Πˆ′1
∂x3
= −2(b1 + b2)(a1 + a2 + a2x1)(−a2b1x3 + a1(b1 + b2 + b2x3))
(b2(1 + x1)(1 + x3) + b1(1 + x1 + x3))3
< 0,
∂Πˆ′3
∂x1
= −2(b1 + b2)(a1 + a2 + a2x1)(−a2b1x3 + a1(b1 + b2 + b2x3))
(b2(1 + x1)(1 + x3) + b1(1 + x1 + x3))3
< 0,
∂Πˆ′3
∂x3
= −2(b1 + b2)(a1 + a2 + a2x1)
2(b1 + b2 + b2x1)
(b2(1 + x1)(1 + x3) + b1(1 + x1 + x3))3
< 0.
(3.25)
Result 3.3. The maximum values of the functions Πˆ′k occur at x = (0, 0), for k = 1, 2
thus
Πˆ′1(x1, x3) ≤ Πˆ′1(0, 0) =
a21
b1
∀x1, x2 ≥ 0
Πˆ′3(x1, x3) ≤ Πˆ′3(0, 0) =
(a1 + a2)
2
b1 + b2
∀x1, x2 ≥ 0
(3.26)
It is clear that for any F1 >
a21
b1
the firms entering the first market will not be able
to recover the fixed cost of entry, thus there will be no entrant in the first market.
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Similarly, for any F3 >
(a1+a2)2
b1+b2
there will be no entrant in the bundle market.
We can identify the boundary of the Survival region S′, i.e. the region that contains
all x1, x2 such that Πˆ
′
1(x1, x3) ≥ F1 and Πˆ′3(x1, x3) ≥ F3. For example, for the market
described in Figure 3.1, there are two curves limiting the Survival region.
Result 3.4. The Survival region S′ is defined by Πˆ′1(x1, x3) ≥ F1 and Πˆ′3(x1, x3) ≥ F3.
Monotonicity implies:

x1 ≤ −1 +
√
b1
F1
a1
b1
− x3
(
b1+a2
√
b1
F1
b1+b2(1+x3)
)
x3 ≤ −1 +
√
b1+b2
F3
a2
b2
+
√
b1+b2
F3
(a1b2−a2b1)
b2(b1+b2(1+x1))
− b1x1b1+b2(1+x1)
(3.27)
Figure 3.1: The Survival region S′ and the Survival Set S when a1 = 65.6, a2 = 34.9, b1 = 34.9, b2 = 68.7, F1 =
8.45, and F3 = 5.3.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of the Survival region S′. In this example the Survival
set S contains the points {(0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (2, 1), (0, 2), (1, 2)}. Figure 3.2
shows the No-Entry region N ′ for the same example. The No-Entry set N contains the
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points {(i, j)|i ≥ 2 and j ≥ 1, or i ≥ 1 and j ≥ 2}. For every point in the N ′ regions,
no new firm will enter either market, since it would not be able to recover the fixed cost
of entry.
Figure 3.2: The No-Entry region N ′ and the No-Entry Set N when a1 = 65.6, a2 = 34.9, b1 = 34.9, b2 = 68.7, F1 =
8.45, and F3 = 5.3.
All equilibria for the game in Case 3.1 lie in the intersection of sets S and N .
Figure 3.3 illsustrates the set E and the region E′ for an example of Case 3.1. The
set E contains two equilibrium points, which establishes that for Case 3.1 there can be
multiple equilibria.
52
Figure 3.3: The Equilibrium region E′ and the Equilibrium set E when a1 = 65.6, a2 = 34.9, b1 = 34.9, b2 =
68.7, F1 = 8.45, and F3 = 5.3.
Next we show that there can be markets with many equilibria. For Case 3.1, define
m(a1, a2, b1, b2, F1, F3) as the number of equilibrium solutions for the parameters set.
Result 3.5.
For any M > 0∃a1, a2, b1, b2, F1, F3 such that m(a1, a2, b1, b2, F1, F3) ≥M. (3.28)
Proof. Proof We can choose the parameters such that the boundaries of S′ have similar
slopes. We can rewrite Equation (3.30) as:

x1 + x3 ≤ −1 +
√
b1
F1
a1
b1
− x3
(
a2
√
b1
F1
−b2(1+x3)
b1+b2(1+x3)
)
x1 + x3 ≤ −1 +
√
b1+b2
F3
a2
b2
+
√
b1+b2
F3
(a1b2−a2b1)
b2(b1+b2(1+x1))
+ x1
(
b2(1+x1)
b1+b2(1+x1)
) (3.29)
∀ > 0, ∃a1, a2, b1, b2, F1, F3 such that
∣∣∣∣∣a2
√
b1
F1
−b2(1+x3)
b1+b2(1+x3)
∣∣∣∣∣ < , ∣∣∣ b2(1+x1)b1+b2(1+x1) ∣∣∣ < , and
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d
√
b1+b2
F3
(a1b2−a2b1)
b2(b1+b2(1+x1))

dx1
< .
For infinitesimally small b2,

∣∣∣∣∣a2
√
b1
F1
−b2(1+x3)
b1+b2(1+x3)
∣∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∣a2
√
b1
F1
b1
∣∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣ b2(1+x1)b1+b2(1+x1) ∣∣∣ ' 0
d

√
b1+b2
F3
(a1b2−a2b1)
b2(b1+b2(1+x1))

dx1
<
√
b1+b2
F3
(a1b2−a2b1)
(b1)2
< 

To fulfill the inequalities and also to ensure that a1b2 − a2b1 ≥ 0, we need a2 ' 0.
Therefore, the boundaries become:
x1 + x3 ≈ −1 + a1√
b1F1
x1 + x3 ≈ −1 + a1√
b1F3
is
(3.30)
Assuming that F3 ≥ F1, both Horizontal and vertical distances of these two parallel
lines are ∆ = a1√
b1F1
− a1√
b1F3
. For ∆ < 1 there are m(a1, a2, b1, b2, F1, F3) = b a1√b1F3 c
equilibria points along the parallel lines (Figure 3.4).

b a1√
b1F3
c ≥M
a1√
b1F1
− a1√
b1F3
< 1
 =⇒ F3 <
1
b1
( a1
M + 1
)2
and
F3
(
a1
a1 +
√
b1F1
)2
< F1 < F3.
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Figure 3.4: The Survival region S′ and the Equilibirum Set E when a1 = 10, a2 = 0.06, b1 = 1.06, b2 = 1.06, F1 =
1.5, and F3 = 1.3.
Next, we introduce two enumeration methods to find the equilibria of this game
under any market setting.
3.4.1.1 First Enumeration Method
We know from (3.25) that each function Π′k(xk) is monotonic decreasing in every xk,
i.e.,
∂Π′1
∂x1
< 0,
∂Π′1
∂x3
< 0,
∂Π′3
∂x3
< 0, and
∂Π′3
∂x1
< 0, which implies that the number of firms
entering each market will be capped by a function of the fixed cost of entry in that
respective market.
Next, we find the bounds on the solution space to improve computational efficiency.
We identify the maximum number of entrants possible nk in each market. We solve
the following problem for each market k, k = 1, 3 using the relaxed form of the profit
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functions (3.24).
x¯k = max
xk
xk
s.t. Πˆ′k(x1, x3) ≥ Fk
xk ≥ 0 for k = 1, 3
(3.31)
Finally, we define the solution space as SS = {n|0 ≤ nk ≤ dx¯ke, nk ∈ N for k = 1, 3}.
The set contains all possible equilibria. We enumerate all integer points in the set and
test to ensure that they are in E.
3.4.1.2 Second Enumeration Method
In order to find the equilibria more efficiently we can further limit the solution space.
We already know that the solution space is bounded by the boundaries of the Survival
region as defined in Equation (3.30). Next, we define another set of boundaries for
the No-Entry region. We can express this region as the intersection of the following
regions: Ni1 = {x|Πˆ′i(x1 + 1, x3) < Fi} and Ni2 = {x|Πˆ′i(x1, x3 + 1) < Fi} for i = 1, 2.
The No-Entry region is defined as N ′ = N11 ∩N22. In order to utilize an enumeration
approach, we introduce a well-defined alternative for region N ′ using N11 and N22.
Result 3.6. Define N¯ = {x|Πˆ′i(x1 + 1, x2 + 1) < Fi} for i = 1, 3, then N ⊆ N¯ .
Proof. Proof Suppose x˜ = (x1, x3) and x˜ ∈ N ′, therefore x˜ ∈ N11 and x˜ ∈ N22.
x˜ ∈ N11 implies that Πˆ′1(x1 + 1, x3) < F1. Due to monotonicity of the continuous
profit function we can conclude that, Πˆ′1(x1 + 1, x3 + 1) ≤ Πˆ′1(x1 + 1, x3) < F1, and
Πˆ′1(x1 + 1, x3 + 1) ≤ Πˆ′1(x1, x3 + 1) < F3. Thus, x˜ ∈ N¯ and N ′ ⊆ N¯ .
Next, we find the boundaries of the N¯ region, i.e., Πˆ′1(x1 + 1, x3 + 1) = F1 and
Πˆ′3(x1 + 1, x3 + 1) = F3
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Result 3.7. N¯ is defined by the inequalities
x1 ≤ −2− b1(1 + x3)
b1 + b2(2 + x3)
+
a1√
b1F1
− (a2
√
b1F1)(1 + x3)
F1(b1 + 2b2 + b2x3)
x3 ≤ −2− b1(1 + x1)
b1 + b2(2 + x1)
+
(a1 + a2(2 + x1))
√
(b1 + b2)F3
F3(b1 + b2(2 + x1))
(3.32)
We use the four boundaries obtained in Equations (3.30) and (3.32), to construct
the following enumeration steps for any set of parameters.
1. Find the values of the four intersection points of the Survival and No-Entry bound-
aries, i.e., si = (x1si, x3si) for i = 1, ..., 4.
2. Use the integer values bmini x1sic ≤ n1 ≤ dmaxi x1sie and bmini x3sic ≤ n3 ≤
dmaxi x3sie as the solution space for the enumeration method.
3. Eliminate parts of the solution space for which Πˆ′k(x1, x3) < Fk, Πˆ
′
k(x1+1, x3) > Fk
or Πˆ′k(x1, x3 + 1) > Fk for k = 1, 3.
3.4.2 Exclusive Bundling and Multiple Customer Groups
Case 3.2.
Supply Side: There are two types of firms in two sub-markets: type 1 that offers the
competitive product {A} in the first sub-market and type 2 that offers a matched-
quantity bundle of the competitive product and an exclusive product {AB} in the
second sub-market.
Demand Side: We now allow for multiple customer groups in the market, with the
following heterogeneous utility functions.
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Uj(yj) = U
′
j1(y
′
j1) + U
′
j2(y
′
j2) = aj1(yj1 + yj3) + aj2yj3 −
bj1
2
(yj1 + yj3)
2 − bj2
2
y2j3
(3.33)
Where Uj(yj) is the total utility of the customer j from consuming yj1 unit of good 1
and yj3 unit of the bundle, j = 1, 2, ..., J .
As before, customer choose consumption levels yjk given price vector p, to maximize
their net value, Sj(yj ,pj) = Uj(yj) − p · yj . Customers’ optimal consumption levels
given the price vector p is
y¯j(p) = (y¯j1, y¯j3) =

(
aj1−p1
bj1
− aj2+p1−p3bj2 ,
aj2+p1−p3
bj2
) if 0 ≤ aj2+p1−p3bj2 ≤
aj1−p1
bj1
(
aj1−p1
bj1
, 0) if
aj1−p1
bj1
≥ 0 and aj2+p1−p3bj2 < 0
(0,
aj1+aj2−p3
bj1+bj2
) if
aj2+p1−p3
bj2
≥ 0 and aj2+p1−p3bj2 >
aj1−p1
bj1
(0, 0) if
aj2+p1−p3
bj2
< 0 and
aj1−p1
bj1
< 0
(3.34)
For tractability, we assume that for each customer j the inequality aj1bj2 − aj2bj1 ≥ 0
holds. The aggregate consumption levels of all customers of product 1 and the bundle
is:
y¯(p) = (y¯1, y¯3) = (
∑
j
aj1 − p1
bj1
− aj2 + p1 − p3
bj2
,
∑
j
aj2 + p1 − p3
bj2
) (3.35)
Next, prices are set such that both markets clear. We find the following inverse-demand
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functions which characterize the Walrasian equilibrium prices, p1 and p3.
p1(Q1, Q3) =

∑
j
aj1
bj1
−Q1−Q3∑
j
1
bj1
if Q1 +Q3 <
∑
j
aj1
bj1
0 otherwise
p3(Q1, Q3) =

∑
j
aj1
bj1
−Q1−Q3∑
j
1
bj1
+
∑
j
aj2
bj2
−Q3∑
j
1
bj2
if Q1∑
j
1
bj1
+Q3(
1
1∑
j bj1
+ 11∑
j bj2
) <
∑
j
aj1
bj1∑
j
1
bj1
+
∑
j
aj2
bj2∑
j
1
bj2
0 otherwise
(3.36)
The aggregate demand of J customer groups can be defined as the demand of one
representative customer group with the following parameters.
a1 =
∑
j
aj1
bj1∑
j
1
bj1
, a2 =
∑
j
aj2
bj2∑
j
1
bj2
, (3.37)
b1 =
1∑
j
1
bj1
, b2 =
1∑
j
1
bj2
.
For example for the case of two customer groups, we have:
a1 =
a11b21 + a21b11
b11 + b21
, a2 =
a12b22 + a22b12
b12 + b22
, (3.38)
b1 =
b11b21
b11 + b21
, b2 =
b12b22
b12 + b12
.
All the results we derived in the one customer group case can be extended to multiple
customer groups by replacing a1, a2, b1, and b2 with their respective equivalents in the
multiple customer groups case.
3.4.3 Mixed Bundling and One Customer Group
In this section, we extend the model to allow for mixed bundling.
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Case 3.3.
Supply Side: There are three types of firms in three sub-markets: type 1 that offers
the product {A} in the first sub-market, type 2 that offers the product {B} in the
second sub-market, and type 3 that offers the bundle of two products {AB} in the
third sub-market.
Demand Side: There is one customer group with the following quadratic utility
function.
U(y) = U ′1(y
′
1) + U
′
2(y
′
2) = a1(y1 + y3) + a2(y2 + y3)−
b1
2
(y1 + y3)
2 − b2
2
(y2 + y3)
2.
(3.39)
The utility functions are concave in the consumption levels. Thus, the first order con-
ditions can reveal the optimal consumption levels for any given set of p1, p2, p3.
3
y¯(p) = (y¯1, y¯2, y¯3) =

(a1−p1b1 − y¯3,
a2−p2
b2
− y¯3, y¯3) if p1 + p2 = p3 and p1 ≤ a1 and p2 ≤ a2,
(a1−p1b1 ,
a2−p2
b2
, 0) if p1 + p2 < p3 and p1 ≤ a1 and p2 ≤ a2,
(0, a2−p2b2 −
a1+p2−p3
b1
, a1+p2−p3b1 ) if p1 + p2 > p3 and
a2−p2
b2
≥ a1+p2−p3b1 ≥ 0,
(a1−p1b1 −
a2+p1−p3
b2
, 0, a2+p1−p3b2 ) if p1 + p2 > p3 and
a1−p1
b1
≥ a2+p1−p3b2 ≥ 0.
(3.40)
Prices p1, p2 and p3 will be such as to ensure non-negative demand for the offerings.
Thus in equilibrium p3 = p1 + p2.
3Since there is only one customer group, we removed the index j from the expression, also we normalized the size
of the customer group to one. We can scale the results for a different size of the customer group.
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Next, prices are set such that both markets clear. We find the following inverse-
demand functions which characterize the Walrasian equilibrium prices, p1 and p3. and
from there we derive the following inverse demand functions.
p1(Q1, Q2, Q3) =

a1 − b1(Q1 +Q3) if Q1 +Q3 ≤ a1b1
0 otherwise
p2(Q1, Q2, Q3) =

a2 − b2(Q2 +Q3) if Q2 +Q3 ≤ a2b2
0 otherwise
p3(Q1, Q2, Q3) = p1(Q1, Q2, Q3) + p2(Q1, Q2, Q3)
(3.41)
Prices such that p1 +p2 = p3, ensure market clearing and also prevent resale among the
customers.
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We obtain the following profit functions for each type of the firms:
Πi1(qi1; Q−i,p) = p1(qi1 +Q−i,1, Q2, Q3) · qi1 (3.42)
=

(a1 − b1(qi1 +Q−i1)− b1Q3)qi1 if qi1 < a1b1 −Q−i1 −Q3,
0 otherwise.
Πi2(qi2; Q−i,p) = p2(Q1, qi2 +Q−i,2, Q3) · qi2 (3.43)
=

(a2 − b2(qi2 +Q−i2)− b2Q3)qi2 if qi2 < a2b2 −Q−i2 −Q3,
0 otherwise.
Πi3(qi3; Q−i,p) = p3(Q1, Q2, qi3 +Q−i,3) · qi3 (3.44)
=

(a1 + a2 − b1Q1 − b2Q2 − (b1 + b2)(qi3 +Q−i3))qi3 if qi1 < a1b1 −Q−i3 −Q1
and qi2 <
a2
b2
−Q−i3 −Q2
(a1 − b1Q1 − b1(qi3 +Q−i3))qi3 if qi1 < a1b1 −Q−i3 −Q1
and qi2 ≥ a2b2 −Q−i3 −Q2
(a2 − b2Q2 − b2(qi3 +Q−i3))qi3 if qi1 ≥ a1b1 −Q−i3 −Q1
and qi2 <
a2
b2
−Q−i3 −Q2
0 otherwise
Thus the optimal production level for each firm in each of the markets is the follow-
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ing:
qˆi1(Q−i,1, Q2, Q3) =

1
2
(
a1
b1
−Q−i1 −Q3
)
if 0 < a1b1 −Q−i1 −Q3,
0 otherwise.
(3.45)
qˆi2(Q1, Q−i,2, Q3) =

1
2
(
a2
b2
−Q−i2 −Q3
)
if 0 < a1b1 −Q−i1 −Q3,
0 otherwise.
(3.46)
qˆi3(Q1, Q2, Q−i,3) =

1
2
(
a1+a2
b1+b2
−Q−i3 − b1b1+b2Q1 − b2b1+b2Q2
)
if qi1 <
a1
b1
−Q−i3 −Q1,
and qi2 <
a2
b2
−Q−i3 −Q2,
0 otherwise.
(3.47)
Assuming symmetry between the firms competing in each market, we can find the
following optimal production quantities for each producer in each market
qˆ1(n1, n2, n3) =

1
b1
(
a1(b1+b2)(1+n2)+(a1b2−a2b1)n3
b2(1+n1)(1+n2+n3)+b1(1+n2)(1+n1+n3)
)
if n1 ≥ 1,
0 if n1 = 0,
(3.48)
qˆ2(n1, n2, n3) =

1
b2
(
a2(b1+b2)(1+n1)−(a1b2−a2b1)n3
b2(1+n1)(1+n2+n3)+b1(1+n2)(1+n1+n3)
)
if n2 ≥ 1,
0 if n2 = 0,
(3.49)
qˆ3(n1, n2, n3) =

a1(1+n2)+a2(1+n1)
b2(1+n1)(1+n2+n3)+b1(1+n2)(1+n1+n3)
if n3 ≥ 1
0 if n3 = 0.
(3.50)
Result 3.8. The equilibrium profit for each type of firm given the number of players in
each market is the following:
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Πˆ1(n1, n2, n3) =

1
b1
(
a1(b1+b2)(1+n2)+(a1b2−a2b1)n3
b2(1+n1)(1+n2+n3)+b1(1+n2)(1+n1+n3)
)2
if n1 ≥ 1,
0 if n1 = 0,
(3.51)
Πˆ2(n1, n2, n3) =

1
b2
(
a2(b1+b2)(1+n1)−(a1b2−a2b1)n3
b2(1+n1)(1+n2+n3)+b1(1+n2)(1+n1+n3)
)2
if n2 ≥ 1,
0 if n2 = 0,
(3.52)
Πˆ3(n1, n2, n3) =

(b1 + b2)
(
a1(1+n2)+a2(1+n1)
b2(1+n1)(1+n2+n3)+b1(1+n2)(1+n1+n3)
)2
if n3 ≥ 1
0 if n3 = 0.
(3.53)
Similar to 3.24, the continuous relaxations of the profit functions are defined as
Πˆ′1(x1, x2, x3) =
1
b1
(
a1(b1 + b2)(1 + n2) + (a1b2 − a2b1)x3
b2(1 + x1)(1 + n2 + x3) + b1(1 + n2)(1 + x1 + x3)
)2
(3.54)
Πˆ′2(x1, x2, x3) =
1
b2
(
a2(b1 + b2)(1 + x1)− (a1b2 − a2b1)x3
b2(1 + x1)(1 + n2 + x3) + b1(1 + n2)(1 + x1 + x3)
)2
(3.55)
Πˆ′3(x1, x2, x3) = (b1 + b2)
(
a1(1 + n2) + a2(1 + x1)
b2(1 + x1)(1 + n2 + x3) + b1(1 + n2)(1 + x1 + x3)
)2
if x3 ≥ 1
(3.56)
We observe from the profit functions that Πi1 + Πi2 > Πi3. In a Cournot model,
because of quantity matching the bundling firm is in a disadvantaged position, unless
it can benefit from a significant fixed cost reduction. We assumed the variable costs
are negligible, thus bundling is viable only if it involves a reduction in the fixed cost of
entry.
Result 3.9. Bundling is viable if and only if
F1 + F2 − F3 > b1 + b2
b1b2
( a2b1(1 + n1 + n3)− a1b2(1 + n2 + n3)
b1(1 + n2)(1 + n1 + n3) + b2(1 + n1)(1 + n2 + n3)
)2
(3.57)
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Figure 3.5: The Survival region S′ when a1 = 9.94, a2 = 9.84, b1 = 0.42, b2 = 1.2, F1 = 10.6, F2 = 3.6, and F3 = 8.4.
We can identify the Survival region S′, the No-Entry region N ′ and the Equilibrium
region E′ for the mixed bundling case. Figure 3.5 illustrate the Survival region S′ for
the relaxed profit function Πˆ′ for k = 1, 2, 3.
Figure 3.6 illustrates N ′ the No-Entry region for the example. The intersection
of regions S′ and N ′ is the region E′ (Figure 3.7). As illustrated in Figure 3.7, the
Equilibrium region may have discontinuities. We are able to construct examples where
this game has no equilibrium or multiple equilibria.
Next, we develop an enumeration technique to find all the equilibria of this market
in terms of number of firms in each market.
3.4.3.1 Enumeration Method
To find all the equilibria of this market we need to identify the set E, i.e., find all
n = (n1, n2, n3) such that Πˆk(n) > min{Fk, nkFk} and Πˆk(nk+) < Fk for k = 1, 2, 3.
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Figure 3.6: The No-Entry region N ′ when a1 = 9.94, a2 = 9.84, b1 = 0.42, b2 = 1.2, F1 = 10.6, F2 = 3.6, and F3 =
8.4.
Figure 3.7: The Equilibrium region E′ when a1 = 9.94, a2 = 9.84, b1 = 0.42, b2 = 1.2, F1 = 10.6, F2 = 3.6, and F3 =
8.4.
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First, we show that the solution space is bounded, due to monotonicity of the profit
functions.
Proposition 3.1. The continuous relaxations of the profit functions of all three types
of firms are strictly monotonically decreasing in the number of firms in their respective
markets.
∂Πˆ′1
∂x1
= −2((b1 + b2)(1 + x2) + b2x3)(a1(b1 + b2)(1 + x2) + a1b2x3 − a2b1x3)
2
b1(b2(1 + x1)(1 + x2 + x3) + b1(1 + x2)(1 + x1 + x3))3
< 0,
∂Πˆ′2
∂x2
= −2((b1 + b2)(1 + x1) + b1x3)(a2(b1 + b2)(1 + x1) + a2b1x3 − a1b2x3)
2
b2(b2(1 + x1)(1 + x2 + x3) + b1(1 + x2)(1 + x1 + x3))3
< 0,
∂Πˆ′3
∂x3
= −2(b1 + b2)(a1 + a2 + a2x1 + a1x2)
2(b1 + b2 + b2x1 + b1x2)
(b1(b2(1 + x1)(1 + x2 + x3) + b1(1 + x2)(1 + x1 + x3))3
< 0.
(3.58)
This implies that the number of firms entering each market will be capped by a
function of the fixed cost of entry in that respective market.
Next, we find bounds on the solution space to improve computational efficiency.
We identify the maximum nk for each market. This is the maximum number of firms
that are able to enter each market and make positive profit. We solve the following
maximization problem for each market k, k = 1, 2, 3 using the relaxed profit functions.
x¯k = max
x
xk
s.t. Πˆk(x1, x2, x3) ≥ Fk
xk ≥ 0 for k = 1, 2, 3
(3.59)
Finally, we define the enumeration space as {n|0 ≤ nk ≤ dx¯ke, nk ∈ N for k =
1, 2, 3}.
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3.4.4 Mixed Bundling and Multiple Customer Groups
Similar to the pure bundling case, we can find the parameters representing multiple
customer groups, to find the answers to this scenario.
Uj(yj)
= U ′j1(y
′
j1) + U
′
j2(y
′
j2) = aj1(yj1 + yj3) + aj2(yj1 + yj3)−
bj1
2
(yj1 + yj3)
2 − bj2
2
(yj1 + yj3)
2
(3.60)
Total utility of the customer j from consuming yj1 unit of product 1, yj2 unit of product
2 and yj3 unit of the bundle, j = 1, 2, ..., J .
Each customer group j chooses optimal consumption levels according to its utility
function.
y¯j(p) = (y¯j1, y¯j2, y¯j3) =

(
aj1−p1
bj1
− y¯j3, aj2−p2bj2 − y¯j3, y¯j3) if p1 + p2 = p3 and p1 ≤ aj1 and p2 ≤ aj2,
(
aj1−p1
bj1
,
aj2−p2
bj2
, 0) if p1 + p2 < p3 and p1 ≤ aj1 and p2 ≤ aj2,
(0,
aj2−p2
bj2
− aj1+p2−p3bj1 ,
aj1+p2−p3
bj1
) if p1 + p2 > p3 and
aj2−p2
bj2
≥ aj1+p2−p3bj1 ≥ 0,
(
aj1−p1
bj1
− aj2+p1−p3bj2 , 0,
aj2+p1−p3
bj2
) if p1 + p2 > p3 and
aj1−p1
bj1
≥ aj2+p1−p3bj2 ≥ 0.
(3.61)
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The Walrasian equilibrium prices are p1, p2 and p3.
p1(Q1, Q3) =

∑
j
aj1
bj1
−Q1−Q3∑
j
1
bj1
if Q1 +Q3 <
∑
j
aj1
bj1
0 otherwise
p2(Q2, Q3) =

∑
j
aj2
bj2
−Q2−Q3∑
j
1
bj2
if Q2 +Q3 <
∑
j
aj2
bj2
0 otherwise
p3(Q1, Q3) = p1(Q1, Q3) + p2(Q2, Q3)
(3.62)
p1(Q1, Q2, Q3) =

∑
j
aj1
bj1
−Q1−Q3∑
j
1
bj1
if Q1 +Q3 ≤
∑
j
aj1
bj1
0 otherwise
p2(Q1, Q2, Q3) =

∑
j
aj2
bj2
−Q2−Q3∑
j
1
bj2
if Q2 +Q3 ≤
∑
j
aj2
bj2
0 otherwise
p3(Q1, Q2, Q3) = p1(Q1, Q2, Q3) + p2(Q1, Q2, Q3)
(3.63)
We can associate the aggregate demand to a representative customer with the following
parameters:
a1 =
∑
j
aj1
bj1∑
j
1
bj1
, a2 =
∑
j
aj2
bj2∑
j
1
bj2
, (3.64)
b1 =
1∑
j
1
bj1
, b2 =
1∑
j
1
bj2
. (3.65)
Similar to Section 3.4.2 we can extended all the results obtained in a single costumer
market to the multiple customer groups case.
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3.4.4.1 Numerical Experiments
To ensure that the enumeration methods are efficient, we analyzed multiple instances of
the game under different values of parameters to identify major patterns in the market
structure.
Market Number of instances
Average computation
time per instance
Exclusive Bundling
and One Customer
Group
5000 4s
Exclusive Bundling
and Multiple
Customer Group
5000 4s
Mixed Bundling and
One Customer Group
1000 10s
Mixed Bundling and
Multiple Customer
Group
1000 10s
Table 3.2: A summay of the enumeration results.
The main driver of the computation time is the optimization function that finds
the maximum values of nk for k = 1, 2, 3. These games can potentially have multiple
equilibria.
Result 3.10. We observed that the ratio of a1b2a2b1 can be a factor determining the maxi-
mum number of equilibria for Case 3.3. Figure 3.8 shows an example.
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Figure 3.8: Number of equilibria for Case 3.3 as a function of a1b2
a2b1
.
Result 3.11. In Case 3.3, the number of firms in markets {A} and {B} grow in the
same direction while the number of {AB} firms shrinks in the opposite direction, and
vice-versa.
In other words more entry into the bundle market drives firms out of the single
product markets.
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3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we studied bundling under competition in a more general setting than
the traditional literature. We used a Cournot framework in which multiple firms can
enter and offer different combinations of independent products and bundles composed of
those products. Firms with the same offers are undifferentiated and engage in quantity
competition. The fixed cost for entering the market for each offer, which may consist
of some combination of the independent components and bundles, varies depending on
the combination. On the demand side, customers buy some mix of the products and
bundles available in the market so as to maximize their utility evaluated at the level of
the components (products or scenarios).
We presented a general formulation for the competitive multi-product, multi-offer,
multi customer group, multi-firm problem. We then investigated certain specific cases,
in which we assumed that customer utility functions are quadratic and additive across
the components. In our first example, firms are of two types. One type offers a single
product, the other type offers that product bundled with another. We showed that
it is possible to have multiple equilibria with both types of firms and that there is no
upper bound to the number of equilibria that may occur. We then considered the case
where there are three types of firms – two that offer each of the two products, and one
that offers a bundle of the two. We found that bundling can be a viable strategy when
the fixed cost of entry for the bundle is lower than the sum of the entry costs for the
independent product markets.
In order to identify all the equilibria in a given case, we proposed enumeration
methods that efficiently determine all the equilibria in both these scenarios. Once
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again, multiple equilibria can occur.
The main managerial implications about the drivers of bundling are the following:
• Bundles create value when each additional component in the bundle adds value
that is comparable to the other components in the bundle.
• Bundling is viable when the cost of entry to the bundled market is less than the
aggregate cost of entering separate markets.
The Cournot model that we presented in this chapter has considerable potential.
The most general formulation is not very tractable; however, we were able to obtain
results for certain special cases that provide insights about entry costs, and oligopolistic
competition that considerably extend the existing literature.
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Chapter 4 Design of Bundles
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study the effects of bundle design on firm profits. We take the
choice of bundle proportions as a decision option that firms can employ to maximize
profits. We have not found previous research addressing the topic of bundle design. In
all previous papers the bundle is usually assumed to be pre-designed with given product
mix proportions (Venkatesh and Mahajan 2009, Raghunathan and Sarkar 2016).
Telecom companies have been choosing alternative bundle designs for a long time
to address specific market segments. For example, some tourist phone plans include
very few minutes of phone call time but high data limits, while others allow very low
data limits and more call minutes. Each design is suitable for a particular customer
group with specific preferences. Another example is cable TV companies who offer
skinny bundles and customized bundles to give customers more flexibility in choosing
their desired mix of channels (Abdallah et al. 2017). Similarly, we see multiple bundle
designs in many products cases such as gift baskets, tool dets, and car options.
We assume that firms can offer bundles of two components to customers who have
quadratic utility functions. We show that for a monopolist firm offering a bundle of
the two products there is always an optimal bundle proportion. This proportion is a
function of the satiation consumption levels of the customer. We extend this case to the
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oligopolistic setting by allowing multiple firms to enter the bundle market and character-
ize number of firms that are able to survive in equilibrium. Next we study a monopolist
bundler selling to two customer groups. If customer groups are heterogeneous, the firm
can have two distinct choices for the bundle proportion that maximize profit. This can
extend to multiple customer groups as well. Finally, we study two symmetric firms
offering independent bundles to multiple customer groups. In equilibrium both firms
choose the same bundle proportion. The optimal bundle proportion is a function of the
aggregate satiation consumption levels of all customers.
4.2 Model
In this section we study three different market settings with firms offering bundles with
arbitrary proportions of products {A} and {B}.
4.2.1 One Bundle and One Customer Group
4.2.1.1 Monopoly Bundling
Case 4.1.
Supply Side: There is one firm offering a bundle of two products {AB}. Each unit
of the bundle consists of α units of product {A} and 1 − α units of product {B},
0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Demand Side: There is one customer group with the following quadratic utility and
surplus functions for consumption of {A} and {B}.
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U(y) = a1(αy) + a2((1− α)y)− b1
2
(αy)2 − b2
2
((1− α)y)2
= (a1α+ a2(1− α))y − b1α
2 + b2(1− α)2
2
y2, (4.1)
S(y, p) = U(y)− py. (4.2)
For b1, b2 > 0, the surplus function is concave in the consumption level. Thus, the first
order conditions reveals the optimal consumption level for any p.
y¯(p) =

a1α+a2(1−α)−p
b2−2αb2+α2(b1+b2) if p ≤ a1α+ a2(1− α)
0 if p > a1α+ a2(1− α)
(4.3)
Next, the price p is set such that the market clears. We find the following inverse-
demand function which characterizes the Walrasian equilibrium price p.
p(Q) =

a1α+ a2(1− α)− (b2 − 2αb2 + α2(b1 + b2))Q if Q ≤ a1α+a2(1−α)b2−2αb2+α2(b1+b2)
0 otherwise
(4.4)
The monopolist selling the bundle chooses the optimal production level Qˆ to maximize
profit. The optimal Qˆ and its corresponding profit level Πˆ are:
Qˆ(α) =
a1α+ a2(1− α)
2(α2b1 + b2(1− α)2)
Πˆ(α) =
(a1α+ a2(1− α))2
4(α2b1 + b2(1− α)2)
(4.5)
Result 4.1. In Case 4.1, the monopolist chooses α∗ as follows.
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α∗ =
a1b2
a2b1 + a1b2
for a1, a2 ≥ 0, b1, b2 > 0 (4.6)
Proof. The profit function Πˆ is not concave; however it is unimodal (Figure 4.1). The
first derivative is given by:
For a1, a2 ≥ 0, b1, b2 > 0,
∂Πˆ
∂α
= −(a1α+ a2(1− α))(a2b1α− a1b2(1− α))
2(α2b1 + b2(1− α)2)2

> 0 for 0 ≤ α < a1b2a2b1+a1b2 ,
= 0 for α = a1b2a2b1+a1b2 ,
< 0 for a1b2a2b1+a1b2 < α ≤ 1.
(4.7)
Figure 4.1: a) The profit function Πˆ, b) The first derivative of the profit function Πˆ with respect to α, c) The second
derivative of the profit function Πˆ with respect to α.
The optimal bundle proportion α∗ represents the ratio of the magnitudes of cus-
tomer’s satiation points for both products.
For a1, a2 ≥ 0, b1, b2 > 0 the bundler’s profit is maximized at α∗ = a1b2a2b1+a1b2 which
gives a profit of Πˆ(α∗) = a
2
1b2+a
2
2b1
4b1b2
. In traditional bundling models the bundle proportion
is assumed to be α = 0.5, which gives a profit of Πˆ(0.5) = (a1+a2)
2
4(b1+b2)
≤ Πˆ(α∗).
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4.2.1.2 Oligopolistic Bundling
Case 4.2.
Supply Side: There are n symmetric firms each offering an identical bundle of two
products {AB}. Each unit of the bundle consists of α units of product {A} and
1− α units of product {B}, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Demand Side: There is one customer group with the same quadratic utility and
surplus functions as in Equations (4.1) and (4.2).
The same results as in Equations (4.3) and (4.4) hold for customer’s optimal con-
sumption level and market clearing prices. However, each symmetric firm’s optimal
production level, qˆ, and equilibrium profit, pˆi, is a function of the total number of firms
in the market, n:
qˆ(α;n) =
a1α+ a2(1− α)
(n+ 1)(α2b1 + b2(1− α)2)
pˆi(α;n) =
(a1α+ a2(1− α))2
(n+ 1)2(α2b1 + b2(1− α)2)
(4.8)
Note that Πˆ(α) equals pˆi(α;n) when n = 1. Therefore firms will choose the same α∗
under 4.1 as in Equation ((4.6)).
Result 4.2. For Case 4.2, in equilibrium, all n firms choose α∗ as follows.
α∗ =
a1b2
a2b1 + a1b2
for a1, a2 ≥ 0, b1, b2 > 0, (4.9)
Now suppose that each entering firm incurs a fixed cost F .
Result 4.3. The number of firms that can enter and survive in Case 4.2 with a bundle
proportion α is
n(α) = b a1α+ a2(1− α)√
F (α2b1 + (1− α)2b2)
c − 1 (4.10)
78
Result 4.4. For a1, a2 ≥ 0, b1, b2 > 0 the maximum number of firms that can enter
with the optimal bundle proportion α∗ and survive in a market with a fixed cost of F is
n(α∗) = b a1α
∗ + a2(1− α∗)√
F (α∗2b1 + (1− α∗)2b2)
c − 1 = ba
2
1b2 + a
2
2b1√
Fb1b2
c − 1 (4.11)
Note that n(α∗) ≥ n(α) for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
4.2.2 One Bundle and Two Customer Groups
4.2.2.1 Monopoly Bundling
Case 4.3.
Supply Side: There is one firm offering a bundle of two products {AB}. Each unit
of the bundle consists of α units of product {A} and 1 − α units of product {B},
0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Demand Side: There are two customer groups, j = 1, 2, with the following quadratic
utility and surplus functions for consumption of {A} and {B}.
Uj(yj) = (aj1α+ aj2(1− α))yj − bj1α
2 + bj2(1− α)2
2
y2j , for j = 1, 2, (4.12)
Sj(yj , p) = U(yj)− pyj (4.13)
We can find the optimal consumption level for every customer given the price p similar
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to (4.3).
y¯j(p) =

aj1α+aj2(1−α)−p
bj1α2+bj2(1−α)2 if p ≤ aj1α+ aj2(1− α),
0 if p > aj1α+ aj2(1− α).
(4.14)
We assume that p ≤ minj aj1α + aj2(1 − α), for j = 1, 2 for simplicity. The aggregate
consumption level for all customer groups is given by y¯(p) =
∑
j
Aj−p
Bj
= A1−pB1 +
A2−p
B2
where A1
.
= a11α+ a12(1− α), A2 .= a21α+ a22(1− α), B1 .= b11α2 + b12(1− α)2, and
B2
.
= b21α
2 + b22(1− α)2.
Next, the price p is set such that the markets clear. We find the following inverse-
demand function which characterizes the Walrasian equilibrium price p.
p(Q) =

A1B2+A2B1−B1B2Q
B1+B2
if Q ≤ A1B2+A2B1B1B2
0 otherwise
(4.15)
The monopolist firm chooses the optimal production level.
Qˆ(α) =
A1B2 +A2B1
2B1B2
Πˆ(α) =
(A1B2 +A2B1)
2
4(B1B2)(B1 +B2)
(4.16)
Our ultimate goal is to find the value of α that maximizes the profit function Πˆ(α).
The profit function need not have a unique maxima as we show in Figure 4.2.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.2: a)Unimodal profit function, b)Bi-modal profit function c)Bi-modal profit function
Figure 4.2 shows that the profit function may be bimodal. There can be two local
maxima for cases where the customers are quite heterogeneous. If only one bundle may
be offered, the profit of each local maximum can be evaluated. The parameters used in
Figure 4.2 are the following:
(A1, B1, A2, B2) =(a)
(
5α+ 1.6(1− α), 4.6α2 + 0.8(1− α)2, 1.2α+ 1.1(1− α), 4.1α2 + 1.4(1− α)2)
(b)
(
3.6α+ 3.6(1− α), 3.1α2 + 0.6(1− α)2, 3.1α+ 2.2(1− α), 0.4α2 + 3(1− α)2)
(c)
(
α+ 10(1− α), 10α2 + 0.5(1− α)2, 10α+ (1− α), 0.5α2 + 10(1− α)2)
Example 4.1. For a11 = a12 = a21 = a22 = A the profit function in Equation (4.16)
simplifies to
Πˆ(α) =
A2
4
(
1
b12(1− α)2 + b11α2 +
1
b22(1− α)2 + b21α2
)
(4.17)
Πˆ(α) = A
2
4 (pi1 + pi2) where pij
.
= 1
bj2(1−α)2+bj1α2 for j = 1, 2. The functions pi1 and
pi2 are not concave; however they are both unimodal (Figure 4.3). The first derivative
of pij for j = 1, 2 is:
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.3: a) The profit function pij , b) The first derivative of the profit function pij with respect to α, c) The second
derivative of the profit function pij with respect to α.
For b1, b2 > 0,
∂pij
∂α
=
2bj2(1− α)− 2bj1α
bj2(1− α)2 + bj1α2

> 0 for 0 ≤ α < bj2bj1+bj2 ,
= 0 for α =
bj2
bj1+bj2
,
< 0 for
bj2
bj1+bj2
< α ≤ 1.
(4.18)
pij(α) has only one maxima at α
∗
j =
bj2
bj1+bj2
and its maximum value equals to pi(α∗j ) =
1
bj1
+ 1bj2 .
For bj1 = 0 and bj2 > 0,
∂pij
∂α
=
2
1− α > 0 (4.19)
pij(α) has only one maxima at α
∗
j = 1 and its maximum value equals to pi(α
∗
j ) =
1
bj1
.
For bj2 = 0 and bj1 > 0,
∂pij
∂α
=
−2
α
< 0 (4.20)
pij(α) has only one maximum at α
∗
j = 0 and its value equals to pi(α
∗
j ) =
1
bj2
.
The bundler’s profit function Πˆ(α) can potentially have two maxima at α∗1 =
b12
b11+b12
and α∗2 =
b22
b21+b22
only if the magnitudes of pi(α∗1) and pi(α∗2) are comparable. Otherwise,
the function will have only one global maximum at the α∗j corresponding to the j with
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the largest pij(α
∗
j ).
For the general case of J customer groups, such that Aj = A for j = 1, ..., J , the
profit function is in the form of Πˆ(α) = A
2
4
∑
j
1
bj1(1−α)2+bj1α2 and can potentially have
J modes (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Profit function with three modes
4.2.2.2 Duopoly Bundling
Case 4.4.
Supply Side: There are two symmetric firms offering a bundle of two products
{AB}. Each unit of the bundle consists of α units of product {A} and 1−α units
of product {B}, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Demand Side: There are two customer groups, j = 1, 2, with the following quadratic
utility and surplus functions for consumption of {A} and {B}.
Uj(yj) = (aj1α+ aj2(1− α))yj − bj1α
2 + bj2(1− α)2
2
y2j , for j = 1, 2, (4.21)
Sj(yj , p) = U(yj)− pyj (4.22)
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The same results as in Equations (4.14) and (4.15) hold for the customers’ optimal
consumption levels and market clearing prices. However, each symmetric firm’s optimal
production level, qˆ, and equilibrium profit, pˆi, is:
qˆ(α) =
A1B2 +A2B1
3B1B2
pˆi(α) =
(A1B2 +A2B1)
2
9(B1B2)(B1 +B2)
(4.23)
Which is a scaled version of the monopoly profit and production quantity. Therefore
all monopoly results also hold for the duopoly case.
4.2.3 Two Bundling Firms with Distinct Bundles and Multiple Cus-
tomer Groups
In the general case, this is a three-stage game. In the first stage, each firm i decides to
enter or stay away from the bundle market.
ri(n) =

1 If Πˆ(n+ 1) ≥ F
0 Otherwise
(4.24)
For tractability we skip the first stage and assume that there are two firms in the market,
i.e., n = 2.
In the second stage, each firm chooses the optimal bundle proportion, given the
competitors choice of bundle proportion.
αˆ(β) = arg max Πˆ1(α;β)
βˆ(α) = arg max Πˆ2(β;α)
(4.25)
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Finally, in the last stage, firms choose their production quantities Qˆ1 and Qˆ2.
Qˆ1(Q2) = arg max Π1(Q1;Q2, α, β)
Qˆ2(Q1) = arg max Π2(Q2;Q1, α, β)
(4.26)
We can formalize this game as follows:
Case 4.5.
Supply Side: There are two firms offering bundles of two products {AB}. The
bundle offered by the first firm consists of α units of product {A} and 1− α units
of product {B}, α ≥ 0, and the bundle offered by the second firm consists of β
units of product {A} and 1− β units of product {B}, α, β ≥ 0.
Demand Side: There are multiple customer groups, j = 1, ..., J , with the following
quadratic utility and surplus functions for consumption of {A} and {B}.
Uj(yj) = aj1(αyj1 + βyj2) + aj2((1− α)yj1 + (1− β)yj2)
− bj1
2
(αyj1 + βyj2)
2 − bj2
2
((1− α)yj1 + (1− β)yj2)2, (4.27)
Sj(yj ,p) = Uj(yj)− p1yj1 − p2yj2. (4.28)
Without loss of generality we assume that α ≥ β. The surplus function is concave in
the consumption levels. Thus, the first order conditions reveal the optimal consumption
levels for any p1 and p2.
y¯j1 + y¯j2 =
aj1
bj1
+
aj2
bj2
+ p1
βbj1 − (1− β)bj2
(α− β)bj1bj2 − p2
αbj1 − (1− α)bj2
(α− β)bj1bj2 (4.29)
85
y¯j(p) =

(
β(aj2(β−α)−βp1+αp2)
(α−β)2bj2 +
(1−β)(aj1(α−β)−(1−β)p1+(1−α)p2)
(α−β)2bj1 ,
α(aj2(α−β)+βp1−αp2)
(α−β)2bj2 +
(1−α)(aj1(β−α)+(1−β)p1−(1−α)p2)
(α−β)2bj1
)
if α 6= β
(
aj1
bj1
+
aj2
bj2
, 0) if α = β and p1 < p2
(0,
aj1
bj1
+
aj2
bj2
) if α = β and p1 > p2
(yj1,
aj1
bj1
+
aj2
bj2
− yj1) if α = β and p1 = p2
Thus the aggregate consumption levels of all customers are:
y¯(p) =

(− β(α−β)
∑
j
aj2
bj2
+ 1−β(α−β)
∑
j
aj1
bj1
+ β(αp2−βp1)
(α−β)2
∑
j
1
bj2
+ (1−β)((1−α)p2−(1−β)p1)
(α−β)2
∑
j
1
bj1
,
− 1−α(α−β)
∑
j
aj1
bj1
+ α(α−β)
∑
j
aj2
bj2
− α(αp2−βp1)
(α−β)2
∑
j
1
bj2
− (1−α)((1−α)p2−(1−β)p1)
(α−β)2
∑
j
1
bj1
)
if α 6= β
(
∑
j
aj1
bj1
+
∑
j
aj2
bj2
, 0) if α = β and p1 < p2
(0,
∑
j
aj1
bj1
+
∑
j
aj2
bj2
) if α = β and p1 > p2
(y¯1,
∑
j
aj1
bj1
+
∑
j
aj2
bj2
) if α = β and p1 = p2
Next, the price vector p is set such that markets clear. We find the following inverse-
demand function which characterizes the Walrasian equilibrium price vector p(Q) as
follows:
p(Q) =
(
α
M1
N1
+ (1− α)M2
N2
−Q1
((1− α)2
N2
+
α2
N1
)−Q2((1− α)(1− β)
N2
+
αβ
N1
)
,
β
M1
N1
+ (1− β)M2
N2
−Q1
((1− α)(1− β)
N2
+
αβ
N1
)−Q2((1− β)2
N2
+
β2
N1
))
(4.30)
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Where Mt
.
=
∑
j
ajt
bjt
and Nt
.
=
∑
j
1
bjt
for t = 1, 2.
4.2.3.1 Simultaneous Entry
Both firms make the decision for their optimal production level Qˆi simultaneously:
Qˆ1(Q2) =
(1− α)M2N1 + αM1N2 −
(
(1− α)(1− β)N1 + αβN2
)
Q2
2
(
(1− α)2N1 + α2N2
) ,
Qˆ2(Q1) =
(1− β)M2N1 + βM1N2 − ((1− α)(1− β)N1 + αβN2)Q1
2
(
(1− β)2N1 + β2N2
) . (4.31)
The optimal production levels in equilibrium is given by:
Qˆ1 =
M1N2((−1+β)(α(−2+β)+β)N1+αβ2N2)−M2N1((−1+α)(−1+β)2N1+β(α+(−2+α)β)N2)
3(1−α)2(1−β)2N21+2(2β2−αβ(1+3β)+α2(2+3(−1+β)β))N1N2+3α2β2N22
,
(4.32)
Qˆ2 =
M1N2((−1+α)(α+(−2+α)β)N1+α2βN2)−M2N1((−1+α)2(−1+β)N1+α(α(−2+β)+β)N2)
3(1−α)2(1−β)2N21+2(2β2−αβ(1+3β)+α2(2+3(−1+β)β))N1N2+3α2β2N22
. (4.33)
And the corresponding profits are:
Πˆ1(α;β) = (M1N2((1−β)(α(−2+β)+β)N1−αβ2N2)+M2N1((−1+α)(1−β)2N1+β(α+(α−2)β)N2))2
× (1−α)2N1+α2N2
N1N2
(
3(αβN2+(1−α)(1−β)N1)2+4N1N2(α−β)2
)2 , (4.34)
Πˆ2(β;α) = (M1N2((1−α)(β(−2+α)+α)N1−α2βN2)+M2N1((−1+α)2(−1+β)N1+α(α(β−2)+β)N2))2
× (1−β)2N1+β2N2
N1N2
(
3(αβN2+(1−α)(1−β)N1)2+4N1N2(α−β)2
)2 . (4.35)
Result 4.5. The profit function Πˆ1(α;β) always has a maximum value within the range
of α ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, the profit function Πˆ2(β;α) always has a maximum value within
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the range of β ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The profit functions have a quartic numerators that have only two double roots.
The denominator is always positive and non-zero, thus it is always continuous. Al-
though, we have not been able to analytically identify the coordinates of the maximum
point for each profit function, we are able to show that such a point always exists. It
either falls at the boundaries, i.e. α = 0 or α = 1, or is a single maximal point for
α ∈ [0, 1].
We define αˆ(β) as the function of Firm 1’s best response to Firm 2’s choice of bundle
design. Similarly, βˆ(α) is the function of Firm 2’s best response to Firm 1’s choice of
bundle design.
For a simultaneous game, since the market is symmetric for both firms, the equi-
librium has to be symmetric, i.e., either α = β or even number of pay-off equivalent
symmetric strategies.
Result 4.6. In equilibrium, αˆ = βˆ = M1M1+M2 .
Proof. First, we show that M1M1+M2 maximizes the profit functions 4.34 and 4.34 for both
firms when α = β. The profit function for α = β equals:
Πˆ1(α;α) =
(αM1N2 + (1− α)M2N1)2
9N1N2(α2N2 + (1− α)2N1) (4.36)
This function is continuous on α ∈ [0, 1]. The first derivative of Πˆ1 is
∂Πˆ1
∂α
= −2(αM2 − (1− α)M1)(M2(N1 − αN1) + αM1N2)
9((1− α)2N1 + α2N2)2 (4.37)
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has two roots at α¯1 and α¯2.
α¯1 =
M1
M1 +M2
α¯2 =
M2N1
M2N1 −M1N2
(4.38)
α¯2 always lies outside the interval [0, 1]. However, we can show that

∂Πˆ1
∂α > 0 for 0 ≤ α < α¯1
∂Πˆ1
∂α = 0 for α = α¯1
∂Πˆ1
∂α < 0 for α¯1 < α ≤ 1
Therefore, α¯2 will maximize the profit function of the first firm. Due to symmetry, an
identical argument holds for the second firm.
We present a few numerical examples to verify this result numerically.
Figure 4.5: Six numerical examples to show the bundle proportions in equilibrium.
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4.2.3.2 Sequential Entry
Result 4.7. In equilibrium, both firms choose the same bundle proportions as they did
in simultaneous game, i.e. αˆ = βˆ = M1M1+M2 .
The following results were obtain for an example of this game through numerical
analysis. The first firm chooses the bundle proportion, α, such that its profit given the
second firm’s response is maximized (Figure 4.6).
(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: a) The best response of the second firm to the choice of α by the first firm, b) Profit of the first firm as
a function of α.
We repeated the same numerical analysis for multiple scenarios and in all cases the
sequential equilibrium is identical to the simultaneous equilibrium.
4.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we addressed the issue of bundle design, where the proportions of the
products in a bundle can be chosen. We first considered the case of a monopolist
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bundler selling a bundle of two products to a single customer type, and showed that
the optimal ratio for the quantities of the two products in the bundle is given by the
ratio of the satiation points for the products. Next, we showed that the same result
holds if multiple symmetric firms are able to offer the same bundle to one customer
group. Next we considered a monopolist offering one type of bundle to two customer
groups. We showed that the bundler’s profit as a function of the bundle proportion
can be bi-modal for certain customer valuations. Generally one mode will be preferred.
However, if neither mode dominates the other, the firm can choose to cater to either one
of the customer segments. Again, we showed that for a symmetric oligopoly identical
results hold. Finally we considered a case of two types of firms that can have different
bundling proportions, with two distinct customer groups. We considered the response
of each type of firm to the bundle design of the other firm. For the game in which
there are two firms which choose their bundle proportions simultaneously, there is a
symmetric equilibrium in which both firms choose the same bundle proportions. In the
sequential form of the game, where one firm chooses the bundle proportion first, with
the other firm following, we again found that in equilibrium both firms play symmetric
strategies.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions
This thesis has studied competitive bundling from three perspectives. In the first chap-
ter, we studied a symmetric Bertrand duopoly for the full scope of bundling strategies.
We were able to show that even in the absence of factors such as market power or com-
plementarity between the bundle components, bundling by itself can help the bundler
firm to differentiate and earn higher profits. We are able to identify asymmetric equilib-
rium strategies for two perfectly symmetric firms. The equilibrium strategies depend on
customers’ valuations of the bundle component. A managerial implication is that the
firm that bundles first can earn a higher profit and is able to discourage its competitor
from bundling. Also, bundling is only successful if customers are heterogeneous and
each customer has a strictly preferred product within the bundle.
In Chapter two, we examined the bundling game in a Cournot, quantity competition
framework. We showed that given a fixed cost of entry to enter the market, we will in
general observe oligopolies in each submarket, i.e., the bundled product market and the
single component markets. The equilibrium is not always unique and it is possible to
construct cases with an arbitrarily large number of equilibria. The following factors can
determine the success of bundles, which depends on two factors. On the demand side,
customers buy bundles as long as both components within the bundle add relatively
comparable values to the customer. On the supply side, firms enter the bundle market
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if the fixed-cost of entry for the bundle market is lower than the sum of fixed-costs of
entry for each component within the bundle by a sufficient amount. These results hold
for a single customer group, as well as for multiple customer groups.
In Chapter three, we studied the problem of bundle design. The optimal bundle pro-
portion is a function of customers’ satiation levels. For both simultaneous and sequential
games, symmetric firms in a duopoly choose symmetric bundle design strategies.
In summary, the equilibrium in the Bertrand model is determined by the customers’
valuations and bundling is a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium if customers are hetero-
geneous and each one of them has a strictly preferred product. However, in the Cournot
model, bundling is a viable strategy only if the fixed cost of entry to the bundled market
is smaller than the sum of the fixed costs of entry to each of the component markets.
In equilibrium, unlike the Bertrand model, multiple entry in each market is possible.
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Appendix A Chapter 2 Proofs
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2.1
Since pil > 0 and
∑
j xijl > 0. In order to have
∑
j xijl > 0, we need p−i,l ≥ pil.
But then, Firm −i could lower its price below pi,l, steal market share from Firm i, and
increase its profit, a contradiction. Hence, there exists no equilibrium such that pil > 0
and
∑
j xijl > 0, for any l.
Also, if pil = 0, then Π−i(p−i; pi, z) = 0 for p−i,l ≥ pil. In particular, p−i,l ≥ 0 is
a best response to pil = 0. As a result, all Nash equilibria of this game are such that
Πi(pil; p−il, z) = Π−i(p−il; pil, z) = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.1
We analyze the best response of Firm 1 to the bundling strategy of Firm 2. Due
to symmetry we can extend the results of the analysis to the reverse case. We use the
short-hand notation p1 and p2 to refer to the prices of the products offered by Firms 1
and 2, respectively.
Let zˆ1(z2) be the set of Firm 1’s best response to z2.
We first show that if Firm 2 offers nothing or a single component, a weakly dominant
strategy for Firm 1 is to offer the bundle. We will then show that if Firm 2 offers the
bundle, a weakly dominant strategy for Firm 1 is to offer a single component.
• When z2 = (0, 0, 0), we consider four different responses by Firm 1:
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1. z1 = (0, 0, 0) =⇒ Π1(p1; p2, z) = 0, ∀p1.
2. z1 = (1, 0, 0) =⇒ Π1(pˆ1; p2, z) = maxp1 p1
∑
j x1j1.
3. z1 = (0, 1, 0) =⇒ Π1(pˆ1; p2, z) = maxp1 p1
∑
j x1j2.
4. z1 = (0, 0, 1) =⇒ Π1(pˆ1; p2, z) = maxp1 p1
∑
j x1j3.
Since each customer’s valuation of the bundle is the sum of her valuations
for each component, i.e., vj3 = vj1 + vj2, for a fixed p1, we always have that∑
j xij3 ≥
∑
j xij1 and
∑
j xij3 ≥
∑
j xij2.
Therefore, (0, 0, 1) ∈ zˆ1(0, 0, 0)
• When z2 = (1, 0, 0), we consider four different responses by Firm 1:
1. z1 = (0, 0, 0) =⇒ Π1(p1; p2, z) = 0, ∀p1.
2. z1 = (1, 0, 0) =⇒ Πˆ1(pˆ1; p2, z) = Πˆ2(z1; z2) = 0 by Lemma 2.1.
3. z1 = (0, 1, 0) =⇒ Π1(pˆ1; p2, z) = maxp2
∑
j x1j2p1, where by (2.1) for j = 1, 2,
x1j2 = 1 ⇐⇒ vj2 − p1 ≥ 0. (A.1)
4. z1 = (0, 0, 1) =⇒ Π1(pˆ1; p2, z) = maxp2
∑
j x1j3p1, where by (2.1), for j =
1, 2,
x1j3 = 1 ⇐⇒ vj1 + vj2 − p1 ≥ max{vj1 − p2, 0}. (A.2)
The first and the second strategies are always dominated by the third and fourth
strategies.
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From (A.1) and (A.2) we conclude that:
x1j2 = 1 ⇐⇒ vj2−p1 ≥ 0 =⇒

vj1 + vj2 − p1 ≥ vj1 ≥ vj1 − p2,
vj1 + vj2 − p1 ≥ 0
=⇒ x1j3 = 1,
thus
∑
j x1j3p1 ≥
∑
j x1j2p1, ∀p1, p2, which means that for a fixed price of p1, Firm
1 can capture more customers by offering the bundle.
By definition of price equilibrium, we have
Πˆi(zi; z−i) = Πi(pˆi; pˆ−i, z) such that
Πi(pˆi; pˆ−i, z) ≥ Πi(pi; pˆ−i, z) ∀pi 6= pˆi; ∀z, i = 1, 2.
(A.3)
Therefore:
Πˆ1((0, 0, 1); (1, 0, 0)) =
∑
j
x1j3pˆ1 ≥
∑
j
x1j3p˜1 ≥
∑
j
x1j2p˜1 = Πˆ1((0, 1, 0); (1, 0, 0)) ≥ 0,
where
pˆi = argmaxpi Πi(pi; pˆ−i, (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0)),∀i = 1, 2
p˜i = argmaxpi Πi(pi; pˆ−i, (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0)), ∀i = 1, 2.
Therefore (0, 0, 1) ∈ zˆ1(1, 0, 0).
• When z2 = (0, 1, 0), using a symmetric argument, we obtain that (0, 0, 1) ∈ zˆ1(0, 1, 0).
• When z2 = (0, 0, 1), we consider four different responses by Firm 1:
1. z1 = (0, 0, 0) =⇒ Π1(p1; p2, z) = 0, ∀p1.
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2. z1 = (1, 0, 0) =⇒ Π1(pˆ1; p2, z) = maxp2
∑
j x1j1p1, in which by (2.1),
x1j1 = 1 ⇐⇒ vj1 − p1 > vj1 + vj2 − p2 and vj1 − p1 ≥ 0.
3. z1 = (0, 1, 0) =⇒ Π1(pˆ1; p2, z) = maxp2
∑
j x1j2p1, in which by (2.1),
x1j2 = 1 ⇐⇒ vj2 − p1 > vj1 + vj2 − p2 and vj2 − p1 ≥ 0.
4. z1 = (0, 0, 1) =⇒ Πˆ1(z1, z2) = Πˆ2(z1, z2) = 0 by Lemma 2.1.
The first and the fourth strategies are always weakly dominated by the second
and third strategies. Both z1 = (1, 0, 0) and z1 = (0, 1, 0) can potentially be the
dominant strategies depending on the relative sizes of customer segments and
their valuations for the products.
Hence, either (1, 0, 0) ∈ zˆ1(0, 0, 1) or (0, 1, 0) ∈ zˆ1(0, 0, 1).
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.2
With non-overlapping offerings, there is no competition in any of the component
markets. Therefore Firm i who offers Product l, l = 1, 2, can capture Customer j, i.e.,
xijl = 1, by setting pil ≤ vjl.
• If zi = (1, 0, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), it is clear that Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0. Moreover,
Firm i can choose to capture the highest-valuation customer only, i.e., vj1 = v,
or both customers. For the former case pˆi = v and Πˆi = v, and for the latter
case pˆi = v and Πˆi = 2v. Thus, in equilibrium the payoff of Firm i is equal to
Πˆi = max{v, 2v}.
• If zi = (0, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), due to symmetry, this case is identical to the
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previous case.
• If zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), since Components 1 and 2 have separate
markets, Firm i can maximize its profit in each of the markets separately. Following
the analysis of the first two cases, Πˆi = max{v, 2v}+ max{v, 2v} = max{2v, 4v}.
• If zi = (1, 0, 0) and z−i = (0, 1, 0), each firm sells in a separate market and thus
each one maximizes its profit in its own respective market. Following the analysis
in the first two cases, Πˆi = Πˆ−i = max{v, 2v}.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.3
We focus on the case where zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (1, 0, 0). Due to symmetry, a
similar proof holds for the other case and we omit the details for brevity. To express
best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ be the smallest
price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of Firm i and Firm
−i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline five possible strategies for Firm i in response to its competi-
tor’s price p−i,1 > 0 ignoring for brevity all situations of ties. For any strategy (x), we
denote Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to one customer, which can happen in one of the following two
cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 1 and
∑
j xij2 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 1’s valuation
for Product 1 is higher than Customer 2’s. Hence, xi11 = 1 and xi21 = 0.
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According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,1−δ}. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1−
δ} and Πˆ(2-a)i = pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij2 = 1 and
∑
j xij1 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 2’s valuation
for Product 2 is higher than Customer 1’s. Hence, xi22 = 1 and xi12 = 0.
According to (2.1), we need pi2 ≤ v. Thus, pˆi2 = v, and Πˆ(2-b)i = pˆi2 = v.
3. To sell one product to each customer, which can happen in one of the following
three cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij2 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,1−
δ}. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and Πˆ(3-a)i = 2pˆi1 = 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 0 and
∑
j xij2 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi2 ≤ v. Thus,
pˆi2 = v and Πˆ
(3-b)
i = 2pˆi2 = 2v.
(c) xi11 = 1, xi21 = 0, xi22 = 1, and xi12 = 0. Under PNC valuations, the firm
sells Product 1 to Customer 1 and Product 2 to Customer 2. Hence, we need
pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,1−δ} and pi2 ≤ v. Therefore, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1−δ}, pˆi2 = v,
and Πˆ
(3-c)
i = pˆi1 + pˆi2 = v + min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
4. To sell both products to one customer and one product to the other customer,
which can happen in one of the following two cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2, xi22 = 1, and xi12 = 0. Under PNC valuations, we need pi1 ≤
min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and pi2 ≤ v. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ}, pˆi2 = v, and
Πˆ
(4-a)
i = 2pˆi1 + pˆi2 = 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}+ v.
(b) xi11 = 1, xi21 = 0, and
∑
j xij2 = 2. Under PNC valuations, we need pi1 ≤
min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and pi2 ≤ v. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ}, pˆi2 = v, and
Πˆ
(4-b)
i = pˆi1 + 2pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ}+ 2v.
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5. To sell both products to both customers. Under PNC valuations, we need pi1 ≤
min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and pi2 ≤ v. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ}, pˆi2 = v, and Πˆ(5)i =
2pˆi1 + 2pˆi2 = 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}+ 2v.
Comparing profits, we obtain that always Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(3-c)
i , Πˆ
(2-a)
i < Πˆ
(3-c)
i , and Πˆ
(3-a)
i <
Πˆ
(4-c)
i . Moreover,
• when p−i,1 > 0, Πˆ(2-b)i < Πˆ(3-c)i , and Πˆ(3-b)i < Πˆ(4-b)i , also
– when v ≤ 2v, Πˆ(3-c)i ≤ Πˆ(4-b)i , Πˆ(4-a)i ≤ Πˆ(5)i , and Πˆ(4-b)i ≤ Πˆ(5)i .
Strategy (5) is the only strategy that is not weakly dominated. Therefore,
pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1−δ} and pˆi2 = v, which results in the same profit as any
other payoff-equivalent strategy, is the unique best response.
– when v > 2v, Πˆ
(4-b)
i < Πˆ
(3-c)
i , and Πˆ
(5)
i < Πˆ
(4-a)
i .
∗ When 0 < p−i,1 ≤ 2v, Πˆ(3-c)i < Πˆ(4-a)i . Strategy (4-a) is the only strategy
that is not dominated. Therefore, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and pˆi2 = v, is
the unique best response.
∗ When 2v < p−i,1, Πˆ(4-a)i < Πˆ(3-c)i . Strategy (3-c) is the only strategy that
is not dominated. Therefore, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and pˆi2 = v, is the
unique best response.
• when p−i,1 = 0, Πˆ(2-b)i = Πˆ(3-c)i = Πˆ(4-a)i = v, and Πˆ(3-b)i = Πˆ(4-b)i = Πˆ(5)i = 2v.
– when v ≤ 2v, Strategies (3-b), (4-b), and (5) are three payoff-equivalent best
responses. Thus, Firm i sets pˆi1 = 0 and pˆi2 = v and earns Πˆi = 2v.
– when v > 2v, Strategies (2-b), (3-c), and (4-a) are three payoff-equivalent best
responses. Thus, Firm i sets pˆi1 = 0 and pˆi2 = v and earns Πˆi = v.
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Firm −i. We next outline three possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its
competitor’s prices pi,1 > 0 and pi,2 ignoring for brevity all situations of ties. For any
strategy (x), we denote Firm −i’s profit, as Πˆ(x)−i .
1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j,l x−i,j1 = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell to one customer, i.e.,
∑
j,l x−i,jl = 1. Under PNC valuations, Customer 1’s
valuation for Product 1 is higher than Customer 2’s valuation for Product 1. Hence,
x−i,11 = 1 and x−i,21 = 0. According to (2.1), we need p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1 − δ}.
Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ} and Πˆ(2)−i = pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ}.
3. To sell to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−ij1 = 2. Under PNC valuations, we need
p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1− δ}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1− δ} and Πˆ(3)−i = 2 min{v, pi1− δ}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that
• when pi1 > 0, Πˆ(1)−i < Πˆ(2)−i , also,
– when v ≤ 2v, Πˆ(2)−i ≤ Πˆ(3)−i
Strategy (3) is the only strategy that is not weakly dominated. Therefore,
pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ}, which results in the same profit as any other
payoff-equivalent strategy, is the unique best response.
– when v > 2v,
∗ When 0 < pi1 ≤ 2v, Πˆ(2)−i < Πˆ(3)−i . Strategy (3) is the only strategy that
is not dominated. Therefore, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ}, is the unique best
response.
∗ When 2v < pi1, Πˆ(2)−i < Πˆ(3)−i . Strategy (2) is the only strategy that is not
dominated. Therefore, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1−δ}, is the unique best response.
• when pi1 = 0, Πˆ(1)−i = Πˆ(2)−i = Πˆ(3)−i = 0 are all payoff-equivalent best response
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strategies.
Comparison. Comparing the best responses of the two firms (in the situations where
there is no tie), it appears that, irrespective of the relative values of v and v, the firms
will engage in a price war on Component 1, undercutting each other’s price. Hence, there
is no equilibrium where the market of Component 1 is not shared. Applying a similar
argument to situations of ties shows that price undercutting remains a best response if
firms have the opportunity to do so. Hence, the unique equilibrium is pˆi1 = pˆ−i,1 = 0.
On the other hand, pˆi2 = v if 2v ≤ v and pˆi2 = v otherwise. As a result Πˆi = max{2v, v}
and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.4
Suppose that zi3 = 1, and z−i = (0, 0, 0), then one of the following four cases are
possible:
1. zi = (0, 0, 1) then Πi(pi; p−i, z) = pi3
∑
j xij3 = 2pi3 if pi3 ≤ v+v, and Πi(pi; p−i, z) =
0 if pi3 > v + v. Thus pˆi3 = v + v and Πˆi = 2(v + v).
2. zi = (1, 0, 1) then by selling Product 1, Firm i can earn v if it sells Product 1 to
one of the customers, and 2v if it sells Product 1 to both customers. However, if
Firm i prices any pi1 < v, it can earn a profit of 2(v + v) by selling the bundle to
both customers. Thus in equilibrium, pˆi3 = v + v and Πˆi = 2(v + v).
3. zi = (0, 1, 1) similar to the previous case, in equilibrium, pˆi3 = v + v and Πˆi =
2(v + v).
4. zi = (1, 1, 1). Firm i offers three products and there are only two customer groups
in the market. Firm i has to sell at most two products to the customer groups. If it
chooses Product 1 and Product 2, then the equilibrium profit is Πˆi = max{2v, 4v},
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according to Proposition 2.2. If it chooses Product 1 and Product 3 (the bundle),
or Product 2 and Product 3, then the equilibrium profit is Πˆi = 2(v + v), similar
to the former two cases. Thus Firm i is better off if it sells only the bundle to both
customers. Thus in equilibrium, pˆi3 = v + v and Πˆi = 2(v + v).
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.5
Since zi and z−i are kept fixed, for simplicity we hereon omit these arguments from
the profit functions and best-response correspondences; also we use the simple notation
of pi = pi3 and p−i = p−il and sij = sij3 and s−i,j = s−ijl for j = 1, 2 and l = 1, 2.
We focus on the case where zi = (0, 0, 1) and z−i = (0, 1, 0). First, we analyze the
best-response correspondence of Firm i for different ranges of prices of Firm −i, namely,
p−i > v, v ≤ p−i ≤ v, and 0 ≤ p−i < v.
• If p−i > v, then customers’ surplus from Firm −i is negative, i.e., s−i,1(p−i) =
s−i,2(p−i) < 0. As long as Firm i offers them a nonnegative surplus, i.e., si1(pi) =
si2(pi) = v+ v− pi ≥ 0, it can capture both customers and earn Πi(pi; p−i) = 2pi;
hence Firm i’s best response is
pˆi(p−i) = v + v, and Πˆi(pi; p−i) = 2(v + v) .
• If v ≤ p−i ≤ v, then s−i,1(p−i) = v − p−i ≤ 0 and s−i,2(p−i) = v − p−i > 0. For
Firm i to capture Customer 1 it is necessary and sufficient to have si1(pi) ≥ 0,
which means pi ≤ v + v. Similarly, to capture Customer 2, it is necessary and
sufficient that si2(pi) ≥ 0 and si2(pi) ≥ s−i,2(p−i), i.e., v + v − pi ≥ v − p−i > 0.
Hence, Firm i captures both customers if pi ≤ v+p−i, it captures Customer 1 only
if v + p−i < pi ≤ v + v, and it captures no customer if pi > v + v. Therefore,
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Πˆi(pi; p−i) = max
{
2(p−i + v), v + v
}
, and pˆi(p−i) =

p−i + v if p−i ≥ v−v2
v + v if p−i ≤ v−v2
.
• If 0 ≤ p−i < v, then s−i,1(p−i) = v − p−i > 0 and s−i,2(p−i) = v − p−i > 0. For
Firm i to capture Customer 1 it is necessary and sufficient that si1(pi) ≥ s−i,1(p−i),
i.e., v + v − pi ≥ v − p−i, i.e., pi ≤ p−i + v. Similarly, to capture Customer 2,
si2(pi) ≥ s−i,2(p−i), i.e., v + v − pi ≥ v − p−i, i.e., pi ≤ p−i + v. Therefore,
Πˆi(pi; p−i) = max
{
2(p−i + v), p−i + v
}
, and pˆi(p−i) =

p−i + v if p−i ≥ v − 2v
p−i + v if p−i ≤ v − 2v
.
Next, we consider Firm −i’s best response. We need to consider four sets for pi;
namely pi > v + v, v ≤ pi ≤ v + v, v ≤ pi < v, and pi < v.
• If pi > v + v, then si1(pi) = si2(pi) < 0. Thus for Firm −i to capture Customer
1 it is necessary and sufficient that p−i ≤ v. Also to capture Customer 2, the
requirement is p−i ≤ v. Hence, Firm −i captures both customers if p−i ≤ v,
captures only one customer if v < p−i ≤ v, and captures no customer if p−i > v.
Therefore,
Πˆ−i(p−i; pi) = max
{
2v, v
}
, and pˆ−i(pi) =

v if 2v ≥ v
v if 2v ≤ v
.
• If v ≤ pi ≤ v + v, then si1(pi) = si2(pi) ≥ 0. Thus, to capture Customer 1, Firm
−i needs to price such that v − p−i > v + v − pi, i.e., p−i < pi − v. Similarly
capturing Customer 2 requires v − p−i > v + v − pi, i.e., p−i < pi − v. Hence,
Firm −i captures both customers if p−i < pi − v, captures only one customer if
pi − v ≤ p−i < pi − v, and captures no customer if p−i ≥ pi − v. Therefore,
Πˆ−i(p−i; pi) = supδ>0{2(pi − v − δ)+, (pi − v − δ)+}, and for some infinitesimal
105
δ > 0, pˆ−i(pi)=

pi − v − δ if pi > 2v − v
pi − v − δ if pi ≤ 2v − v
.
• If v < pi < v, then v − p−i < v + v − pi, i.e., s−i,1(p−i) < si1(pi) ∀p−i ≥ 0. Thus
Firm −i can never capture Customer 1 at any nonnegative price p−i ≥ 0. To
capture Customer 2, it is necessary and sufficient to have s−i,2(p−i) > si2(pi) and
s−i,2(p−i) ≥ 0, which is equivalent to v − p−i > v + v − pi and v − p−i ≥ 0, i.e.,
p−i < pi − v. Therefore,
Πˆ−i(p−i; pi) = pˆ−i(pi) = pi − v − δ for some infinitesimal δ > 0.
• If 0 ≤ pi ≤ v, then s−i,1(p−i) < si1(pi) and s−i,2(p−i) < si2(pi) for any p−i ≥ 0.
Hence Firm −i does not capture any customer at any nonnegative price p−i ≥ 0.
Hence,
Πˆ−i(p−i; pi) = 0, and pˆ−i(pi) = {p−i|p−i ≥ 0}.
In conclusion, there are three separate best-response correspondences for both firms
depending on the relative values of v and v:
1. When v ≤ 2v, assuming that prices have to be set in increments of δ > 0 (e.g. cents)
pˆi(p−i) =

v + v if p−i > v
p−i + v if 0 ≤ p−i ≤ v
and pˆ−i(pi) =

v if pi > v + v
pi − v − δ if 2v − v < pi ≤ v + v
pi − v − δ if v < pi ≤ 2v − v
[0,∞) if 0 ≤ pi ≤ v
.
This game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium at (v, 0) (Figure A.1), yielding
Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0. Firm i does not deviate from this strategy since it would
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earn strictly less profit by either increasing or decreasing its price. On the other
hand, p2 = 0 is a weakly dominant strategy for Firm −i, since Firm −i can still
earn zero profit for any other p−i. This equilibrium is not unique; however it is
payoff-equivalent to any other equilibria for this game.
Figure A.1: Firms’ pricing best-response correspondences when v ≤ 2v
p−i
pi
v + v
v
2v − v
2(v − v)
v − v
v
v
2. When 2v < v ≤ 3v, assuming that prices have to be set in increments of δ > 0,
pˆi(p−i) =

v + v if p−i > v
p−i + v if v − 2v ≤ p−i ≤ v
p−i + v if 0 ≤ p−i ≤ v − 2v
, and pˆ−i(pi) =

v if pi > v + v
pi − v − δ if v < pi ≤ v + v
[0,∞) if 0 ≤ pi ≤ v
.
(A.4)
This game does not have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium since the best-response
correspondences do not intersect.
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Figure A.2: Firms’ pricing best response correspondences when 2v < v ≤ 3v
p−i
pi
v + v
v
v − 2v
v
3. When v > 3v, assuming that prices have to be set in increments of δ > 0
pˆi(p−i) =

v + v if p−i > v
p−i + v if v−v2 ≤ p−i ≤ v
v + v if v ≤ p−i ≤ v−v2
p−i + v if 0 ≤ p−i < v
, and pˆ−i(pi) =

v if pi > v + v
pi − v − δ if v < pi ≤ v + v
[0,∞) if 0 ≤ pi ≤ v
.
(A.5)
It can be verified that this game also does not have a pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium.
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Figure A.3: Firms’ pricing best-response correspondences when 3v < v
p2
p1
v + v
v
v+v
2
v−v
2
v
v
Assuming that δ is the smallest price deviation that firms make to undercut the competi-
tor’s price, the following iteration process of elimination of strictly dominated strategies
reveals the strategy supports for games described in (A.4) and (A.5).
• When 2v < v ≤ 3v
In the first iteration, Firm −i starts off by the full set of pricing strategies, i.e.,
pˆ−i ∈ [0,∞). According to (A.4), in the first iteration, pˆi(p−i) ∈ [v − v, v + v]
is Firm i’s best response to Firm −i prices. In the second iteration, Firm −i
responds by pˆ−i ∈ [v − 2v − δ, v − δ] and Firm i responds by pˆi(p−i) ∈ [v − v, v +
v − δ] + {2(v − v) − δ}. The best response of Firm i in iteration t is pˆi(p−i) ∈
[v−v, v+v− (t−1)δ)+{2(v−v)−δ}. However, for t > 3+ v−vδ the single point is
included within the range, i.e., v− v ≤ 2(v+ v)− δ ≤ v+ v− (t− 1)δ, and the best
response of Firm i becomes pˆi(p−i) ∈ [v − v, 2(v − v)− δ]. As a result, Firm −i’s
best response to pˆi ∈ [v − v, 2(v − v)− δ] will be pˆ−i(pi) ∈ [v − 2v − δ, v − 2δ] and
as a response Firm i will set pˆi(p−i) ∈ [v − v, v + v − 2δ]. Each iteration shrinks
both firms’ range of best responses until the following ranges are achieved, after
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which none of the strategies are strictly dominated, hence no further elimination
occurs.
pˆi(p−i) ∈ [v − v, 2(v − v)− δ],
pˆ−i(pi) ∈ [v − 2v − δ, 2v − 3v − 2δ].
(A.6)
• When v > 3v In the first iteration, Firm −i starts off by the full set of pricing
strategies, i.e., pˆ−i ∈ [0,∞). According to (A.5), pˆi(p−i) ∈ [v+v2 , v + v] is Firm i’s
best response to Firm −i prices. In the next iteration, Firm −i responds by setting
pˆ−i(pi) ∈ [v−v2 − δ, v − δ] and as a response Firm i sets pˆi(p−i) ∈ [v+v2 , v + v]. Any
further iteration will not shrink firms’ range of best responses, since none of the
strategies are strictly dominated, hence no further elimination occurs.
pˆi(p−i) ∈
[
v + v
2
, v + v
]
,
pˆ−i(pi) ∈
[
v − v
2
− δ, v − δ
]
.
(A.7)
Although there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibria when 2v < v ≤ 3v and when
v > 3v, we next show that the following CDF functions characterize the mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium of this game:
Fi(pi) =

pi−a
pi+c−a , for a ≤ pi < b
1, for pi = b
F−i(p−i) = 2− b
p−i + a− c for c ≤ p−i ≤ c+ b− a
110
where
a
.
= v − v, b .= 2(v − v)− δ, and c .= v − 2v − δ when 2v < v ≤ 3v,
a
.
=
v + v
2
, b
.
= v + v, and c
.
=
v − v
2
− δ when v > 3v.
(A.8)
Firm i offers a surplus of sij3(pi) = v + v − pi to both customers, j = 1, 2, while
Firm −i offers a surplus of s−i,12(p−i) = v − p−i to Customer 1 and a surplus of
s−i,22(p−i) = v − p−i to Customer 2.
• When v > 3v, for any pi ∈ [a, b], si13(pi) ≥0, and si13 ≥ s−i,12 over all p−i ∈
[c, c+ b− a],1 thus Firm i captures Customer 1 for every pi ∈ [a, b]. Similarly, for
any pi ∈ [a, b], si23(pi) ≥ 0, while si23(pi) ≥ s−i,22(p−i) only if p−i ≥ pi − v, thus
Firm i captures Customer 2 for every pi ≤ p−i + v. Therefore, Firm i’s market
share equals
(
1 +
∫ c+b−a
pi−v
dF−i(p−i)
)
. For any pi ∈ [a, b], Πi(pi;F−i) is Firm i’s
profit when Firm −i employs the randomizing profile F−i(p−i) = 2− bp−i+a−c over
c ≤ p−i ≤ c+ b− a. Hence, for any pi ∈ [a, b]:
Πi(pi;F−i) =lim
δ→0
∫ c+b−a
c
Πi(pi; p−i)dF−i(p−i) = lim
δ→0
(
pi
(
1 +
∫ c+b−a
pi−v
dF−i(p−i)
))
=lim
δ→0
(
pi
(
1 + F−i(c+ b− a)− F−i(pi − v)
))
=lim
δ→0
(
pi
( b
pi + δ
))
= v + v.
(A.9)
Similarly, for any p−i ∈ [c, c+ b− a], Π−i(p−i;F−i) denotes Firm −i’s profit when
Firm i employs the randomizing profile Fi(pi) =
pi−a
pi+c−a over a ≤ pi < b and Fi(b) =
1. Because Firm −i captures Customer 2 if Firm i prices at any pi ∈ (p−i + v, b],
1The requirement for si13 ≥ s−i,12, is pi − p−i ≤ v. For pi ∈ [a, b] and p−i ∈ [c, c + b − a], max(pi − p−i) =
v + v − ( v−v
2
− δ) = v+3v
2
+ δ. When v > 3v and δ is infinitesimal, v+3v
2
+ δ ≤ v
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its market share equals
∫ b
p−i+v
dFi(pi). Hence, for any pi ∈ [c, c+ b− a],
Π−i(p−i;Fi) = lim
δ→0
(∫ b
a
Π−i(p−i; pi)dFi(pi)
)
= lim
δ→0
(
p−i
∫ b
p−i+v
dFi(pi)
)
= lim
δ→0
(
p−i
(
Fi(b)− Fi(p−i + v)
))
= lim
δ→0
(
p−i
(
1− p−i −
v−v
2
p−i − δ
))
=
v − v
2
.
(A.10)
• When 2v < v ≤ 3v, for any pi ∈ [a, b], si13(pi) ≥0, and si13 ≥ s−i,12 over all
p−i ∈ [c, c+ b−a], thus Firm i captures Customer 1 for every pi ∈ [a, b]. Similarly,
for any pi ∈ [a, b], si23(pi) ≥ 0, while si23(pi) ≥ s−i,22(p−i) only if p−i ≥ pi−v, thus
Firm i captures Customer 2 for every pi ≤ p−i + v. Therefore, Firm i’s market
share equals
(
1 +
∫ c+b−a
pi−v
dF−i(p−i)
)
. For any pi ∈ [a, b], Πi(pi;F−i) is Firm i’s
profit when Firm −i employs the randomizing profile F−i(p−i) = 2− bp−i+a−c over
c ≤ p−i ≤ c+ b− a. Hence, for any pi ∈ [a, b]:
Πi(pi;F−i) =lim
δ→0
∫ c+b−a
c
Πi(pi; p−i)dF−i(p−i) = lim
δ→0
(
pi
(
1 +
∫ c+b−a
pi−v
dF−i(p−i)
))
=lim
δ→0
(
pi
(
1 + F−i(c+ b− a)− F−i(pi − v)
))
=lim
δ→0
(
pi
( b
pi + δ
))
= 2(v − v).
(A.11)
Similarly, for any p−i ∈ [c, c+ b− a], Π−i(p−i;F−i) denotes Firm −i’s profit when
Firm i employs the randomizing profile Fi(pi) =
pi−a
pi+c−a over a ≤ pi < b and Fi(b) =
1. Because Firm −i captures Customer 2 if Firm i prices at any pi ∈ (p−i + v, b],
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its market share equals
∫ b
p−i+v
dFi(pi). Hence, for any pi ∈ [c, c+ b− a],
Π−i(p−i;Fi) =lim
δ→0
(∫ b
a
Π−i(p−i; pi)dFi(pi)
)
= lim
δ→0
(
p−i
∫ b
p−i+v
dFi(pi)
)
=lim
δ→0
(
p−i
(
Fi(b)− Fi(p−i + v)
))
=lim
δ→0
(
p−i
(
1− p−i − (v − 2v)
p−i − δ
))
= v − 2v.
(A.12)
We already showed in (A.6) and (A.7) that the strategy support is obtained through
iterated eliminated of dominated strategies, thus ∀pi /∈ [a, b] Firm i’s profit is strictly
less than its profit at any pi ∈ [a, b]. Similarly, ∀p−i /∈ [c, c + b − a] Firm −i’s profit is
strictly less than its profit at any p−i ∈ [c, c + b − a]. Therefore, Fi(pi) and F−i(p−i)
characterize a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium over pi ∈ [a, b] and p−i ∈ [c, c+ b− a].
To summarize, we have the following:
• For 3v < v
Strategy supports of both firms: σi = [
v+v
2 , v + v], σ−i = [
v−v
2 − δ, v − δ],
CDF of Firm i: Fi(pi) =
2pi−(v+v)
2(pi−v−δ) for
v+v
2 ≤ pi < v + v and Fi(v+v) =
1,
CDF of Firm −i: F−i(p−i) = 2− v+vp−i+v+δ for
v−v
2 ≤ p−i ≤ v − δ,
Equilibrium profits: Πˆi = v + v, Πˆ−i = v−v2 .
• For 2v ≤ v ≤ 3v
Strategy supports of both firms: σi = [v − v, 2(v − v) − δ], σ−i = [v − 2v −
δ, 2v − 3v − 2δ],
CDF of Firm i: Fi(pi) =
pi−(v−v)
pi−v−δ forv − v ≤ pi < 2(v − v)− δand Fi(2(v−v)−
δ) = 1,
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CDF of Firm −i: F−i(p−i) = 2− 2(v−v)p−i+v+δ forv − 2v ≤ p−i ≤ 2v − 3v − 2δ,
Equilibrium profits: Πˆi = 2(v − v) and Πˆ−i = v − 2v.
In Appendix B we characterize this equilibrium by construction and prove that it is
unique.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.6
To express best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ
be the smallest price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of
Firm i and Firm −i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline five possible strategies for Firm i in response to its competi-
tor’s price p−i,3 > 0 ignoring all situations of ties for brevity. For any strategy (x), we
denote Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to one customer, which can happen in one of the following two
cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 1 and
∑
j xij2 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 1’s valuation
for Product 1 is higher than Customer 2’s. Hence, xi11 = 1 and xi21 =
0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}. Thus, pˆi1 =
min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ} and Πˆ(2-a)i = pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij2 = 1 and
∑
j xij1 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 2’s valuation
for Product 2 is higher than Customer 1’s. Hence, xi22 = 1 and xi12 =
0. According to (2.1), we need pi2 ≤ min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}. Thus, pˆi2 =
min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}, and Πˆ(2-b)i = pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}.
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3. To sell one product to each customer, which can happen in one of the following
three cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij2 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,3−
v − δ}. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ} and Πˆ(3-a)i = 2pˆi1 = 2 min{v, p−i,3 −
v − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 0 and
∑
j xij2 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi2 ≤ min{v, p−i,3−
v − δ}. Thus, pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ} and Πˆ(3-b)i = 2 min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}.
(c) xi11 = 1, xi21 = 0, xi22 = 1, and xi12 = 0. Under PNC valuations, the
firm sells Product 1 to Customer 1 and Product 2 to Customer 2. Hence, we
need pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ} and pi2 ≤ min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}. Therefore,
pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,3−v−δ}, pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,3−v−δ}, and Πˆ(3-c)i = pˆi1 + pˆi2 =
2 min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}.
4. To sell both products to one customer and one product to the other customer,
which can happen in one of the following two cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2, xi22 = 1, and xi12 = 0. Under PNC valuations, we need pi1 ≤
min{v, p−i,3−v−δ} and pi2 ≤ min{v, p−i,3−v−δ}. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,3−
v − δ}, pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}, and Πˆ(4-a)i = 2pˆi1 + pˆi2 = 2 min{v, p−i,3 −
v − δ}+ min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}.
(b) xi11 = 1, xi21 = 0, and
∑
j xij2 = 2. Under PNC valuations, we need pi2 ≤
min{v, p−i,3−v−δ} and pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,3−v−δ}. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,3−
v − δ}, pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}, and Πˆ(4-b)i = 2pˆi2 + pˆi1 = 2 min{v, p−i,3 −
v − δ}+ min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}.
5. To sell both products to both customers. Under PNC valuations, we need pi1 ≤
min{v, p−i,3−v−δ} and pi2 ≤ min{v, p−i,3−v−δ}. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,3−v−δ},
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pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}, and Πˆ(5)i = 2pˆi1 + 2pˆi2 = 4 min{v, p−i,3 − v − δ}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that
• When p−i,3 > v + v,
Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(2−a)
i = Πˆ
(2−b)
i < Πˆ
(3−c)
i = 2v and Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(3−a)
i = Πˆ
(3−b)
i < Πˆ
(5)
i = 4v.
Also, Πˆ
(4-a)
i = Πˆ
(4-b)
i is a convex combination of Πˆ
(3-c)
i and Πˆ
(5)
i and it only equals
Πˆ
(3-c)
i and Πˆ
(5)
i when Πˆ
(3-c)
i =Πˆ
(5)
i , i.e. v = 2v.
– When v ≤ 2v, Strategy (5) is the dominant strategy.
– When v = 2v, both Strategies (3-c) and (5) are payoff equivalent and not
dominated.
– When v > 2v, Strategy (3-c) is the dominant strategy.
• When v < p−i,3 ≤ v + v,
Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(3-c)
i , Πˆ
(2-a)
i = Πˆ
(2-b)
i < Πˆ
(3-c)
i , Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(3-a)
i = Πˆ
(3-b)
i < Πˆ
(5)
i , also Πˆ
(4-a)
i =
Πˆ
(4-b)
i is a convex combination of Πˆ
(3-c)
i and Πˆ
(5)
i and it only equals Πˆ
(3-c)
i and Πˆ
(5)
i
when Πˆ
(3-c)
i =Πˆ
(5)
i .
– When v ≤ 2v,
Strategy (3-c), i.e., pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,3−v−δ} and pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,3−v−δ},
is the best response when v < p−i,3 ≤ 2v − v.
Strategy (5), i.e., pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,3−v−δ} and pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,3−v−δ},
is the best response when 2v − v < p−i,3 ≤ v + v.
– When v ≥ 2v, Πˆ(4-a)i = Πˆ(4-b)i < max{Πˆ(3-c)i , Πˆ(5)i } and Πˆ(3-c)i < Πˆ(5)i .
Strategy (3-c), i.e., pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,3−v−δ} and pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,3−v−δ},
is the best response.
• When v < p−i,3 ≤ v,
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Πˆ
(3-a)
i = Πˆ
(3-b)
i < 0 = Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(3-c)
i , Πˆ
(5)
i < 0 = Πˆ
(1)
i , Πˆ
(4-a)
i = Πˆ
(4-b)
i < Πˆ
(2-a)
i =
Πˆ
(2-b)
i ≤ Πˆ(3-c)i . Thus Strategy (3-c) is the only strategy that is not weakly domi-
nated when.
• When 0 ≤ p−i,3 ≤ v,
Πˆ
(2-a)
i = Πˆ
(2-b)
i = Πˆ
(3-a)
i = Πˆ
(3-b)
i = Πˆ
(3-c)
i = Πˆ
(4-a)
i = Πˆ
(4-b)
i = Πˆ
(5)
i < 0 = Πˆ
(1)
i .
The Strategy (1), which means staying out of business, is the only one that is not
weakly dominated when 0 ≤ p−i,3 ≤ v.
Strategies (1), (3-c), and (5) that survive weakly dominance are symmetric, i.e.,
pˆi1 = pˆi2 = pˆi. Accordingly, we restrict our analysis of Firm −i’s best response to only
symmetric strategies for Firm i.
Firm −i. We next outline three possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its com-
petitor’s price pi > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm −i’s profit as Πˆ(x)−i . Given
Firm i’s symmetric pricing strategy, Firm −i can sell to either both or no customers.
1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j,l x−i,j1 = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−ij1 = 2. We need pˆ−i,3 = min{v + v, pi + v},
and Πˆ
(2)
−i = 2 min{v + v, pi + v}
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
−i < Πˆ
(2)
−i
Comparison. Comparing the best responses of any two firms it is clear that if pi = 0,
then pˆ−i,3 = v. And if p−i,3 = v, the best response of Firm i is pˆi ∈ [0,∞); hence pˆi = 0
and pˆ−i,3 = v is an equilibrium. If 0 < pi < v, then pˆ−i,3 = v + pi. The best response
of Firm i is then either pˆi = min{v, p−i,3 − v− δ} or pˆi = min{v, p−i,3 − v− δ} so when
pˆ−i,3 = v+pi, this becomes pˆi = min{v, pˆi−δ} ≤ pˆi−δ, or pˆi = min{v, v−v−δ+pˆi} < pˆi
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which both yield a contradiction. Similarly, if pi > v, then pˆ−i,3 = v + v and when
p−i,3 = v + v, the best response of Firm i is either pˆi = p−i,3 − v − δ = v − δ, or
pˆi = p−i,3− v− δ = v− δ which both yield a contradiction. Hence, the only equilibrium
is pˆi1 = pˆi2 = 0 and pˆ−i,3 = v. As a result Πˆi = 0 and Πˆ−i = 2v.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.7
We focus on the case where zi = (1, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 0, 0). Due to symmetry, a
similar proof holds for the other case and we omit the details for brevity. To express
best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ be the smallest
price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of Firm i and Firm
−i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline three possible strategies for Firm i in response to its com-
petitor’s price p−i,1 > 0 ignoring all situations of ties. For any strategy (x), we denote
Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to one customer, which can happen in one of the following two
cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 1 and
∑
j xij3 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 1’s valuation
for Product 1 is higher than Customer 2’s. Hence, xi11 = 1 and xi21 = 0.
According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,1 − δ, pi3 − v − δ}. Firm i sets
any pi3 > v + v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and
Πˆ
(2-a)
i = pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij3 = 1 and
∑
j xij1 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 2’s valuation
for Product 1 is lower than Customer 1’s. Hence, xi23 = 1 and xi13 = 0.
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According to (2.1), we need pi3 ≤ min{v + v, v + min{pi1, p−i,1}}. Firm i sets
any pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus, pˆi3 = min{v+ v, p−i,1 + v}, and
Πˆ
(2-b)
i = min{v + v, p−i,1 + v}.
3. To sell one product to each customer, which can happen in one of the following
three cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij3 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, pi3 −
v, p−i,1 − δ}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v + v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus,
pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and Πˆ(3-a)i = 2pˆi1 = 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 0 and
∑
j xij3 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi3 ≤ min{v+v, v+
min{pi1, p−i,1}}. Firm i sets any pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus,
pˆi3 = min{v + v, p−i,1 + v} and Πˆ(3-b)i = 2pˆi3 = 2 min{v + v, p−i,1 + v}.
(c) xi11 = 1, xi21 = 0, xi23 = 1, and xi13 = 0. Under PNC valuations, the firm
sells Product 1 to Customer 1 and the bundle to Customer 2. Hence, we need
pi1 ≤ min{v, pi3 − v − δ, p−i,1 − δ} and pi3 ≤ min{v + v, v + min{pi1, p−i,1}.
Therefore, pˆi1 = min{v, pi3 − v − δ, p−i,1 − δ}, pˆi3 = min{v + v, pi1 + v}, and
Πˆ
(3-c)
i = pˆi1 + pˆi3 = min{v, pi3 − v − δ, p−i,1 − δ}+ min{v + v, pi1 + v}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that
• When p−i,1 > v,
Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(3-a)
i < Πˆ
(2-a)
i < Πˆ
(3-c)
i < Πˆ
(3-b)
i and the only strategy that are not domi-
nated is Strategy (3-b).
• When 0 < p−i,1 ≤ v,
Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(3-a)
i < Πˆ
(2-a)
i < Πˆ
(3-c)
i . The only strategies that are not dominated are
(3-b) and (3-c). Relative values of v and v determine the dominant strategy:
119
– When v ≤ 2v,
Strategy (3-b), i.e., any pˆi1 ≥ v and pˆi3 = min{v+ v, p−i,1 + v}, is the best
response.
– When v > 2v,
Strategy (3-c), i.e., pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1−δ} and pˆi3 = min{v+v, p−i,1+v−δ},
is the best response when 0 < p−i,1 < v − v.
Strategy (3-b), i.e., any pˆi1 > v and pˆi3 = min{v+ v, p−i,1 + v}, is the best
response when v − v ≤ p−i,1.
• When p−i,1 = 0, Πˆ(2-a)i < Πˆ(1)i , Πˆ(3-a)i < Πˆ(1)i ,Πˆ(2-b)i < Πˆ(3-c)i ,Πˆ(1)i < Πˆ(3-c)i .Relative
values of v and v determine the dominant strategy:
– When v ≤ 2v,
Strategy (3-b), i.e., any pˆi1 ≥ v and pˆi3 = v, is the best response.
– When v > 2v,
Strategy (3-c), i.e., pˆi1 = 0 and pˆi3 = v is the best response when
Firm −i. We next outline three possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its
competitor’s prices pi,1 > 0 and pi,3 > 0 ignoring all situations of ties. For any strategy
(x), we denote Firm −i’s profit, as Πˆ(x)−i .
1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j x−i,j1 = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell to one customer, i.e.,
∑
j x−i,j1 = 1. Under PNC valuations, Customer
1’s valuation for Product 1 is higher than Customer 2’s valuation for Product 1.
Hence, x−i,11 = 1 and x−i,21 = 0. According to (2.1), we need p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1−
δ, pi3 − v − δ}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ, pi3 − v − δ} and Πˆ(2)−i = pˆ−i,1 =
min{v, pi1 − δ, pi3 − v − δ}.
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3. To sell to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−ij1 = 2. Under PNC valuations, we need
p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1 − δ, pi3 − v − δ}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ, pi3 − v − δ} and
Πˆ
(3)
−i = 2 min{v, pi1 − δ, pi3 − v − δ}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that if pi1 = 0 or pi3 < v then Strategy 1 is the dominant
strategy. Otherwise, Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(2)
i and Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(3)
i . Relative values of v and v determine
the dominant strategy between Strategies (2) and (3).
• Firm i plays Strategy (3-b) and Firm −i plays Strategy (2)
• Firm i plays Strategy (3-c) and Firm −i plays Strategy (2)
• Firm i plays Strategy (3-b) and Firm −i plays Strategy (3)
• Firm i plays Strategy (3-c) and Firm −i plays Strategy (3)
Under the first and third cases the equilibrium prices are pi3 = v and p−i,1 = 0.
Similarly, under second and fourth cases firms will engage in a price war in the first
product market, thus pi1 = p−i,1 = 0 and pi3 = v. Therefore the equilibrium profits are
Πˆi = max{2v, v} and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.8
We focus on the case where zi = (1, 0, 1) and z−i = (0, 1, 0). Due to symmetry, a
similar proof holds for the other case and we omit the details for brevity. To express
best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ be the smallest
price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of Firm i and Firm
−i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline three possible strategies for Firm i in response to its com-
petitor’s price p−i,2 ≥ 0 ignoring all situations of ties. For any strategy (x), we denote
Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
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1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to one customer, which can happen in one of the following two
cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 1 and
∑
j xij3 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 1’s valuation
for Product 1 is higher than Customer 2’s. Hence, xi11 = 1 and xi21 = 0.
According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, pi3−v−δ}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v+v
to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 = v and Πˆ
(2-a)
i = pˆi1 = v.
(b)
∑
j xij3 = 1 and
∑
j xij1 = 0. Under PNC valuations, we need pi3 ≤ min{v +
v, pi1 +v, p−i,2 +v}. Firm i sets any pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus,
pˆi3 = min{v + v, p−i,2 + v}, and Πˆ(2-b)i = min{v + v, p−i,2 + v}.
3. To sell one product to each customer, which can happen in one of the following
three cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij3 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, pi3−v}.
Firm i sets any pi3 > v + v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 = v and
Πˆ
(3-a)
i = 2pˆi1 = 2v.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 0 and
∑
j xij3 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi3 ≤ min{v +
v, pi1 +v, p−i,2 +v}. Firm i sets any pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus,
pˆi3 = min{v + v, p−i,2 + v} and Πˆ(3-b)i = 2pˆi3 = 2 min{v + v, p−i,2 + v}.
(c) xi11 = 1, xi21 = 0, xi23 = 1, and xi13 = 0. Under PNC valuations, the
firm sells Product 1 to Customer 1 and the bundle to Customer 2. Hence,
we need pi1 ≤ min{v, pi3 − v − δ} and pi3 ≤ min{v + v, pi1 + v, p−i,2 + v}.
Therefore, pˆi1 = min{v, pi3 − v − δ}, pˆi3 = min{v + v, pi1 + v, p−i,2 + v}, and
Πˆ
(3-c)
i = pˆi1 + pˆi3 = min{v, pi3 − v − δ}+ min{v + v, pi1 + v, p−i,2 + v}.
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Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i < Πˆ
(2-a)
i , Πˆ
(2-a)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-b)i , Πˆ(3-a)i ≤ Πˆ(3-b)i , and
Πˆ
(3-c)
i < Πˆ
(3-b)
i with equality occurring only for p−i,2 = 0. Thus the only strategies that
are not weakly dominated are Strategies (2-b) and (3-b). Among them, the one that
will be adopted depends on the values of v, v, and p−i,2:
When p−i,2 > 0, the best response of Firm i, involves offering the bundle only. Thus,
Firm i avoids competition in the market of Product 1. Therefore, this game reduces to
the game characterized in Proposition 2.5, where zi = (0, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 0, 0).
When p−i,2 = 0, Firm −i will deviate to earn non-zero profits similar to Proposition
2.5.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.9
We focus on the case where zi = (1, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 1, 0). Due to symmetry, a
similar proof holds for the other case and we omit the details for brevity. To express
best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ be the smallest
price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of Firm i and Firm
−i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline three possible strategies for Firm i in response to its com-
petitor’s price p−i,1 > 0 and p−i,2 ≥ 0 ignoring all situations of ties. For any strategy
(x), we denote Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to one customer, which can happen in one of the following two
cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 1 and
∑
j xij3 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 1’s valuation
for Product 1 is higher than Customer 2’s. Hence, xi11 = 1 and xi21 = 0.
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According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,1−δ}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v+v
to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and Πˆ(2-a)i = pˆi1 =
min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij3 = 1 and
∑
j xij1 = 0. Under PNC valuations, to ensure
∑
j xij3 = 1
Firm i focuses on capturing the customer j for whom the following inequalities
could be fulfilled pi3 ≤ min{v + v, p−i,1 + vj1, p−i,2 + vj2} for j = 1 or j = 2.
Firm i sets any pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus, pˆi3 = min{v +
v, p−i,1 +vj1, p−i,2 +vj2} and Πˆ(2-b)i = pˆi3 = min{v+v, p−i,1 +vj1, p−i,2 +vj2}.
3. To sell one product to each customer, which can happen in one of the following
three cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij3 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, pi3 −
v, p−i,1 − δ}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v + v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus,
pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and Πˆ(3-a)i = 2pˆi1 = 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 0 and
∑
j xij3 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi3 ≤ min{v +
v, pi1 + v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v}. Firm i sets pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 = 0.
Thus, pˆi3 = min{v + v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v} and Πˆ(3-b)i = 2pˆi3 = 2 min{v +
v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v}.
(c) xi11 = 1, xi21 = 0, xi23 = 1, and xi13 = 0. Under PNC valuations, the firm
sells Product 1 to Customer 1 and the bundle to Customer 2. Hence, we need
pi1 ≤ min{v, pi3−v−δ, p−i,1−δ} and pi3 ≤ min{v+v, pi1+v, p−i,1+v, p−i,2+v}.
Therefore, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ}, pˆi3 = min{v + v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v}, and
Πˆ
(3-c)
i = min{v, p−i,1 − δ}+ min{v + v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-c)i , Πˆ(3-a)i < Πˆ(3-b)i , Πˆ(2-a)i < Πˆ(3-c)i , and
Πˆ
(2-b)
i ≤ Πˆ(3-c)i . Thus the only strategies that are not weakly dominated are Strategies
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(3-b) and (3-c).
Firm −i. We next outline five possible strategies for Firm i in response to its com-
petitor’s prices p−i,1 > 0, and p−i,3 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm i’s profit,
as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to one customer, which can happen in one of the following two
cases:
(a)
∑
j x−i,j1 = 1 and
∑
j x−i,j2 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 1’s valua-
tion for Product 1 is higher than Customer 2’s. Hence, x−i,11 = 1 and x−i,21 =
0. According to (2.1), we need p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} and Πˆ(2-a)−i = pˆ−i,1 =
min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
(b)
∑
j x−i,j2 = 1 and
∑
j x−i,j1 = 0. Under PNC valuations, Customer 2’s val-
uation for Product 2 is higher than Customer 1’s. Hence, x−i,22 = 1 and
x−i,12 = 0. According to (2.1), we need p−i,2 ≤ min{v, pi3 − v − δ}. Thus,
pˆ−i,2 = min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}, and Πˆ(2-b)−i = pˆi2 = min{v,max{pi3 − v −
δ, 0}}.
3. To sell one product to each customer, which can happen in one of the following
three cases:
(a)
∑
j x−i,j1 = 2 and
∑
j x−i,j2 = 0. According to (2.1), we need p−i,1 ≤
min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 −
v − δ, 0}} and Πˆ(3-a)−i = 2pˆ−i,1 = 2 min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
(b)
∑
j x−i,j1 = 0 and
∑
j x−i,j2 = 2. According to (2.1), we need p−i,2 ≤
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min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}. Thus, pˆ−i,2 = min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} and
Πˆ
(3-b)
−i = 2 min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
(c) x−i,11 = 1, x−i,21 = 0, x−i,22 = 1, and x−i,12 = 0. Under PNC valuations, the
firm sells Product 1 to Customer 1 and Product 2 to Customer 2. Hence, we
need p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1− δ,max{pi3− v− δ, 0}} and p−i,2 ≤ min{v,max{pi3−
v − δ, 0}}. Therefore, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}, pˆ−i,2 =
min{v,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}}, and Πˆ(3-c)−i = pˆ−i,1+pˆ−i,2 = min{v, pi1−δ,max{pi3−
v − δ, 0}}+ min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
4. To sell both products to one customer and one product to the other customer,
which can happen in one of the following two cases:
(a)
∑
j x−i,j1 = 2, x−i,22 = 1, and x−i,12 = 0. Under PNC valuations, we need
p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} and p−i,2 ≤ min{v,max{pi3 − v −
δ, 0}}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1−δ,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}}, pˆ−i,2 = min{v,max{pi3−
v − δ, 0}}, and Πˆ(4-a)−i = 2pˆi1 + pˆi2 = 2 min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} +
min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
(b) x−i,11 = 1, x−i,21 = 0, and
∑
j x−i,j2 = 2. Under PNC valuations, we need
p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} and p−i,2 ≤ min{v,max{pi3 − v −
δ, 0}}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1−δ,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}}, pˆ−i,2 = min{v,max{pi3−
v − δ, 0}}, and Πˆ(4-b)i = 2pˆ−i,2 + pˆ−i,1 = 2 min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} +
min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
5. To sell both products to both customers. Under PNC valuations, we need p−i,1 ≤
min{v, pi1− δ,max{pi3− v− δ, 0}} and p−i,2 ≤ min{v,max{pi3− v− δ, 0}}. Thus,
pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}, pˆ−i,2 = min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}},
and Πˆ
(5)
−i = 2pˆi1 + 2pˆi2 = 2 min{v, pi1− δ,max{pi3−v− δ, 0}}+ 2 min{v,max{pi3−
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v − δ, 0}}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-a)i , Πˆ(2-a)i ≤ Πˆ(2-b)i , Πˆ(2-b)i ≤ Πˆ(4-a)i ,
Πˆ
(3-a)
i ≤ Πˆ(3-b)i , and Πˆ(3-b)i ≤ Πˆ(4-b)i . Thus the only strategies that are not weakly
dominated are Strategies (3-c), (4-a), (4-b), and (5).
Comparison. Comparing the best responses of the two firms, it appears that both
firms try to capture both customer groups. Below, we analyze the eight different com-
binations of best response strategies of the firms.
• Firm i plays (3-b) and Firm −i plays (3-c). On one hand, Firm i only sells the
bundle and has to lower pˆi3 according to pˆ−i,1 and pˆ−i,2. On the other hand, Firm
−i has to undercut Firm i’s bundle price to capture any customers. Thus, in
equilibrium pˆi3 = v, pˆ−i,1 = p−i,2 = 0, Πˆi = 2v, and Πˆ−i = 0.
• Firm i plays (3-b) and Firm −i plays (4-a). Due to a similar reason to the one
above, in equilibrium pˆi3 = v, pˆ−i,1 = p−i,2 = 0, Πˆi = 2v, and Πˆ−i = 0.
• Firm i plays (3-b) and Firm −i plays (4-b). Due to a similar reason to the one
above, in equilibrium pˆi3 = v, pˆ−i,1 = p−i,2 = 0, Πˆi = 2v, and Πˆ−i = 0.
• Firm i plays (3-b) and Firm −i plays (5). Due to a similar reason to the one above,
in equilibrium pˆi3 = v, pˆ−i,1 = p−i,2 = 0, Πˆi = 2v, and Πˆ−i = 0.
• Firm i plays (3-c) and Firm −i plays (3-c). Both firms will engage in a price war
on Component 1, undercutting each other’s price. Also due to a similar reason to
the one above, p−i,2 will be priced to zero, in equilibrium. In equilibrium pˆi3 = v,
pˆ−i,1 = p−i,2 = 0, Πˆi = v, and Πˆ−i = 0.
• Firm i plays (3-c) and Firm −i plays (4-a). Due to a similar reason to the one
above, in equilibrium pˆi3 = v, pˆ−i,1 = p−i,2 = 0, Πˆi = 2v, and Πˆ−i = 0.
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• Firm i plays (3-c) and Firm −i plays (4-b). Due to a similar reason to the one
above, in equilibrium pˆi3 = v, pˆ−i,1 = p−i,2 = 0, Πˆi = 2v, and Πˆ−i = 0.
• Firm i plays (3-c) and Firm −i plays (5). Due to a similar reason to the one above,
in equilibrium pˆi3 = v, pˆ−i,1 = p−i,2 = 0, Πˆi = 2v, and Πˆ−i = 0.
It appears that irrespective of the strategy each firm plays, in equilibrium, pˆi1 = pˆ−i,1 =
pˆ−i,2 = 0, Firm i always sells only the bundle, and thus Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 2.1
Firm i offers three different products, i.e., Component 1, Component 2, and the
bundle, but there are only two customer groups in the market. Firm i can capture at
most two customers, thus it has to strategically choose only two products to compete
with Firm −i. There are three possibilities.
1. Capture customers by Product 1 and Product 2. According to Proposition 2.3,
Πˆi = max{v, 2v} and Πˆ−i = 0.
2. Capture customers by the common product, also offered by Firm −i, and the
bundle. According to Propositions 2.7, Πˆi = max{v, 2v} and Πˆ−i = 0.
3. Capture customers by the products that is not offered by Firm −i and the bundle.
According to Propositions 2.8,
• For v ≥ 3v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = v + v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = v−v2 .
• For 2v < v < 3v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2(v − v) and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = v − 2v.
• For v ≤ 2v, Πˆi(zi; z−i) = 2v and Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0.
Under any relative valuations v, v, the third strategy, i.e., offering the product not
offered by Firm −i and the bundle, yields the maximum profit for Firm i.
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Proof. Proof of Corollary 2.2
Firm i offers three different products, i.e., Component 1, Component 2, and the
bundle, but there are only two customer groups in the market. Firm i can capture at
most two customers, thus it has to strategically choose only two products to compete
with Firm −i. There are three possibilities.
1. Capture customers by Product 1 and Product 2. According to Proposition 2.1,
both firms make zero profit.
2. Capture customers by Product 1 and the bundle. According to Proposition 2.9,
Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
3. Capture customers by Product 2 and the bundle. According to Proposition 2.9,
Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Firm i will only price either Product 1 or Product 2 and the bundle competitively to
capture both customer groups. In equilibrium Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.10
Both firms offer the bundle, i.e., zi3 = z−i3 = 1. For the sake of simplicity we remove
the (z1, z2) arguments from the profit function expressions. To express best responses,
it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ be the smallest price increment
(e.g., cents). We consider the best responses of Firm i.
Firm i. We first outline three possible strategies for Firm i in response to its com-
petitor’s prices p−i,k > 0 for k = 1, 2 and p−i,3 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote
Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
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2. To sell one product to one customer, which can happen in one of the following
three cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 1,
∑
j xij3 = 0, and
∑
j xij2 = 0. This strategy is feasible only
if zi1 = 1. Under PNC valuations, Customer 1’s valuation for Product 1
is higher than Customer 2’s. Hence, xi11 = 1 and xi21 = 0. According to
(2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v,max{min{pi3, p−i3} − v − δ, 0}, z−i1(p−i1 − δ)}.
Firm i sets any pi3 > v + v and any pi2 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0 and∑
j xij2 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v,max{p−i3 − v − δ, z−i1(p−i1 − δ), 0}} and
Πˆ
(2-a)
i = pˆi1 = min{v,max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}, z−i1(p−i1 − δ)}.
(b)
∑
j xij2 = 1,
∑
j xij3 = 0, and
∑
j xij1 = 0. This strategy is feasible only
if zi2 = 1. Under PNC valuations, Customer 2’s valuation for Product 2
is higher than Customer 1’s. Hence, xi22 = 1 and xi12 = 0. According to
(2.1), we need pi2 ≤ min{v,max{min{pi3, p−i3} − v − δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2 − δ)}.
Firm i sets any pi3 > v + v and any pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0 and∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus, pˆi2 = min{v,max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2 − δ)} and
Πˆ
(2-b)
i = pˆi2 = min{v,max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2 − δ)}.
(c)
∑
j xij3 = 1,
∑
j xij1 = 0, and
∑
j xij2 = 0. Under PNC valuations, to
ensure
∑
j xij3 = 1, Firm i focuses on capturing the Customer j for whom
the following inequalities could be fulfilled v(−j)3− z−ik(v(−j)k− p−ik) ≤ pi3 ≤
min{vj3, p−i3 − δ, vj3 − z−ik(vjk − p−ik)} for k = 1, 2. Firm i sets any pi1 =
pi2 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 =
∑
j xij2 = 0. Thus, pˆi3 = min{vj3, p−i3 −
δ, vj3−z−ik(vjk−p−ik)} for k = 1, 2, and Πˆ(2-c)i = pˆi3 = min{vj3, p−i3−δ, vj3−
z−i1(vj1 − p−i1), vj3 − z−i2(vj2 − p−i2)} for j = 1 or 2.
3. To sell one product to each customer, which can happen in one of the following
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three cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2,
∑
j xij2 = 0, and
∑
j xij3 = 0. This strategy is feasible only if
zi1 = 1. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, z−i1(p−i1−δ),max{min{pi3, p−i3}−
v− δ, 0}}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v+ v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 =
min{v,max{p−i3− v− δ, 0}, z−i1(p−i1− δ)} and Πˆ(3-a)i = 2 min{v,max{p−i3−
v − δ, 0}, z−i1(p−i1 − δ)}.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 1 and
∑
j xij3 = 1. This strategy is feasible only if zi1 = 1. Under
PNC valuations, Customer 1’s valuation for Product 1 is higher than Cus-
tomer 2’s. Hence, xi11 = 1 and xi21 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤
min{v, z−i1(p−i1−δ),max{min{pi3, p−i3}−v−δ, 0}}, and pi3 ≤ min{v+v, v+
pi1, z−i1(v+p−i1), zi2(v+pi2), z−i2(v+p−i2), p−i3−δ}. Firm i sets pi2 > v to en-
sure that
∑
j xij2 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, z−i1(p−i1−δ),max{p−i3−v−δ, 0}}
and pˆi3 = min{v + v, v + pi1, z−i1(v + p−i1), z−i2(v + p−i2), p−i3 − δ} and
Πˆ
(3-b)
i = pˆi1 + pˆi3 = min{v, z−i1(p−i1 − δ),max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}} + min{v +
v, v + pi1, z−i1(v + p−i1), z−i2(v + p−i2), p−i3 − δ}.
(c)
∑
j xij2 = 2,
∑
j xij1 = 0, and
∑
j xij3 = 0. This strategy is feasible only if
zi2 = 1. According to (2.1), we need pi2 ≤ min{v,max{p−i3−v−δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2−
δ)}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v + v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus, pˆi2 =
min{v,−v+ p−i3− δ, z−i2(p−i2− δ)} and Πˆ(3-c)i = 2pˆi2 = 2 min{v,max{p−i3−
v − δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2 − δ)}.
(d)
∑
j xij2 = 1 and
∑
j xij3 = 1. This strategy is feasible only if zi2 = 1. Un-
der PNC valuations, Customer 2’s valuation for Product 2 is higher than
Customer 1’s. Hence, xi22 = 1 and xi12 = 0. According to (2.1), we need
pi2 ≤ min{v, z−i2(p−i2 − δ),max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}} and pi3 ≤ min{v + v, v +
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pi2, z−i1(v + p−i1), z−i2(v + p−i2), p−i3 − δ}. Firm i sets pi1 > v to ensure
that
∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus, pˆi2 = min{v, z−i2(p−i2 − δ),max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}},
pˆi3 = min{v + v, v + pi2, z−i1(v + p−i1), z−i2(v + p−i2), p−i3 − δ}, and Πˆ(3-d)i =
pˆi2 + pˆi3 = min{v, z−i2(p−i2 − δ),max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}} + min{v + v, v +
pi2, z−i1(v + p−i1), z−i2(v + p−i2), p−i3 − δ}.
(e)
∑
j xij1 = 1,
∑
j xij2 = 1, and
∑
j xij3 = 0. This strategy is feasible only if
zi1 = zi2 = 1. Under PNC valuations, Customer 1’s valuation for Product 1 is
higher than Customer 2’s and Customer 2’s valuation for Product 2 is higher
than Customer 1’s. Hence, xi11 = xi22 = 1 and xi12 = xi21 = 0. According
to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v,max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}, z−i1(p−i1 − δ)} and pi2 ≤
min{v,max{p−i3−v−δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2−δ)}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v+v to ensure
that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v,max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}, z−i1(p−i1 − δ)},
pˆi2 = min{v,max{p−i3 − v − δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2 − δ)} and Πˆ(3-e)i = pˆi1 + pˆi2 =
min{v,−v+p−i3−δ, z−i1(p−i1−δ)}+min{v,max{p−i3−v−δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2−δ)}.
(f)
∑
j xij3 = 2,
∑
j xij1 = 0, and
∑
j xij2 = 0. According to (2.1), we need
pi3 ≤ min{v+ v, z−i1(v+ p−i1), z−i2(v+ p−i2), p−i3 − δ}. Thus, pˆi3 = min{v+
v, z−i1(v + p−i1), z−i2(v + p−i2), p−i3 − δ} and Πˆ(3-f)i = 2pˆi3 = 2 min{v +
v, z−i1(v + p−i1), z−i2(v + p−i2), p−i3 − δ}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-a)i , Πˆ(2-b)i ≤ Πˆ(2-c)i , Πˆ(2-a)i ≤ Πˆ(2-c)i , Πˆ(3-a)i ≤
Πˆ
(3-f)
i , Πˆ
(3-c)
i ≤ Πˆ(3-f)i , Πˆ(3-e)i ≤ Πˆ(3-b)i , and Πˆ(3-e)i ≤ Πˆ(3-d)i . Thus the only strategies that
are not weakly dominated are strategies where Firm i sells the bundle and therefore
competes in the bundled product market namely Strategies (2-c), (3-b), (3-d), and (3-
f). The common requirement of all such strategies is setting pi3 < p−i3 for i = 1, 2.
Firms will thus engage in a price war on the bundle, undercutting each other’s price.
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In equilibrium pˆi3 = pˆ−i,3 = 0. From (2.1) we conclude that in such a market, xijk = 0
∀i, j, k 6= 3. Therefore Πˆi = Πˆ−i = 0
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.11
With non-overlapping offerings, there is no competition in any of the product mar-
kets. Therefore Firm i who offers Product l can capture both customers, i.e., xijl = 2,
by setting pil ≤ vjl.
• If zi = (1, 0, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), it is clear that Πˆ−i(z−i; zi) = 0. Under PPC,
Firm i can capture both customers by setting pˆi = v and Πˆi = 2v.
• If zi = (0, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), Firm i can capture both customers under PPC
by setting pˆi = v, and Πˆi = 2v.
• If zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 0, 0), Firm i can maximize its profit by setting pi1 = v
and pi2 = v and thus earn Πˆi = 2(v + v).
• If zi = (1, 0, 0) and z−i = (0, 1, 0), firms operate in separate markets. Following
the results in the first two cases, Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 2v.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.12
We focus on the case where zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (1, 0, 0). To express best
responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ be the smallest price
increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of Firm i and Firm −i
and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline three possible strategies for Firm i in response to its com-
petitor’s price p−i,1 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
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1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to each customer, i.e.,
∑
l xi1l = 1 and
∑
l xi2l = 1, which can
happen in one of the following two cases.
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij2 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, p−i,1−
δ}. Firm i sets any pi2 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij2 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 =
min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and Πˆ(2-a)i = 2pˆi1 = 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 0 and
∑
j xij2 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi2 ≤ v. Firm i sets
any pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus, pˆi2 = v and Πˆ
(2-b)
i = 2pˆi2 = 2v.
3. To sell both products to both customers. Under PPC valuations, we need pi1 ≤
min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and pi2 ≤ v. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ}, pˆi2 = v, and Πˆ(3)i =
2pˆi1 + 2pˆi2 = 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}+ 2v.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-a)i , Πˆ(2-a)i ≤ Πˆ(3)i , and Πˆ(2-b)i ≤ Πˆ(3)i . Thus
the only strategy that is not weakly dominated is Strategy (3).
Firm −i. We next outline two possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its com-
petitor’s prices pi,1 > 0 and pi,2 ≥ 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm −i’s profit
as Πˆ
(x)
−i .
1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j,l x−i,j1 = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−ij1 = 2. Under PPC valuations, we need
p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1− δ}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1− δ} and Πˆ(2)−i = 2 min{v, pi1− δ}.
Comparison. Comparing the best responses of the two firms, it appears that, ir-
respective of the relative values of v and v, the firms will engage in a price war on
Component 1, undercutting each other’s price. Hence, there is no equilibrium where
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the market of Component 1 is not shared. Hence, pˆi1 = pˆ−i,1 = 0, and pˆi2 = v. As a
result Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.13
We focus on the case where zi = (1, 1, 0) and z−i = (0, 1, 0). To express best
responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ be the smallest price
increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of Firm i and Firm −i
and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline three possible strategies for Firm i in response to its com-
petitor’s price p−i,2 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to each customer, i.e.,
∑
l xi1l = 1 and
∑
l xi2l = 1, which can
happen in one of the following two cases.
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij2 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ v. Firm i sets
any pi2 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij2 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 = v and Πˆ
(2-a)
i = 2pˆi1 = 2v.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 0 and
∑
j xij2 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi2 ≤ min{v, p−i,2−
δ}. Firm i sets any pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus, pˆi2 =
min{v, p−i,2 − δ} and Πˆ(2-b)i = 2pˆi2 = 2 min{v, p−i,2 − δ}.
3. To sell both products to both customers. Under PPC valuations, we need pi1 ≤ v
and pi2 ≤ min{v, p−i,2 − δ}. Thus, pˆi1 = v, pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,2 − δ}, and Πˆ(3)i =
2pˆi1 + 2pˆi2 = 2v + 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-a)i , Πˆ(2-a)i ≤ Πˆ(3)i , and Πˆ(2-b)i ≤ Πˆ(3)i . Thus
the only strategy that is not weakly dominated is Strategy (3).
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Firm −i. We next outline two possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its com-
petitor’s prices pi,1 ≥ 0 and pi,2 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm −i’s profit,
as Πˆ
(x)
−i .
1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j x−i,j2 = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−ij2 = 2. Under PPC valuations, we need
p−i,2 ≤ min{v, pi2− δ}. Thus, pˆ−i,2 = min{v, pi2− δ} and Πˆ(2)−i = 2 min{v, pi2− δ}.
Comparison. Comparing the best responses of the two firms, it appears that, ir-
respective of the relative values of v and v, the firms will engage in a price war on
Component 2, undercutting each other’s price. Hence, there is no equilibrium where
the market of Component 2 is not shared. Hence, pˆi2 = pˆ−i,2 = 0, and pˆi1 = v. As a
result Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.14
1. If zi = (0, 0, 1), then Πi(pi; p−i, zi, z−i) = pi3
∑
j xij3 = 2pi3 if pi3 ≤ v + v, and
Πi(pi; p−i, zi, z−i) = 0 if pi3 > v + v. Thus pˆi3 = v + v and Πˆi = 2(v + v).
2. If zi = (1, 0, 1), then by selling Product 1, Firm i can earn 2v, if it sells its to
both customers. However, if Firm i prices pi1 > v, it can earn a profit of 2(v + v)
by selling the bundle to both customers. Thus in equilibrium, pˆi3 = v + v and
Πˆi = 2(v + v).
3. If zi = (0, 1, 1), similar to the previous case, we obtain that in equilibrium pˆi3 =
v + v and Πˆi = 2(v + v).
4. zi = (1, 1, 1), Firm i offers three products and there are only two customer groups
in the market. Firm i has to sell at most two products to the customer groups.
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If it chooses Product 1 and Product 2, then the equilibrium profit Πˆi = 2(v + v),
according to Proposition 2.11. If it chooses Product 1 and the bundle, or Product
2 and the bundle, then the equilibrium profit is again Πˆi = 2(v + v). Thus in
equilibrium, Πˆi = 2(v + v).
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.15
To express best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ
be the smallest price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of
Firm i and Firm −i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline two possible strategies for Firm i in response to its competi-
tor’s price p−i,1 ≥ 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ(x)i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell the bundle to both customers. Under PPC valuations, we need pi3 ≤
min{v + v, p−i,1 + v}. Thus, pˆi3 = min{v + v, p−i,1 + v}, and Πˆ(3)i = 2pˆi3 =
2 min{v + v, p−i,1 + v}.
Firm −i. We next outline two possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its com-
petitor’s price pi3 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm −i’s profit, as Πˆ(x)−i .
1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j,l x−i,j1 = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−ij1 = 2. Under PPC valuations, we need
p−i,1 ≤ min{v,max{pi3− v− δ, 0}}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v,max{pi3− v− δ, 0}} and
Πˆ
(2)
−i = 2 min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
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Comparison. Comparing the best responses of the two firms, it appears that, irre-
spective of the relative values of v and v, Firm −i will undercut pi3− v and Firm i will
lower its bundle price accordingly. In equilibrium, pˆ−i,1 = 0 and pˆi3 = v. As a result
Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.16
The proof follows the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2.15, and is omitted
for the sake of brevity.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.17
To express best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ
be the smallest price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of
Firm i and Firm −i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline two possible strategies for Firm i in response to its competi-
tor’s prices p−i,1 ≥ 0 and p−i,2 ≥ 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm i’s profit, as
Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell the bundle to both customers. Under PPC valuations, we need pi3 ≤
min{v + v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v}. Thus, pˆi3 = min{v + v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v}, and
Πˆ
(3)
i = 2pˆi3 = 2 min{v + v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2)i . Thus Firm i’s best response is Strategy
(2), i.e., capturing both customers with the bundle.
Firm −i. We next outline three possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its
competitor’s price pi3 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm −i’s profit, as Πˆ(x)−i .
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1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j,l x−i,jl = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell one product to each customer, i.e.,
∑
l xi1l = 1 and
∑
l xi2l = 1, which can
happen in one of the following two cases.
(a)
∑
j x−i,j1 = 2 and
∑
j x−i,j2 = 0. According to (2.1), we need p−i,1 ≤
min{v,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}}. Firm−i sets any p−i,2 > v to ensure that
∑
j x−i,j2 =
0. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}} and Πˆ(2-a)−i = 2pˆ−i,1 = 2 min{v,max{pi3−
v − δ, 0}}..
(b)
∑
j x−i,j1 = 0 and
∑
j x−i,j2 = 2. According to (2.1), we need p−i,2 ≤
min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}. Firm −i sets any p−i,1 > v to ensure that∑
j x−i,j1 = 0. Thus, pˆ−i,2 = min{v,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}} and Πˆ(2-b)−i = 2pˆ−i,2 =
2 min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
3. To sell to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−ij1 = 2 and
∑
j x−ij2 = 2. Under PPC valua-
tions, we need p−i,1 ≤ min{v,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}}, and p−i,2 ≤ min{v,max{pi3−v−
δ, 0}}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}}, pˆ−i,2 = min{v,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}}
and Πˆ
(2)
−i = 2pˆ−i,1 + 2pˆ−i,2 = 2 min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} + 2 min{v,max{pi3 −
v − δ, 0}}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-a)i , Πˆ(2-a)i ≤ Πˆ(3)i , and Πˆ(2-b)i ≤ Πˆ(3)i . Thus
the only strategy that is not weakly dominated is Strategy (3).
Comparison. Comparing the best responses of the two firms, it appears that, irre-
spective of the relative values of v and v, Firm −i will undercut pi3 and Firm i will
lower its bundle price accordingly. In equilibrium, pˆ−i,1 = pˆ−i,2 = 0, and pˆi3 = v. As a
result Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.18
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To express best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ
be the smallest price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of
Firm i and Firm −i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline two possible strategies for Firm i in response to its competi-
tor’s price p−i,1 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to each customer, i.e.,
∑
j xij1 = 2 or
∑
j xij3 = 2, which can
happen in one of the following two cases.
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij3 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, pi3 −
v− δ, p−i,1− δ}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v+ v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus,
pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and Πˆ(2-a)i = 2pˆi1 = 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 0 and
∑
j xij3 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi3 ≤ min{v +
v, p−i,1 + v − δ}. Firm i sets any pi1 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus,
pˆi3 = min{v+ v, p−i,1 + v− δ} and Πˆ(2-b)i = 2pˆi3 = 2 min{v+ v, p−i,1 + v− δ}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-b)i and Πˆ(2-a)i < Πˆ(2-b)i . Thus Firm i’s best
response is Strategy (2-b), i.e., capturing both customers with the bundle.
Firm −i. We next outline two possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its com-
petitor’s price pi1 > 0 and pi3 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm −i’s profit, as
Πˆ
(x)
−i .
1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j,l x−i,jl = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell Product 1 to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−i,j1 = 2. According to (2.1),
we need p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 −
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δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} and Πˆ(2)−i = 2pˆ−i,1 = 2 min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2)i . Thus the best response of Firm −i is
Strategy (2).
Comparison. Comparing the best responses of the two firms, it appears that, irre-
spective of the relative values of v and v, Firm −i will undercut pi3 − v and pi1 and
Firm i will lower its bundle price accordingly. In equilibrium, pˆ−i,1 = 0, and pˆi3 = v.
As a result Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.19
To express best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ
be the smallest price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of
Firm i and Firm −i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline two possible strategies for Firm i in response to its competi-
tor’s price p−i,2 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to each customer, i.e.,
∑
j xij2 = 2 or
∑
j xij3 = 2, which can
happen in one of the following two cases.
(a)
∑
j xij2 = 2 and
∑
j xij3 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi2 ≤ min{v,max{pi3−
v − δ, 0}, p−i,2 − δ}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v + v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0.
Thus, pˆi2 = min{v, p−i,2 − δ} and Πˆ(2-a)i = 2pˆi2 = 2 min{v, p−i,2 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij2 = 0 and
∑
j xij3 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi3 ≤ min{v +
v, p−i,2 + v − δ}. Firm i sets any pi2 > v to ensure that
∑
j xij2 = 0. Thus,
pˆi3 = min{v+ v, p−i,2 + v− δ} and Πˆ(2-b)i = 2pˆi3 = 2 min{v+ v, p−i,2 + v− δ}.
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Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-b)i and Πˆ(2-a)i < Πˆ(2-b)i . Thus Firm i’s best
response is Strategy (2-b), i.e., capturing both customers with the bundle.
Firm −i. We next outline two possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its com-
petitor’s price pi2 > 0 and pi3 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm −i’s profit, as
Πˆ
(x)
−i .
1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j,l x−i,j2 = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell Product 2 to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−i,j2 = 2. According to (2.1),
we need p−i,2 ≤ min{v, pi2 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}. Thus, pˆ−i,2 = min{v, pi2 −
δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} and Πˆ(2)−i = 2pˆ−i,2 = 2 min{v, pi2 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2)i . Thus the best response of Firm −i is
Strategy (2).
Comparison. Comparing the best responses of the two firms, it appears that, irre-
spective of the relative values of v and v, Firm −i will undercut pi3 − v and pi2 and
Firm i will lower its bundle price accordingly. In equilibrium, pˆ−i,2 = 0, and pˆi3 = v.
As a result Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.20
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2.18 and is therefore omitted for
brevity. This time Firm −i seeks to price below pi3 − v.
Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.21
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.19 and is therefore omitted for brevity.
This time, Firm −i seeks to price below pi3 − v.
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Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.22
We focus on the case where zi = (1, 0, 1) and z−i = (1, 1, 0). Due to symmetry, a
similar proof holds for the other case and we omit the details for brevity. To express
best responses, it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ be the smallest
price increment (e.g., cents). We consider in turn the best responses of Firm i and Firm
−i and then compare them.
Firm i. We first outline two possible strategies for Firm i in response to its competi-
tor’s price p−i,1 > 0 and p−i,2 ≥ 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm i’s profit, as
Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to each customer, i.e.,
∑
j xij1 = 2 or
∑
j xij3 = 2, which can
happen in one of the following two cases.
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij3 = 0. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, pi3 −
v− δ, p−i,1− δ}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v+ v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus,
pˆi1 = min{v, p−i,1 − δ} and Πˆ(2-a)i = 2pˆi1 = 2 min{v, p−i,1 − δ}.
(b)
∑
j xij1 = 0 and
∑
j xij3 = 2. According to (2.1), we need pi3 ≤ min{v +
v,min{pi1, p−i,1} + v, p−i,2 + v}. Firm i sets any pi1 > v to ensure that∑
j xij1 = 0. Thus, pˆi3 = min{v + v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v} and Πˆ(2-b)i = 2pˆi3 =
2 min{v + v, p−i,1 + v, p−i,2 + v}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-b)i and Πˆ(2-a)i < Πˆ(2-b)i . Thus Firm i’s best
response is Strategy (2-b), i.e., capturing both customers with the bundle.
Firm −i. We next outline three possible strategies for Firm −i in response to its
competitor’s prices pi1 > 0 and pi3 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote Firm −i’s
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profit, as Πˆ
(x)
−i .
1. To sell to no customer, i.e.,
∑
j,l x−i,jl = 0. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
−i = 0.
2. To sell one product to each customer, i.e.,
∑
l xi1l = 1 and
∑
l xi2l = 1, which can
happen in one of the following three cases.
(a)
∑
j x−i,j1 = 2 and
∑
j x−i,j2 = 0. According to (2.1), we need p−i,1 ≤
min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}. Firm −i sets any p−i,2 > v to ensure
that
∑
j x−i,j2 = 0. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ, pi3 − v − δ} and Πˆ(2-a)−i =
2pˆ−i,1 = 2 min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
(b)
∑
j x−i,j1 = 0 and
∑
j x−i,j2 = 2. According to (2.1), we need p−i,2 ≤
min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}. Firm −i sets any p−i,1 > v to ensure that∑
j x−i,j1 = 0. Thus, pˆ−i,2 = min{v,max{pi3−v−δ, 0}} and Πˆ(2-b)−i = 2pˆ−i,2 =
2 min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
3. To sell to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j x−ij1 = 2 and
∑
j x−ij2 = 2. Under PPC
valuations, we need p−i,1 ≤ min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}, and p−i,2 ≤
min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}. Thus, pˆ−i,1 = min{v, pi1 − δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}},
pˆ−i,2 = min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} and Πˆ(2)−i = 2pˆ−i,1 + 2pˆ−i,2 = 2 min{v, pi1 −
δ,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}+ 2 min{v,max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(3)i , Πˆ(2-a)i ≤ Πˆ(3)i , and Πˆ(2-b)i ≤ Πˆ(3)i . Thus
the only strategy that is not weakly dominated is Strategy (3).
Comparison. Comparing the best responses of the two firms, it appears that, irre-
spective of the relative values of v and v, Firm −i will undercut pi3 and Firm i will
lower its bundle price accordingly. In equilibrium, pˆ−i,1 = pˆ−i,2 = 0, and pˆi3 = v. As a
result Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
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Proof. Proof of Corollary 2.3
Firm i offers three different products, i.e., Product 1, Product 2, and the bundle,
but there are only two customer groups in the market. Firm i can capture at most two
customers, thus it has to strategically choose only two products to compete with Firm
−i. There are three possibilities.
1. Capture customers with Product 1 and Product 2.
• If z−i = (1, 0, 0), according to Proposition 2.12, Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0,
• If z−i = (0, 1, 0), according to Proposition 2.13, Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0,
• If z−i = (1, 1, 0), according to Lemma 2.1, Πˆi = 0 and Πˆ−i = 0.
2. Capture customers with Product 1 and the bundle.
• If z−i = (1, 0, 0), according to Proposition 2.18, Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0,
• If z−i = (0, 1, 0), according to Proposition 2.20, Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0,
• If z−i = (1, 1, 0), according to Proposition 2.22, Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
3. Capture customers with Product 2 and the bundle.
• If z−i = (1, 0, 0), according to Proposition 2.21, Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0,
• If z−i = (0, 1, 0), according to Proposition 2.19, Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0,
• If z−i = (1, 1, 0), according to Proposition 2.22, Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
Summarizing the three scenarios above, firms’ equilibrium profits are:
• If z−i = (1, 0, 0), Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0,
• If z−i = (0, 1, 0), Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0,
• If z−i = (1, 1, 0), Πˆi = 2v and Πˆ−i = 0.
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Proof. Proof of Proposition 2.23
Both firms offer the bundle, i.e., zi3 = z−i3 = 1. For the sake of simplicity we remove
the (z1, z2) arguments from the profit function expressions. To express best responses,
it is useful to think of price sets as discrete grids; let δ be the smallest price increment
(e.g., cents). We consider the best responses of Firm i.
Firm i. We first outline three possible strategies for Firm i in response to its com-
petitor’s prices, p−i,k > 0 for k = 1, 2 and p−i,3 > 0. For any strategy (x), we denote
Firm i’s profit, as Πˆ
(x)
i .
1. To sell to no customer. In that case, Πˆ
(1)
i = 0.
2. To sell one product to each customer, which can happen in one of the following
three cases:
(a)
∑
j xij1 = 2,
∑
j xij2 = 0, and
∑
j xij3 = 0. This strategy is feasible only if
zi1 = 1. According to (2.1), we need pi1 ≤ min{v, z−i1(p−i1−δ),max{min{pi3, p−i3}−
v− δ, 0}}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v+ v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus, pˆi1 =
min{v,max{p−i3− v− δ, 0}, z−i1(p−i1− δ)} and Πˆ(2-a)i = 2 min{v,max{p−i3−
v − δ, 0}, z−i1(p−i1 − δ)}.
(b)
∑
j xij2 = 2,
∑
j xij1 = 0, and
∑
j xij3 = 0. This strategy is feasible only if
zi2 = 1. According to (2.1), we need pi2 ≤ min{v,max{p−i3−v−δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2−
δ)}. Firm i sets any pi3 > v + v to ensure that
∑
j xij3 = 0. Thus, pˆi2 =
min{v,max{p−i3−v−δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2−δ)} and Πˆ(2-b)i = 2pˆi2 = 2 min{v,max{p−i3−
v − δ, 0}, z−i2(p−i2 − δ)}.
(c)
∑
j xij3 = 2,
∑
j xij1 = 0, and
∑
j xij2 = 0. According to (2.1), we need
pi3 ≤ min{v+ v, z−i1(v+ p−i1), z−i2(v+ p−i2), p−i3 − δ}. Thus, pˆi3 = min{v+
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v, z−i1(v + p−i1), z−i2(v + p−i2), p−i3 − δ} and Πˆ(2-c)i = 2pˆi3 = 2 min{v +
v, z−i1(v + p−i1), z−i2(v + p−i2), p−i3 − δ}.
3. To sell to both customers, i.e.,
∑
j xij1 = 2 and
∑
j xij2 = 2 and xij3 = 0. This
strategy is feasible only if zi1 = 1 and zi2 = 1. Under PPC valuations, we need
pi1 ≤ min{v, z−i,1(p−i,1 − δ),max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}, and pi2 ≤ min{v, z−i,2(p−i,2 −
δ),max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}}. Thus, pˆi1 = min{v, z−i,1(p−i,1 − δ),max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}},
pˆi2 = min{v, z−i,2(p−i,2 − δ),max{pi3 − v − δ, 0}} and Πˆ(3)i = 2pˆi1 + 2pˆi2 =
2 min{v, z−i,1(p−i,1−δ),max{pi3−v−δ, 0}}+2 min{v, z−i,2(p−i,2−δ), pi3−v−δ}.
Comparing profits, we obtain that Πˆ
(1)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-a)i , Πˆ(2-a)i ≤ Πˆ(2-c)i , Πˆ(2-b)i ≤ Πˆ(2-c)i , and
Πˆ
(2-c)
i ≤ Πˆ(2-d)i . Thus the only strategy that is not weakly dominated are the Strategies
(2-c) and (3), according to which Firm i sells the bundle, which requires pi3 < p−i,3
for i = 1, 2. Firms will engage in a price war on the bundle, undercutting each other’s
price. In equilibrium pˆi3 = pˆ−i,3 = 0. From 2.1 we conclude that in such a market,
xijk = 0 ∀i, j, k 6= 3. Therefore Πˆi = Πˆ−i = 0.
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Appendix B Construction of Mixed Strategy in Chapter 2
Pricing Games
A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is constructed by discretization of the action spaces
where a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist, i.e., when the best-response
correspondences do not intersect. We study the game where z1 = (0, 0, 1) and z2 =
(0, 1, 0) as an example.
Proposition B.1. Fix m and let n
.
= 2m. Suppose zi = (0, 0, 1) and z−i = (0, 1, 0),
and let a, b, and c as in (A.8) Suppose that Firm 1 randomizes on pik = a + k · (b−a)n
for k = 0, ..., n according to the following distribution:1
F
(n)
1 (p1k) =
(p1k − a)n+ b− a
(p1k + c− a)n+ b− a for 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1,
F
(n)
1 (p1n) = 1.
(B.1)
and that Firm 2 randomizes on p2k = c + k · (b−a)n for k = 0, ..., n according ot the
following distribution:
F
(n)
2 (p2k) = 2−
b
p2k − c+ a for 0 ≤ k ≤ n. (B.2)
Then Π1(p1k; z, F
(n)
2 ) = b ∀k = 0, ..., n and Π2(p2k; z, F (n)1 ) = c ∀k = 0, ..., n.
1Here we assume that the smallest discrete price increment, b−a
n
, is larger than the infinitesimal price deviation,
δ, in (A.8). Thus, the results hold for n > b−a
δ
.
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Proof. Proof of Proposition B.1 When z1 = (0, 0, 1) and z2 = (0, 1, 0), the discrete
randomization profile of the firms are indicated by two PMFs f
(n)
1 (p1k), and f
(n)
2 (p2k).
Similar to the derivation of (A.9), (A.10), (A.11), and (A.12) we obtain:
pi1
(
p1k; z1, z2, F
(n)
2
)
=

p1k
(∑n
l=k+1 f
(n)
2 (p2l) + 1
)
for k = 0, ..., n− 1,
p1n = b for k = n.
pi2
(
p2k; z1, z2, F
(n)
1
)
= p2k
(
n∑
l=k
f
(n)
1 (p1l)
)
for all k = 0, ..., n.
We next find f
(n)
1 (p1k), and f
(n)
2 (p2k) by construction.
Firm 1:
f
(n)
2 (p2k) =
n∑
l=k
f
(n)
2 (p2l)−
n∑
l=k+1
f
(n)
2 (p2l) =
pi1(p1k−1)
a+ (k−1)(b−a)n
− pi1(p1,k)
a+ (k)(b−a)n
, for k = 1, ..., n− 1,
f
(n)
2 (p2n) =
pi1(p1,n−1)
p1,n−1
− 1 = b− a
n(b− b−an )
,
f
(n)
2 (p20) = 1−
n∑
l=1
f
(n)
2 (p2l) = 2−
b
a
.
By the definition of mixed strategies, the profit functions have to be equal, i.e.,
pi1(p1k) = pi1(p1k−1) = pi1(p1n) = b.
As a result, we obtain the following formulation for f
(n)
2 (p2k)
f
(n)
2 (p2k) =
b(b− a)
n(p2k − c+ a)(p2,k − c+ a− b−an )
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
f
(n)
2 (p20) = 1−
n∑
l=1
f
(n)
2 (p2k) = 2−
b
a
.
149
And the discrete CDF corresponding to f
(n)
2 (p2k) is
F
(n)
2 (p2k) = 2−
b
p2k − c+ a for 0 ≤ k ≤ n.
Firm 2:
f
(n)
1 (p1k) =
n∑
l=k
f
(n)
1 (p1k)−
n∑
l=k+1
f
(n)
1 (p1k) =
pi2(p2k)
c+ (k)(b−a)n
− pi2(p2k+1)
c+ (k+1)(b−a)n
, for k = 0, ..., n− 1,
f
(n)
1 (p1n) = 1−
n−1∑
l=0
f
(n)
1 (p1l).
By definition of a mixed strategy, all profit functions have to be equal:
pi2(p2k) = pi2(p2k+1) = pi2(p20) = p20
n∑
l=0
f
(n)
1 (p1l) = p20 · 1 = c.
Hence, we obtain
f
(n)
1 (p1k) =
c(b− a)
n(p1k + c− a)(p1k + c− a+ b−an )
for 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1,
f
(n)
1 (p1n) = 1−
n−1∑
k=0
f
(n)
1 (p1k) =
c
c+ b− a k = n.
And the discrete CDF corresponding to f
(n)
1 (p1k) is
F
(n)
1 (p1k) =
(p1k − a)n+ b− a
(p1k + c− a)n+ b− a for 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1,
F
(n)
1 (p1n) = 1.
Corollary B.1. The discrete CDFs proposed in Proposition B.1 describe a unique dis-
crete mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the game in (A.8) with n+1 equally-distanced
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price points.
Proof. Proof of Corollary B.1 First, we show that every discrete price outside the
strategy support gives strictly less profit than the mixed strategy profits:
Given F
(n)
2 (p2k), ∀p2k ∈ [c, c+ b− a],
• If p1k < a, Firm 1 captures both customers. Thus pi1(p1k) = 2p1k < 2a. However,
Firm 1’s profit under the mixed strategy is b = 2a.
• If p1k > b
– When v > 3v, Firm 1 does not capture any customer. Thus pi1(p1k) = 0 and
strictly less than Firm 1’s profit under the mixed strategy.
– When 2v ≤ v ≤ 3v, p1k = b+ k b−an and pi1(p1k) = p1k(1− F1(k − 1)). We can
prove that pi1(p1k) < b by mathematical induction.
1. For k = 1, p11(1− F (0)) < b,
2. For k ≥ 1, pi1(p1,k+1) < pi1(p1k).
Given F
(n)
1 (p1k), ∀p1k ∈ [a, b],
• If p2k < c,
– When 3v < v
∗ For a− c ≤ p2k < c, pi2(p2k) = p2k < c.
∗ For 0 ≤ p2k < a− c, p2k = a− c− k b−an and pi2(p2k) = p2k(2− F1(n− k)).
We can prove that pi2(p2k) < c by mathematical induction.
1. For k = 1, p21(2− F (n− 1)) < c,
2. For k ≥ 1, pi2(p2,k+1) < pi2(p2k).
– When 2v ≤ v ≤ 3v,
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∗ For 0 ≤ p2k < c, p2k = c− k b−an and pi2(p2k) = p2k(2−F1(n− k)). We can
prove that pi2(p2k) < c by mathematical induction.
1. For k = 1, p21(2− F (n− 1)) < c,
2. For k ≥ 1, pi2(p2,k+1) < pi2(p2k).
• If p2k > d, Firm 1 captures no customers. Thus pi2(p2k) = 0 and strictly less than
Firm 2’s profit under the mixed strategy.
We conclude that F
(n)
1 and F
(n)
2 identify a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, since the
profit for each firm is constant over the strategy support of that firm (Proposition B.1),
and its strictly less outside the strategy support. Moreover, in Proposition B.1 we
arrived at a unique discrete CDF with n + 1 equally distanced price points, thus the
discrete mixed strategy is unique.
Next, we use Gm as a refinement of the discretization grid over a continuous strategy
space [0, 1].2
Definition B.1. The m th refinement grid, Gm, is of the form Gm = {x|x = k2m , 0 ≤
k ≤ 2m} for m ≥ 0.
Corollary B.2. Each grid Gm contains all the grids Gl for 0 ≤ l ≤ m. In other words,
as m grows larger, the previous discrete points on the grid are preserved.
Definition B.2. For any p ∈ [α, β] and for any m, let pm = α + (β − α)km2m where
km = arg min{k|α+ (β − α) k2m ≥ p}
Next, we show that the limiting set of the discrete grid Gn is dense.
2Please note that any interval can be normalized to [0, 1], thus the results we obtain here can be extended to any
continuous interval.
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Lemma B.1.
∀p ∈ [0, 1], and ∀γ > 0,∃N such that ∀m ≥ N, 0 ≤ pm − p < γ.
Proof. Proof of Lemma B.1 We have that 0 ≤ pm − p according to the definition of
pm. Also according to the same definition pm − p ≤ 12m thus ∀m > − log2 γ, we obtain
pm − p < γ.
Lemma B.2. ∀ > 0, and ∀p ∈ [a, b],∃N : ∀m > N, |F (2m)1 (pm)− F ∗1 (p)| <  in which
F ∗1 (p) =
p−a
p+c−a and F
(n)
1 is defined in (B.1).
Proof. Proof of Lemma B.2 For any  we set γ < c2 and N > log
2(b−a)
c
2 . We choose the
largest N such that 0 ≤ pm − p < γ ∀m > N , which is guaranteed to exist by Lemma
B.1, and also N > log
2(b−a)
c
2 . Therefore, ∀m > N ,
|F (2m)1 (pm)− F ∗1 (p)| =
∣∣∣∣ (pm − a)2m + b− a(pm + c− a)2m + b− a − p− ap+ c− a
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ c(pm − p) + c
(b−a)
2m
(pm − a+ c+ b−a2m )(p+ c− a)
∣∣∣∣∣
<
∣∣∣∣ c(pm − p)(p+ c− a)2
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ c(b− a)2m(p+ c− a)2
∣∣∣∣ < cγc2 + c(b− a)2mc2 = γc + b− a2mc < ,
where the first inequality results from the fact that 0 ≤ pm − p < γ and 0 < (p + c −
a) < (pm + c − a) + b−a2m and the second inequality follows from 0 ≤ pm − p < γ and
0 < c ≤ p+ c− a, ∀p ≥ a.
Lemma B.3. ∀ > 0 and ∀p ∈ [c, c+ b− a), ∃N : ∀m > N, |F (2m)2 (pm)− F ∗2 (p)| <  in
which F ∗2 (p) = 2− bp+a−c is defined in (B.2).
Proof. Proof of Lemma B.3 For any  we set γ < a
2
2b and N > log
2b(b−a)
a2
2 . We choose the
largest N such that 0 ≤ pm − p < γ ∀m > N , which is guaranteed to exist by Lemma
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B.1, and also N > log
2b(b−a)
a2
2 . Therefore, ∀m > N ,
|F (2m)2 (pm)− F ∗2 (p)| =
∣∣∣∣2− bpm − c+ a −
(
2− b
p− c+ a
)∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ pm − p(pm − c+ a)(p− c+ a)
∣∣∣∣
<
∣∣∣∣ γ(p− c+ a)2
∣∣∣∣ < γa2 < .
Where, the first inequality results from the fact that 0 ≤ pm−p < γ and 0 < (p+a−c) ≤
(pm + a− c) and the second inequality follows from 0 < a ≤ p− c+ a, ∀p ≥ c.
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Appendix C Examples
Below we present through a few examples, how different chapters of this dissertation
pertain to different industries and their bundling practices.
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Desktop Computers Applicable Applicable Applicable
• Desktop computers are sold as mixed-bundles. All the computer parts consisting
of the main unit, display, input devices, and the printer can be sold separately, or
as a bundle.
• Both Cournot and Bertrand models are applicable to this industry. Companies
such as HP and Dell offer the full spectrum of the mixed-bundle, while companies
such as LG and Samsung focus only on displays, while Epson focuses only on
printers.
• The manufacturers can choose different sizes of storage and processing power to
customize the design of the bundle.
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Laptops Not applicable Applicable Applicable
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• Laptop manufacturers always offer pure bundles of computer parts. The best
model to capture their competition is a Cournot oligopoly model with identical
firms.
• Manufacturers can choose different sizes of storage and processing power to cus-
tomize the design of the bundle.
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Fast food combo meals Applicable Applicable Applicable
• Most fast food chains often offer mixed bundles of sandwiches and soft drinks,
which is very close to the two-product bundles presented in this thesis.
• The competition among the chains can be modeled using both Bertrand and
Cournot frameworks. However, the fast food industry is far from a duopoly and
the oligopolistic approach is more applicable.
• Since most customers only consume one unit of the sandwich and one unit of the
coke, the design of the bundle is only applicable for family-size meals.
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Gift Baskets Not applicable Applicable Applicable
• Gift basket companies offer an assortment of food and gifts that are priced based
on quantity.
• Cournot framework is more applicable to this industry, where there is a separate
oligopolistic market for each component inside the bundle.
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• Gift basket companies practice several designs to meet the demand of a multitude
of customer segments.
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Telecom Bundles Not applicable Applicable Applicable
• Due to high entry costs, telecom is often an oligopoly with very few firms.
• Different offerings are usually prices based on the quantity, e.g. number of minutes,
text messages, or size of the data plan.
• Design of multiple bundles with different sizes of date, text, and call is very common
among telecom firms.
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Amazon Prime Membership Applicable Not applicable Not applicable
• Amazon Prime offers multiple services including shipping, streaming, reading and
other shopping services. It is the only firm that bundles this large set a services in
a single bundle.
• Amazon prime faces competition in each of the its component markets. For ex-
ample, in online retail Ebay is a competitor, or in streaming services Netflix and
Spotify are competitors. This setting is captured in the Bertrand model (Chapter
2)
• Amazon Prime bundle only consists of services and thus the bundle proportion
design question is not applicable.
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Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Campus Photo Studio Not applicable Not applicable Applicable
• The UCLA photo studio that offers graduation portrait services is a monopoly.
• None of the Bertrand and Cournot models are applicable to this monopolistic
setting.
• They offer multiple bundles with different designs (e.g. the number and size of
printed copies and files vary across bundles, or some bundles contain a frame and
a tassel).
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